Asia Times: Moslem axis presents third force in Indonesia



	August 13, 1999	atimes.com

Southeast Asia

Moslem axis presents third force in Indonesia
STRATFOR.COM
Global Intelligence Update
August 12, 1999

Summary:

The final results of Indonesia's June 7 general election have once again been thrown into confusion with the National Election Committee (PPI) failing to come to a conclusion on the number of seats allowed to parties that participated in a vote-sharing agreement under the national election rules. The question has arisen over the formation of a "central axis" of Indonesian Moslem parties, which together may account for more seats than either the Indonesian Democratic Struggle party (PDI-P) or the ruling Golkar party in the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR). Debate within this central axis over whom to support as the next president of Indonesia has changed the face of Indonesia's presidential race. The central axis now becomes either a major swing vote between Megawati Sukarnoputri's PDI-P and BJ Habibie's Golkar, or becomes a third alternative to the leading parties. Interestingly, in either case the equation seems to shift in favor of Habibie.

Analysis:

The Indonesian National Election Committee (PPI) failed to meet its self-imposed August 10 deadline for the completion of the distribution of seats in the House of Representatives (DPR) after being unable to resolve differences over how to allocate seats among parties that had signed a stembus akoord (Vote-sharing agreement). Within the 48 political parties that participated in the June 7 general elections, two groups have emerged that have made vote-sharing agreements. One is made up of Indonesian Democrats Alliance Party (PADI), the Love the Nation Democratic Party (PDKB) and the Unity in Diversity Party (PBI). The other agreement was made among Moslem parties, and the United Development Party (PPP), the Crescent and Star Party (PBB), the Justice Party (PK), the People's Awakening Party (PKU), the Nahdlatul Umat Party (PNU), the Indonesian United Islam Party 1905 (PSII-1905), the Moslem Peoples' Party (PUI) and the Masyumi Party.

Questions about the distribution of votes among these parties has led to confusion, as there are varying interpretations of the election laws set up governing the vote-sharing accords. While these parties undeniably form a voting bloc based on their individually won seats, it is possible that these eight parties may claim as many as 40 additional seats over what they already have garnered individually. This would occur if the PPI allowed the parties to amalgamate their votes in districts where they came in second, third, or on down the list. In close vote counts, two plus three can frequently unseat one.

In addition, these parties have joined with the National Mandate Party (PAN), and the National Awakening Party (PKB) to form the "central axis," a Moslem bloc to balance the tensions between Megawati Sukarnoputri's PDI-P and Indonesian President BJ Habibie's Golkar party. Prior to taking into account the sharing of votes among these parties, the preliminary seat allocation for the DPR gives 154 seats to PDI-P, 120 seats to Golkar, and 168 to the central axis.

The formation of the central axis creates a new dimension to the presidential race in Indonesia. While there were just two main forces, Golkar and PDI-P, with the Moslem vote split as to which candidate to side with, there is now a major third force which can act either as a massive swing vote, or front its own alternative candidate. Rather than being a showdown between Habibie, who is seen as a representation of the old system of Indonesian politics, and Megawati, a nationalist reformer, there is now an important religious wildcard. The central axis, however, has yet to completely coalesce, or to decide its position for the presidential election.

While Abdurrahman Wahid's PKB is a part of the central axis, it has also formed an alliance with Megawati's PDI-P, presenting it with split allegiances. While Wahid has continually supported Megawati for President, though admitting PKB may not accept her, he has also said he is willing to run for president of Indonesia. On August 8, Wahid responded positively to an earlier suggestion by political rival Amien Rais of PAN that Wahid would be a good candidate for the central axis to support. Wahid said, "I am willing to be the candidate for religious reasons," adding, "In political life we have to rely on the teachings of Islam. That's what I do." Wahid's acceptance of a run for the presidency has caused confusion within the PKB, which has been working with PDI-P. Local PKB leaders are trying to decide whether to back Megawati or Wahid. As well, within the central axis there are differing views. PPP Deputy Chairman Karmani said that Wahid's nomination was jeopardized by his continuing support of Megawati. And PKB's participation in the central axis was also questioned over its support of PDI-P.

As the central axis works to bring itself together and focus its unified goals, it will be faced with three options. It may back Habibie, Megawati, or front a third candidate. Backing Habibie means being tied to the old regime of former Indonesian President Suharto. However, PBB General Chairman Yusril Ihza Mahendra has said, "We are in need of a predominant government, but, we also have to develop gradually a strong opposition." Yusril's position suggests an acceptance of the built-in stability of the Habibie-Golkar government as a necessary transitional step for Indonesia. Yusril has said that Golkar has already begun lobbying the Moslem parties for support, offering a coalition cabinet made up of representatives of several parties. Yusril said, "PDI-Struggle should start intensive lobbying like Golkar. I have never heard Mega[wati] making such an offer. What did Megawati offer?" However, countering Yusril's mild statements on Golkar, PK President Nur Mahmudi Ismail said, "If Habibie will be elected, there will be a psychological impact. Golkar, which signifies the KKN (corruption, collusion, nepotism), has managed to attract support from the Islam parties. This would imply that millions of KKN practitioners will be growing a sense of security."

While supporting Habibie may mean a continuation of the status quo in Indonesia, supporting Megawati - a woman - has been opposed by many Moslems as being against the teachings of Islam. While this view has been pronounced incorrect by several Moslem scholars in Indonesia, Moslem support for Megawati has also lagged over earlier accusations that she was not actually a Moslem. However, Megawati has received nearly 35 percent of the popular vote, and a Habibie win will likely trigger a social outcry leading to unrest. Megawati is also favored by the international community as a democratic reformer for Indonesia.

The third possibility for the central axis is to front its own candidate. This suggestion has raised questions among axis members about the role of the axis. One faction feels that the central axis was formed to provide a stabilizing mediator in the heated race between Megawati and Habibie. The other faction feels that the central axis should instead provide an alternative to Habibie and Megawati, someone who could balance all of Indonesia's various groups. The suggestion of Wahid as a possibly axis candidate, then, fills this second role. Wahid has long been a supporter of a form of reconciliation government of elites from all parts of Indonesia's political and religious spectrum. Wahid has managed to have good relations simultaneously with Megawati, Habibie, the Moslems and Indonesian Armed Forces commander General Wiranto.

A Wahid candidacy, however, raises a new problem, a three-way deadlock. The central axis holds 34 percent of the DPR, PDI-P has 31 percent and Golkar has 24 percent, with 8 percent going to the military. However, it is not in the DPR but in the Peoples' Constituent Assembly (MPR) that the presidential election is carried out. The MPR combines the 500 DPR members with an additional 200 regional and interest group appointees. The 700-member MPR is not bound by the general election to translate the popular vote into the choice of the next president. The central axis, PDI-P, and Golkar are all currently guaranteed less than 25 percent of the MPR seats. However, the appointment process to choose the additional 200 members will raise these figures. Although to what level is the question. Traditionally, Golkar has managed to maintain parliamentary control of the outlying and troubled regions of Indonesia, and many of the special interest groups gaining seats in the MPR are also closely tied to the old regime and Golkar.

The outcome of the presidential election in the MPR, then, may well turn into a three-party race, pitting the old regime against the democratic opposition against the Moslems. Much is dependent upon the maintenance of the central axis, as well as its decision as to which candidate to back. While the central axis has the ability to support one of the two main candidates, it is unlikely that either Habibie or Megawati would bow to the axis and throw their support behind it. Despite Wahid's potential as a compromise presidential candidate for Indonesia, much rests on his health. Wahid, who is nearly blind, is currently in the United States for eye surgery and has often said that he will not take a political office if his eyesight does not improve. Other possible Moslem candidates, such as Amien Rais, are weaker potential candidates than Wahid.

Despite his ties to the old regime, Habibie offers stability for a transitional government, as demonstrated by his ability to hold Indonesia together following the resignation of Suharto and the June elections. A Moslem backing of Habibie, and Golkar as well, could bring the military back into the alliance. The military has been wary of supporting Habibie's candidacy thus far, as it will be responsible for internal stability following the presidential election, and a Habibie win is likely to trigger social unrest. However, the moderating force of the Moslems could offer the stability necessary to keep the peace, allowing the support of Wiranto and the army. Habibie's offer of a coalition or reconciliation cabinet may also ease the transition, offering Golkar experience with Moslem and even opposition oversight from within.

The central axis has significantly altered the playing field in the November presidential elections in the MPR. If it runs a candidate in opposition to Golkar and PDI-P, it may hand the election to Golkar by virtue of the additional 200 MPR seats open to Golkar manipulation. And when given the choice between backing Megawati or Habibie, the choice appears to be for Habibie. All this falls apart if the bloc splits up and divides support between Golkar and PDI-P. But if the central axis remains united, however unlikely it may have seemed in the past, it is becoming increasingly possible for a Habibie victory without a subsequent violent civil uprising. The final announcement of the distribution of seats in the DPR by the PPI will not only bring to rest questions about Indonesia's complicated election laws, but may also significantly impact the upcoming presidential race.

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