Asia Times: Manila mismanagement: a reopening for Washington


	June 21, 2000	atimes.com

Southeast Asia

Manila mismanagement: a reopening for Washington
STRATFOR.COM
Global Intelligence Update
June 20, 2000

Summary

In a move designed to undercut conservative power, the Iranian parliament, dominated by reform politicians, has filed a motion to restrict security and military personnel from policing university campuses. The motion, originally introduced in the wake of last year's bloody riots, must still receive approval from the conservative Guardian Council. By forcing the council to take the hard-line position, the parliament abandons the tenuous truce between the two camps that ended last year's bloody riots. This hot-button issue presages institutional gridlock, which could once again lead to civilian frustration - and violence in the streets.

Analysis

The Philippine government June 19 reiterated a warning to foreign governments not to give in to ransom demands of the Abu Sayyaf, a group that has been holding 21 hostages taken from a Malaysian island in April. The statement followed the Malaysian foreign minister's suggestion that paying a ransom may be a viable option. In addition, Manila threatens to further strain relations with Kuala Lumpur by again raising the Philippines' claim of sovereignty over the Malaysian state of Sabah.

The government in Manila is increasingly isolating the Philippines from its Asian neighbors. It is cultivating a tough image to shift the blame and attention away from its inability to resolve domestic problems. In the short term, such tensions will further complicate negotiations for the release of the hostages. In the longer term, the isolation may allow the United States to be drawn back into the Philippines.

Since it began almost two months ago, Manila and Kuala Lumpur have been split as to how to resolve the hostage situation in the southern Philippines. Malaysia has expressed concern at the apparent lack of progress in bringing the crisis to an end.

The Philippine government refuses even to consider ransom as an option. In contrast, while on a visit to the Philippines June 15 Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar said, ''in exceptional circumstances like this there would have to be exceptional ways of dealing with such matters.''

The Philippine government faces mounting international criticism and reports that both Malaysia and Germany are considering payment for the hostages' release. In order to mitigate negative domestic press as well, Manila has begun shifting blame for its inability thus far to solve the difficult Abu Sayyaf problem.

For example, Philippine Senator Rodolfo Biazon, chairman of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, suggested that a Malaysian-based crime group was responsible for the kidnapping in Sipadan, rather than the Abu Sayyaf, according to ABS-CBN News. Biazon implied that this might be a reason behind Kuala Lumpur's efforts to ''meddle'' in the hostage situation.

In addition, Philippine Immigration Commissioner Rufus Rodriguez on June 13 called for the expulsion of the Malaysian ambassador to the Philippines for his interfering in the hostage negotiations by meeting with the Abu Sayyaf in May, according to the Straits Times. Rodriguez's recommendation echoed similar calls by Philippine senators in May.

The heightened tensions between Manila and Kuala Lumpur are symptomatic of the Philippine government's reactionary tactics to rebuild popular support and cover for its inability to solve their problems. President Joseph Estrada's administration has suffered a loss of popular support amid continuing economic malaise, an escalation of fighting against separatists in the south and accusations of graft and corruption.

The tensions have also spilled over to an older, more deep-seated issue. Calls for a review of the Philippine's position on the issue of the state of Sabah, claimed by both nations, have again arisen in the Philippine Senate.

Raising the issue of Sabah further distracts from the domestic issues and potentially plays to nationalism. In addition, the Muslim separatist struggle in the Philippines traces its roots back to the dispute over Sabah, claiming Philippine military officers had several Muslim soldiers executed for refusing to invade Sabah in the 1960s.

In response to the increasing crises, the government has cultivated Estrada's former tough guy movie image. In dealing with the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Estrada has established a June 30 deadline for peace talks, while refusing to let up on the military advance against the rebels. A similar stance has been taken toward the Abu Sayyaf, with the military launching attacks on members of the group holding Philippine hostages taken in a separate incident.

The Philippines' problems are not isolated to Malaysia. Both Malaysia and Indonesia have been tagged as training and supporting bases for Philippine Muslim separatists - spreading responsibility away from the Philippine government.

Manila is also engaged in several economic disputes. A confrontation over airline access between the Philippines and Taiwan, triggered by Manila's moves to protect Philippine Airlines, expanded recently with Taipei banning new Filipino workers from coming to Taiwan. Manila is also locked in a trade dispute with Canberra over fruits and cattle. These issues as well have nationalistic undertones.

In the short term, the beleaguered Philippine government's attempts to bolster public support while struggling with its domestic problems will only increase stress with Malaysia and other neighbors. This could add further difficulties to the hostage situation, as impatient foreign governments begin independently entering negotiations for the hostages' release. It also becomes an exploitable issue for the Abu Sayyaf, who drew attention to the status of Sabah in calling for its return to the Philippines as part of a hostage settlement.

In the long run, the Philippines threatens to isolate itself from its Asian neighbors. Trade and territorial disputes, fueled by nationalistic undertones, will further weaken regional ties. Already Manila's domestic problems are undermining its regional interactions. The Philippine head for the United Nations peacekeeping force in East Timor is likely to be replaced by a Thai, as several hundred Philippine soldiers withdrew from the operation to deal with the fighting in the southern Philippines; the Philippine commander is being promoted to tackle problems at home.

The heightened isolation may lead to increased US involvement in the Philippines. Unable to defend itself externally and internally, Manila may seek a return, albeit a slow and measured one, for US military involvement. With US relations waning with China, and the potential movement of the Indian navy into the South China Sea, the United States will find a rekindled relationship with the Philippines to be in their mutual strategic interest.

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