
| Southeast Asia
OPINION: Formidable threats face democratic Indonesia By Kevin McGahan*
On June 7, Indonesia will hold its first democratic elections in more thanfour decades. The event marks a definitive watershed in Indonesia'sdifficult transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. But itshistorical importance should not overshadow the likelihood that theelections will produce a weak coalition government; a government illprepared to address the complex economic, social and political tensions ofthe country's thousands of islands.
In the absence of strong policy leadership,desperately needed economic reforms are likely to be delayed orcompromised, undermining the government's ability to launch a sustainedeconomic recovery. A post-election regime that fails to improve the livesof its citizens will lose legitimacy. Ethnic, religious, and separatistviolence would continue to rock the country. As a result, Indonesia'snascent democracy and territorial integrity would be in jeopardy.
Fractionalized government is almost assured. After former presidentSuharto's resignation amid widespread protests last year, Indonesia beganto reform its political process. In sharp contrast to the three partiesofficially sanctioned to contest elections in the past, 48 parties are nowcompeting for representation in the 500-seat parliament. With this numberof candidates, no single party will win an outright majority of the seats.
Although completely discredited among the citizenry, the ruling Golkarparty could emerge as a dominant faction in the new government. In thatevent, the much-maligned President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie could stay onas president.
How would he be able to hold on? Golkar and Habibie maintain considerableadvantages over their competitors. First, after monopolizing the politicalsystem for decades, Golkar is deeply entrenched throughout the vastarchipelago. In fact, Golkar remains largely popular in many rural areas.Second, Golkar has a wealth of resources to sway voters - it is certainlynot above buying votes outright. Last, Golkar represents the status quo,which some members of the elite support. Many wealthy entrepreneursquietlyfavor Golkar because they feel that it will continue with the corruptpolicies under which they have flourished.
More importantly, the presidential process is stacked in Habibie's favor.In November, the 700-seat People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) will electthe president and vice-president, each to a five-year term. The MPRincludes all 500 members of parliament, and 200 members appointed by thepresident. Much to the chagrin of democratic activists, the military hasretained 38 seats in the parliament. Thus, Habibie is nearly assured 238votes from the outset and has a head start on securing the presidency.
Acknowledging these strengths, the three main opposition parties - MegawatiSukarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-Perjuangan),AmienRais's National Mandate Party (PAN), and Abdurrahman Wahid's NationalAwakening Party (PKB) - have formed a pact. Although each party will stillrun separately in the general elections, this alliance has boosted theirleverage against Habibie. According to recent polls, the most popularcandidate in the country is Megawati, the daughter of founding presidentSukarno. Not surprisingly, she holds wide name recognition and has thesupport of retired military officials who still cherish her father.Megawati's followers also include the urban poor, middle-classChinese-Indonesians, and moderate Muslims.
Even if the opposition defeats the government at the polls, a reform-ledcoalition would be weak. Although Megawati, Rais, and Wahid have paid lipservice to forming a coalition with each other in the past, their egos anddisparate views have prevented them from coming together until recently.Wahid and Megawati are close friends, but Rais is the outsider. Both Wahidand Rais are Islamic leaders, but they differ on their interpretations ofIslam and its importance in political life. Also, unlike Megawati, Raisfavors more decentralized power for the provinces - including possibleindependence for East Timor - and less military involvement in Indonesianpolitics.
With such divergent positions on critical issues, their government willlikely fail to provide strong political leadership. Separatist movementsmay use the divisiveness to further their causes. In August, EastTimorese are scheduled to vote on an autonomy proposal that offers greatercontrol to local officials but still confers security powers to theIndonesian army. The vote is expected to fail, paving the way forindependence. An Indonesian government in disarray will surely not managethe secession process well. More importantly, East Timorese independencecould embolden other separatist movements - namely those in Aceh and IrianJaya - to leave the Indonesian state.
Policy leadership could prove to be equally problematic. Outside of a fewnebulous statements about embracing IMF-prescribed policies, none of themajor candidates have offered any real policy options for nursing theeconomy back to health. But without reform in the corporate, financial,andbanking sectors, the economy will continue to suffer.
The next few months in Indonesia will be times of high anxiety. Much tohiscredit, President Habibie has boldly fulfilled his commitment to keepIndonesia on its transition to democracy. But elections are no panacea forpolitical instability and a weak coalition is the most likely outcome. Theeconomic crisis that triggered the unrest that resulted in the ouster ofSuharto will fester. Political destabilization may follow.
*Kevin McGahan is Lead Country Analyst at Marvin Zonis + Associates, Inc.,an international political risk consulting firm.
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