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The Koreas
PYONGYANG WATCH Rogue and superpower: best buddies?
By Aidan Foster-Carter
In the last months of his life, the late Kim Il-sung startled a group of foreign guests by talking almost wistfully of how he'd always wanted to go to America: just for "fishing and hunting, to make friends".
Weeks later, America nearly came hunting for him. It's now a matter of record that the US and North Korea came close to war in June 1994, after Pyongyang's removal of fuel rods - enabling plutonium to be siphoned off - at its suspect Yongbyon site had escalated tensions over its nuclear program.
Back then, Clinton administration policy on North Korea was driven by so-called "NPT hawks". After Iraq had fooled UN inspectors, the plan was to crack down hard on the next nuclear miscreant. In vain did State Department specialists plead that a second Korean war really wasn't a great idea. But Jimmy Carter saved the day, meeting Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang, and both sides backed off from a showdown.
Though - or because? - the "Great Leader" died a month later, talking continued. In October the Geneva Agreed Framework defused the nuclear crisis; few would claim it is yet definitively resolved. This in turn ushered in wider ties between these two foes, who before had hardly met except in combat.
Though tentative at first and underscored by mutual mistrust, over the past six years this has developed into a unique and highly anomalous relationship between the world's sole superpower and arguably its most egregious rogue state (a term Washington recently dropped in favor of "states of concern").
Contrast the US's tough treatment of the likes of Cuba, Iraq and Libya with its kindness to Kim Jong-il. While sanctions against Pyongyang weren't formally lifted until this year (and some remain), the famine from 1995 on prompted ever larger US donations via the UN's World Food Program - to the point where North Korea has become Asia's biggest recipient of US food aid. Despite official denials, the timing of specific donations makes it clear that these were political carrots to encourage amenability.
Such generosity didn't stop the "Dear Leader" setting new cats among pigeons, by firing an unexpectedly big missile across Japan in August 1998. Critics - notably a few vocal Republicans in the US Congress - cry appeasement, and accuse Clinton of giving endlessly to North Korea while getting nothing real back. Even in one minor exception, the little-known ongoing cooperation to return remains of Americans missing in action, the grisly truth is that it's often not clear who or what these bones are - but the US pays up. But the hawks have been isolated since Kim Dae-jung threw Seoul's weight firmly behind a "sunshine" approach, and its seeming vindication in the North-South summit and subsequent inter-Korean progress.
Now the odd friendship may get even warmer, in the wake of last week's visit to Washington by North Korea's de facto No 2, Vice Marshal Cho Myong-rok. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright is expected to head for Pyongyang soon, and Clinton himself may make the trip. There is talk of opening liaison offices - as already mentioned in the Agreed Framework - but in practice North Korea hadn't seemed keen.
All this bonhomie is fine and dandy. Yet you don't have to be a hawk to wonder if Kim Jong-il's smile diplomacy means North Korea is actually giving any ground. Despite a long but vague joint statement, Marshal Cho left with no concrete progress on any of the many substantive issues that still divide the two countries.
Thus North Korea had been expected to get itself off the US list of states deemed to sponsor terrorism, by extraditing the ageing Japanese Red Army terrorists who hijacked a plane to Pyongyang 30 years ago and have been there ever since. But no deal was done. Perhaps Kim Jong-il is saving this for his next talks with Japan on October 30, as a sop to Tokyo's demands to come clean on abduction issues.
But for Washington, the big bone to pick remains missiles. An alleged North Korean threat to the US mainland by 2005 is the key driver of the push for National Missile Defense which looms large in the US presidential race. The US also has proliferation concerns: customers include Iran, Syria, Libya and Pakistan. Pyongyang has brazenly demanded US$1 billion per year as its price to halt missile exports.
In that context, a solid deal to curb North Korea's missiles could help Al Gore reach the White House. But conversely, more mere meeting and greeting with no movement on missiles or other concerns - did anyone whisper human rights? - could backfire and benefit Bush. The prospect of a less friendly US administration - but then again, don't George W and Kim Jong-il have something in common? - may have prompted Cho's trip, after North Korea had spent a year stalling on sending a top-level figure to reciprocate William Perry's Pyongyang visit back in May 1999. When Albright - let alone Clinton - meets Kim Jong-il, it will be time to stop hailing formal breakthroughs and ask: But where's the beef?
(Special to Asia Times Online)
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