Asia Times: Summit success could be too much for US, Japan : Rental Car Reservations


	May 10, 2000	atimes.com

Japan

Summit success could be too much for US, Japan
STRATFOR.COM's
Global Intelligence Update
May 9, 2000

Summary

Officials from Seoul and Pyongyang have held the fourth in a series of meetings in preparation for their inter-Korean summit, the first high-level contact between the Koreas, which are still technically at war. The two governments are moving quickly and appear to be sparking concern in both Washington and Tokyo that in the heat of the moment the summit might produce too much progress, too quickly, toward reconciliation. In the long term, a reunified Korea would dramatically lower tension in the region - but at the cost of American and Japanese influence.

Analysis

Representatives from North Korea and South Korea met in Panmunjom May 8 for the fourth round of preparatory talks before a planned inter-Korean summit scheduled for June 12-14. The summit between South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and General Secretary of the Workers' Party of [North] Korea Kim Jong-il will mark a major milestone for Kim Dae-jung's so called ''sunshine'' policy of constructive engagement with the North.

However, the speed at which inter-Korean contact is accelerating is drawing concern from the United States and Japan, both of which have strategic interests in the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The concern is that, in the excitement of the historic summit, Seoul may reach agreements with Pyongyang without full consideration of the long-term ramifications or the interests of Washington and Tokyo, whose interests do not necessarily coincide with a speedy reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

Preparations for the forthcoming summit have proceeded at an accelerated pace. On March 9, Kim Dae-jung delivered the ''Berlin Declaration'', laying out four principles of cooperation with the North. On the same day, secret meetings between South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) and North Korea's Chosun Asia-Pacific Peace Committee (CAPPC), Pyongyang's semi-official agency for inter-Korean economic contact, were held in Singapore, according to the JoongAng Ilbo.

Just one month later, on April 10, Seoul and Pyongyang simultaneously announced an agreement to hold an inter-Korean summit in June. Preparatory talks for the summit followed quickly in Panmunjom on April 22, 27, May 3, and 8. North Korea is driving the pace of the inter-Korean talks, setting the date of the summit announcement prior to South Korea's April 14 general elections.

In doing so, Pyongyang was attempting to boost the chances of victory for Kim Dae-jung's Millennium Democratic Party (MDP). Should Kim's power substantially diminish, Pyongyang could therefore avoid potential backsliding by Seoul in its economic initiatives to the North. As well, it gave Pyongyang the ability to take the lead in the negotiations, with Seoul following.

China also played a role in arranging the inter-Korean summit. Beijing has exerted increasing influence over Pyongyang, exemplified by the uncharacteristic visit of Kim Jong- il to the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang March 5. This meeting may have been instrumental in convincing Pyongyang to finally enter into negotiations with the South.

Less than one week after Kim's visit to the embassy, the initial secret inter-Korean talks were held in Shanghai. China then served as host to several rounds of secret meetings between South Korean Culture and Tourism Minister Park Ji-won and North Korean CAPPC Vice-Chairman Song Ho-kyong.

Despite China's involvement, South Korea has taken pride in noting that the current road toward the inter-Korean summit has been a bilateral effort, without third party interference or assistance. However, Seoul has also engaged in a series of discussions with Tokyo and Washington to appease the concerned trilateral partners in dealing with North Korea.

While Seoul hopes to gain some stability on the peninsula and is leaving the subject of the summit meeting fairly open, the agenda has been an item of friction with the United States and Japan. Washington wants Seoul to address Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs at the summit while avoiding talks of reducing or removing US troops in South Korea, according to reports from Tokyo. Further, Tokyo is concerned that South Korean economic assistance to the North will undermine the carrot and stick economic measures the international community has used to keep Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs in check.

In essence, both Tokyo and Washington are concerned that Kim Dae-jung's zeal in engaging Pyongyang may supercede his personal judgement, making him more susceptible to the demands and desires of North Korea. However, Washington and Tokyo have longer-range concerns about an inter-Korean summit being led by North Korea with Chinese guidance.

While the summit agenda is unlikely to lead to a soon-reunified Korea, neither Japan nor the United States is prepared for the possibility, however unlikely. South Korea currently hosts 36,000 US troops, a substantial portion of the US forces in Asia. These serve not only to deter North Korean aggression but also to maintain a strong US presence near China. A unified Korea would be less likely to host these troops.

Initially, this may appear a positive move. Without the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula, the United States lessens the chance of facing simultaneous crises by reducing a major flashpoint. In addition, Washington can redeploy the troops, strengthening its positions elsewhere, or even decommissioning some, saving resources and money.

For Japan, no longer having an unpredictable North Korea on its coast would also further redirection of forces. Already, with the warming of Russian-Japanese ties, Japan has shifted its defensive forces southward to prepare for potential events in Korea or the Taiwan Strait. A stabilized Korea, in lessening security concerns, may also boost regional economic growth.

However, despite the positive effects, the unification of Korea would drastically alter the balance of power in East Asia. No longer divided, Korea would discontinue hosting US forces on the peninsula. With China remaining a concern, these would need to be relocated elsewhere in Asia or along the Pacific. Further, the justification for the US troops in Japan, which has shifted from a Soviet threat to a North Korea threat, is weakened.

The US position in regards to China, once weakened, will be further exacerbated in that the reunified Korea will likely soften its military ties with the United States and may instead lean toward its more traditional regional partner - China - which shares with Korea a historical antagonism toward Japan.

With the two Koreas moving closer together with the assistance of China, the United States and Japan will make every effort to ensure their agendas are addressed, or at least not countermanded, by South Korea.

US concerns are already having an effect on the inter-Korean negotiations. On April 15, the United States warned that sanctions, softened last year in return for North Korean promises to stop missile testing, may be reinstated. Further, in the annual State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism report, released May 1, North Korea was again listed as a terrorist state, despite intense negotiations by Pyongyang and Seoul for North Korea's removal from the list

Japan too is affecting North Korea's mood upon entering the summit negotiations. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori said in late April that Japan's acts in World War II might not have been aggression, as history was subject to interpretation. The comments drew strong condemnation from Pyongyang. Also, South Korea's agreement with Washington not to discuss the US troop presence has triggered a backlash from Pyongyang, which responded through state media saying such talk was a deliberate move to ''throw a wet blanket over the meeting and summit''.

Seoul and Pyongyang are now focusing on solving the last minor issues before announcing a formal arrangement for the June summit. With the summit just one month away, Tokyo and Washington will continue to press Seoul and Pyongyang to address their concerns. As well, they will take subtle steps to slow or undermine the talks, diverting the focus from general economic and social ties and refocusing instead on contentious issues of US forces, missiles and nuclear issues. While peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula may be a long-term desire of all parties involved, with North Korea in the driver's seat, the United States and Japan are not prepared to let things proceed smoothly.

(c) 2000, WNI, Inc.
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