Asia Times: Why the US has invented North Korea



	March 4, 2000	atimes.com

The Koreas

If the DPRK didn't exist, it would be necessary to invent it The North Korean threat and US security policy
When US policymakers and congressmen discuss the major security threats facing the United States, they inevitably cite North Korea. Certainly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) makes a convenient enemy. Its belligerent rhetoric, extreme xenophobia, and bizarre Orwellian propaganda seem to justify the characterizations of the "isolated Stalinist state" that accompany any newspaper article on North Korea. Such easy characterizations, while convenient fodder for politicians pushing certain weapons systems or defense spending priorities, are a poor substitute for an informed, dispassionate debate over the degree to which North Korea actually has either the capacity or the intent to truly threaten US interests.

Designating threats to national security must follow the determination of a country's national interests. In the period shortly following World War II, Korea was not considered a vital area of interest by US policymakers. Both Douglas MacArthur and, more famously, Dean Acheson pointedly left Korea out of their definitions of the US security perimeter. The effect of Acheson's speech on North Korea's decision to invade is still debated by historians whose primary concern is assigning blame for the outbreak of the Korean War.

The change in this outlook resulted not from a realization of Korea's importance, but by a revised estimate of US security interests by the National Security Council, in a document known as NSC-68. NSC-68 posited a Manichean world view that considered a victory for communism anywhere a victory for communism everywhere. The problem, however, was that the American public in 1950 was not eager so soon after victory in World War II to return to the high levels of military expenditure that would be needed to implement this policy. The DPRK attack, invariably described in the Western press as unprovoked and Soviet-directed, provided the justification policy-makers were seeking. As Paul Nitze, the primary author of NSC-68, put it, "Korea came along and saved us."

Although the Korean War firmly identified South Korea (ROK) as a US ally, subsequent US administrations were not always convinced of the continuation of that alliance. Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, favored withdrawing troops from South Korea as part of their plan for improving relations with China. Reversal of their decision resulted not because of a DPRK threat, but rather a ROK one - specifically, that South Korea would seek to develop its own nuclear weapons capacity.

When Jimmy Carter sought to complete the Nixon-Kissinger withdrawal program, he ran into stiff opposition both from the US military and from some of his own advisors. Carter's plan had been predicated on the belief that South Korea was capable of defending itself even without the presence of US forces. Opponents of withdrawal, however, made much use of new intelligence estimates that showed the DPRK threat to be greater than previously thought. One State Department official referred to the new estimates as a "smoking gun".

The use of revised intelligence estimates of DPRK capabilities to push a certain policy agenda continues to this day. A more recent example is the estimate of the DPRK's long-range missile capabilities contained in the Rumsfield Commission report, and heavily exploited by the Cox Committee in the US Congress. Supporters of building a national missile defense system routinely and matter-of-factly cite the DPRK's imminent ability to launch ICBMs laden with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads onto US soil. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright consistently points to North Korea when trying to persuade the Russians to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty.

The main evidence for these fears is the DPRK's launch in August 1998 of what was apparently a three-stage rocket. Much was made of the fact that the rocket landed in the Pacific Ocean on the far side of Japan. Press reports, however, contained precious little analysis of how effective the test really was. The third stage failed in its stated design to place a satellite into orbit. Despite this, North Korea has yet to attempt another missile test, due either to political considerations or to lack of resources.

The DPRK's missile capability is also limited in terms of accuracy and payload. The quickest way to increase the range of missiles is to decrease their payloads, as Saddam Hussein demonstrated with his largely ineffective Scud attacks during the Gulf War. But doing so greatly limits the effectiveness of a conventional warhead, and miniaturizing a nuclear warhead is technologically difficult. Biological or chemical warheads do offer the possibility of heavy damage with a smaller payload, but without an accurate guidance system, their utility is limited. While North Korea may be able to hit Japan with a missile, it could not, for instance, expect to successfully target US military bases in Japan. DPRK missiles thus amount to terror weapons. North Korea could conceivably rain bombs indiscriminately down on Japanese territory, much as Iraq did to Tel Aviv. But whereas Hussein was trying to provoke an Israeli response as a way of breaking the US-Arab coalition, terror-bombing of Japan would make little strategic sense for North Korea.

Most discussions of the DPRK missile threat assume that North Korea is inveterately hostile and would launch a southward attack at a moment's notice, if not deterred by superior strength. Whether or not this is true, the fact remains that North Korea does face enemies that are vastly superior to it in all aspects save possibly number of troops, and recent wars have shown that to be a poor indicator of success in conflict. Even a conventional war would undoubtedly result in the complete annihilation of North Korea as a political entity. US-ROK military planning calls for responding to a DPRK invasion with a full-scale counterattack to unify the country under southern control. The DPRK's counter-threat consists of the ability to inflict huge casualties before expiring from the scene. Thus, while DPRK missile development holds out the possibility of inflicting limited damage on the US and its allies, American ability to respond is almost limitless. The DPRK appears to recognize this, given its continued willingness in negotiations with the US to trade threat reduction for diplomatic normalization.

In their book "Preventive Diplomacy", former US defense secretary William Perry and Harvard University professor Ashton B. Carter rejected the idea that North Korea constitutes a first-level threat to the US - that is, a country capable of not only harming US interests, but directly threatening national security. Yet time and again, North Korea is cited as not only "a" but "the" major threat to US security. Such exaggeration leads to neither a realistic appraisal of US security challenges nor a well-thought out strategy for dealing with North Korea. It is time that US policymakers begin dealing with North Korea on its own terms, rather than using it as a foil to promote unrelated policy goals.

*Tim Savage is Security Program Officer for the Nautilus Institute (Reposted with permission from OneDemocracy.com, http://www.onedemocracy.com)

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