Asia Times: India/Pakistan


	June 26, 2002	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

India not interested in a "US" Europe
By P M Kamath

The terrorist attacks of September 11 were a nerve-shattering experience to all democracies in the world. Though the direct victim of these attacks was the United States, the member states of the European Union (EU) and India were also affected, not only as democracies but also because of their close economic, political and cultural ties with one another.

But what is unique is that the US, as the greatest champion of democracy, has been drawn close to two non-democracies - the military dictatorship of Pakistan and communist China. For India, these new relationships of the US have a direct bearing on its perceptions in world politics, since India sees its security threats emanating only from these two non-democratic countries.

Of course, India's links with the US were of different kinds during the bipolarity of the Cold War era. Then, until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the US and Europe were tied to one another economically, politically, militarily and culturally. Pakistan and China were close geopolitical allies of the US. On the other hand, though India had close economic, cultural and educational relations with the US and EU, its political ties and military cooperation were more intense with the then Soviet Union - again largely on geopolitical grounds. The US is a new factor in Indian security calculations since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a unipolar world.

International terrorism
However, in the post-Cold War period, international terrorism has emerged, as rightly noted by the EU-India joint declaration of 2000, as a "major threat to regional and international peace and security". (1) India has been the victim of cross-border terrorism promoted by Pakistan as a revengeful act against India's role in the birth of Bangladesh from the ruins of East Pakistan in 1971. First Pakistan used terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy to promote a secessionist movement in Punjab. If Pakistan had succeeded in acting as a midwife in the birth of an independent state of Punjab, it would have also acted as buffer state between Pakistan and India in addition to avenging for the secession of East Pakistan. (2)

Its failure to get the formation of an independent state in Punjab, however, provided it with experience in the conduct of sustained cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Pakistan has always claimed to limit its role in J&K to providing only moral, political and diplomatic support. President General Pervez Musharraf reiterated this in his speech on January 12, though he added that Kashmir runs into the blood of every Pakistani.

But politicians out of power speak more honestly than while in power. The former justice minister under the Benazir Bhutto government, S M Zafar, who was also the chairman of Pakistan's Human Rights Commission, said at a pro-Pakistan congregation in London that "everything is done by Pakistan in Kashmir". He further added, "Kashmiri movement is the official jargon for armed violence and terrorism in the state." As a matter of fact at this meeting he pleaded for the "privatization of the Kashmiri struggle" so that every Pakistani organization could go to Kashmir. (3)

India during the past two decades has sacrificed more than 75,000 lives in two states for Pakistan's perfection of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. The Patterns of Global Terrorism-2000, a report released by the US government, listed 138 terrorist attacks, of which 44 were reported in India. The report also spoke of South Asia as the epicenter of global terrorism. But the attitude of the US toward Indian problems of cross-border terrorism in J&K has been, until September 11, one of using it as a way to subdue Indian aspirations for a legitimate role in international affairs commensurate with its size and human and economic resources.

However, despite Indian efforts, the US refused to take Indian perceptions of international terrorism seriously. One illustration of this is the fact that India had pleaded with the US State Department to declare Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad as terrorist outfits in the above-referred report. But it was not done until after September 11. Even as late as in September 2000, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had warned the US, "Indeed, in our neighborhood - in this, the 21st century - religious war has not just fashioned into, it has been proclaimed to be an instrument of state policy." He then cautioned, "Distance offers no insulation. It should not cause complacence." (4)

Indian perceptions of the EU
What has been the Indian perception of the EU? Has it changed since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon? At the outset, it has to be made clear that it is exceedingly difficult to discern EU perceptions as though the EU were a fully and well-integrated regional organization or a federal state of Europe. It is yet to have a single foreign or defense policy, though it has partially achieved the goal of a single currency. Absence of an EU policy as such on a crucial issue can be perceived in the manner in which the EU countries responded to September 11.

Recently, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi pointed out how British Prime Minister Tony Blair, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder went separately to Washington to hold talks with the US president on military cooperation. Berlusconi also followed them subsequently. But he rightly argues that EU leaders ought to have met first to decide their response and then should have sent Secretary General Javier Solana, the official responsible for EU foreign and security policy, to speak on their behalf. (5)

The member states of the EU have been close allies of the US in world affairs. Thus, any discussion of how India perceives EU policies has to focus on a few individual countries. So, on one end of the spectrum there is Britain, which has always claimed a "special relationship" with the US, at least since World War II. On and off, British policy makers have affirmed their close ties with the US. Recently, British Minister for the EU Peter Hain described his country as "a steadfast ally of the USA". (6) Naturally, Britain has generally taken the cue from the US to develop its policy toward India.

On the other end, there is France, which has always tried to strike an independent approach in its foreign policy in relation to the US. That independence is also perceived by India on various global issues. Thus, the present French ambassador in India, Bernard de Montferrand, for instance, stated, "We consider India one of our major partners ... we have made a long-term commitment to India." (7)

Other members of the EU, such as Germany and Italy, have tried to follow a middle course. This is more often an accurate description in security, foreign and diplomatic - or what are called high politics issues - while it is possible to see a common EU approach in economic matters. But in the economic area, where it does not hurt EU members' own national interests, it is more often perceived that the EU follows the US line of action.

The above Indian perceptions can be illustrated by taking EU policies on the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 prior to the terrorist attacks on the US, and EU policies on the Indian case regarding cross-border terrorism promoted by Pakistan after September 11.

In the case of the Indian nuclear tests, the US was hypercritical of India. The then secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, like a schoolteacher, scolded India, stating, "We want to make them [Indians] understand that they cannot blast their way into nuclear status." (8) Later, she also reminded India that nuclear weapons would not help a country "to enhance its national strength and status". (9) Then British foreign secretary Robin Cook was quick to say that the nuclear tests had not, in fact, helped to enhance Indian security. (10)

The US imposed economic sanctions against India and withheld US$143 million in aid. The main motive was to punish New Delhi for its assertion of an independent nuclear policy in relation to its national security. The punitive intentions became clear from the testimony of Karl Inderfurth, the then assistant secretary of state, when he stated, "More than $1 billion worth of loans have been postponed ... having a ripple effect in the Indian economy and is resulting in decreased investor confidence." (11)

On the back of the minds of US policy makers was their fear that if the United States left unpunished a distant actor such as India, then more powerful and closer allies such as Japan and Germany might also assert themselves by going in for an independent nuclear deterrent.

The fact that the US dominated nuclear policy of prominent members of the EU is clear from how even a suggestion of a different line of thinking was nipped in the bud by the US. The German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, in November 1998 made a suggestion that in the absence of a threat, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should adopt a doctrine of "no first use" with regard to nuclear weapons. The then US defense secretary, William Cohen, was quick to denounce the suggestion. On the other hand, the German head of the NATO military committee publicly had to state that it was fundamental for NATO to retain its nuclear-first-strike option. (12)

Thus, the US economic sanctions against India were followed by some of the European countries. Germany was equally or more interested in publicly punishing India. Germany froze all development aid - it must be remembered that EU development aid has been far more significant to India than the US contribution, which has never amounted to more than $50 million per year since the 1970s. However, France did not follow the US lead in imposing economic sanctions. The French ambassador in India specifically pointed out recently that France has been "cautious to be consistent in our behavior ... we did not apply sanctions after the Pokhran II tests". (13)

But once the US mellowed in its criticism of Indian nuclear policy, it began to loosen economic sanctions. Then, European nations became clearly anxious to fall in line with the US policy. This was aided by the international terrorist attacks on the US.

But prior to that, by and large the European nations followed the US lead on the terrorist threats against India. Let us see the responses of the Bill Clinton administration. It was largely one of advising India to take into consideration the root cause of terrorism in J&K - aspirations of the people of Kashmir. The US official most despised during the first term of the Clinton administration was Robin Raphel, assistant secretary of state. Her pro-Pakistan leanings need no illustration. After terrorists tried to attack unsuccessfully, on Republic Day celebrations in J&K in 1995, she, instead of condemning terrorism, said the case once again emphasized the need to resolve the underlying cause.

But toward the end of his administration Clinton visited South Asia. One day prior to his landing in New Delhi in March 2000, he had described the region as most dangerous. But his five-day stay in India brought about many changes in Clinton's perceptions. His shift had been partly influenced by the military takeover of power in Pakistan in October 1999. He admitted in an interview with Peter Jennings of ABC on March 21, "I believe that there are elements within the Pakistani government that have supported those who are engaged in violence in Kashmir." (14) There were many such instances of incremental acceptance by the US of Pakistan's involvement in cross-border terrorism and moving closer to the Indian position on the subject. Thus, for instance, he almost endorsed the Indian position when he said, "You cannot expect a dialogue to go forward unless there is an absence of violence and respect for the LoC" (Line of Control).

Analyzing Clinton's visit, I wrote at the time, "One immediate benefit of Clinton's change of heart is that other nations who faithfully follow the US lead in international relations, like Britain, Japan and Germany, will follow suit." (15) Visiting New Delhi soon after Clinton's South Asian tour was Robin Cook. There was a welcome change in the British foreign secretary's perceptions of India's problems of cross-border terrorism. He also repeated Clinton's formulation that cross-border terrorism must end before the serious Indo-Pakistani negotiations could begin.

This pattern of major European powers following the US lead in international affairs appears to be a reversal of earlier policy of the United States following the British lead on Indian policy. US officials after their visit to India made it a practice to stop in London to brief the officials there on their talks with Indian leaders.

After September 11, the US decided to make Pakistan a frontline state in its war against terrorism. As Pakistan was geopolitically important for the US in this endeavor, and it was almost on the brink of economic crisis, the US announced certain economic incentives for Pakistan's joining the international coalition against terrorism. The US then extended duty-free access of Pakistan's exports of textiles to the US. These concessions were followed by the EU, which also announced similar duty-free entry of Pakistani garments to their markets. The impact was immediate. Indian textile exports fell by 18 percent. (16)

Indian concerns over cross-border terrorism remained an issue of less concern to the US and by implication to the influential members of the EU. Scores of Western officials have visited New Delhi since September 11. By and large they have urged Indian leaders to exercise "restraint". This was well reflected during Vajpayee's visit to Washington last November 9. One correspondent critical of the approach of the US fight against terrorism loudly wondered about Bush, "When terrorism hits America, you go halfway across the world and make war in Afghanistan. But when we [India] suffer terrorism, you ask us to be restrained. Is an Indian right less precious than an American right?" (17)

It was only after terrorists attacked the Indian parliament on December 13 that the US perception changed over the intensity of the threat from cross-border terrorism faced by India. What is happening now is a general declaration from Bush, as during Musharraf's visit to Washington, that "one of the worst things that can happen in the world is terrorist organizations mating up with nations which have had a bad history and nations which develop weapons of mass destruction. It would be devastating for those of us who fight for freedom." (18)

Multipolar world
Does this mean that the EU does not have its own agenda? Does it mean major European countries are so keen to demonstrate their loyalty to the US policies - at least where they do not direly conflict with their national interests? It seems to be a mix of both. The individual member countries and the EU as a well-integrated regional organization have their own differences with the US.

Thus, for instance, the EU does not want to assign any role to NATO in the proposed 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force, which is meant for peacekeeping. But the US wants NATO - which is meant to protect the EU from external threats, if any - to have a say. Former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger sees the EU "creating a military force institutionally distinct from NATO" as likely to impair "allied cooperation without enhanced allied military capability". But the EU Council describes the proposed force as "separable but not separate". (19)

The EU sees itself emerging as one of the centers of power in world politics. The EU as an organization is officially committed to the world evolving into a multipolar one. This is also the commitment of France in particular, as it is also the goal of India to promote a multipolar world. But the US would act as a brake in the evolution of a multipolar world. As a matter of fact, the US lost interest in further integration of the EU after the end of the Cold War in December 1991.

My study of world politics had led me long ago, during the Cold War, to argue in favor of India putting some of her eggs in the European basket instead of putting all of them in the Soviet basket. (20) In the same logic, I have recently argued that instead of putting all our eggs in the US basket, it would be prudent for India to develop closer political and military relations in addition to economic and cultural ties with the EU.

This of course could only be on a reciprocal basis. Recently, when European Commission president Romano Prodi was in Mumbai he sounded the right chord when he expressed "displeasure over the fact that India and Indians were constantly looking at the US in all major areas of cooperation". But this kind of cooperative promotion of a multipolar world is possible on the basis of mutuality of perceptions. To the extent that India is able to perceive an independent EU policy particularly involving India's critical security concerns, India would look to the EU for enhanced levels of cooperation in different fields. We of course need to remember that we are comparing policies of a sovereign nation like India to a transnational organization like the EU, which is stronger than a regional organization but weaker than a fully integrated sovereign nation.

Policy options
First and foremost is the need for the EU to develop its own foreign policy and security options in keeping with its interests as distinct from the national interests of individual countries. Of course, it is not necessary that on every issue the position of the EU be different from that of the US. But when it follows policies in quick succession to a policy pronouncement by the US which hurts India and changes its policies in response to the shift in the US perceptions, the inevitable conclusion is that the EU is postponing by a few steps the emergence of a multipolar world.

In the field of education, Indian students look to the US as a mecca. The greatest advantage is that of English as a common language. Only one out of 16 goes to the EU. EU countries need to push vigorously for the teaching of European languages in India and also offer fellowships to Indian students to study in Europe. India can also offer Gandhi fellowships to EU scholars to provide opportunities to study in India along the lines of Fulbright fellowships offered by the US after the end of World War II.

India had had at least four centuries of interaction with Europeans prior to independence in 1947. However, no longer do Indians look at the Europeans through the prism of the colonial past. But there is always a lurking fear that neo-colonialism might come back through the US-dominated economic liberalization program initiated by India in June 1991. The need is to build on that. This alone can translate the ideal of an India-EU strategic partnership based on "universal values of democracy" in a multipolar world. But before this happens, there ought be a widespread intellectual conviction that a multipolar world is better suited to promote peace, security and a civil society than the present unipolar world.

(1) "EU India Summit on 28 June 2000 - Joint Declaration" pg 2. Their commitment was reiterated in "Declaration Against International Terrorism, 23 November 2001", see Strategic Digest, vol XXXI, no 12, December 2001, pg 1637.

(2) For details see Kshitij Prabha, Terrorism: An Instrument of Foreign Policy, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi 2000.

(3) The Indian Express (Mumbai), September 9, 1996.

(4) See "Address by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to the Joint Session of the United States Congress" on September 14 2000", Strategic Digest, vol XXX, no 10, October 2000, pg 1442.

(5) The Times of India (Mumbai), February 12, 2002.

(6) The Free Press Journal (Mumbai), February 2002.

(7) The Times of India (Mumbai), February 23, 2002.

(8) The Times of India (New Delhi), June 23, 1998. Also see P M Kamath, "Indian Nuclear Tests, Then and Now: An Analysis of US and Canadian Response", Strategic Analysis, vol XXIII, no 5, August 1999, pp 749-762.

(9) The Times of India (Mumbai), July 28, 1998.

(10) For a detailed analysis see P M Kamath, "Indian Nuclear Strategy: A Perspective for 2020", Strategic Analysis, vol XXII, no 12, March 1999, pp 1933-1953.

(11) See K Inderfurth, "US Chagrined to Implement Sanctions on India, Pakistan", USIA's Washington File, June 18, 1998.

(12) The Times of India (Mumbai), November 27, 1998. Also see "No First Use for NATO", 1st ed.

(13) The Times of India (Mumbai), February 23, 2002.

(14) Interview of the President by Peter Jennings, ABC World News, March 21, 2000, Strategic Digest, vol XXX, no 4, April 2000, pg 407.

(15) See "India-US Relations", The Observer of Business and Politics, May 18, 2000.

(16) The Times of India (Mumbai), November 5, 2001.

(17) "Remarks by the US President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee at the White House", November 9, 2001, Strategic Digest, vol XXXI, no 12, December 2001, pg 1639.

(18) P M Kamath, "American Moment of Decision on Terrorism", The Free Press Journal (Mumbai), February 25, 2002.

(19) See "Europe's Changing Political Structure", CQ Researcher, vol 11, no 25, July 13, 2001, pp 560-563.

(20) "Indo-US Relations in the 1980s: Politics of Security", in P M Kamath (ed), Indo-US Relations: Dynamics of Change, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi 1987, pg 53.

P M Kamath is a professor of politics, department of politics, University of Bombay

(© Heartland. This version has been edited by Asia Times Online.) To subscribe to Heartland, please email cassanpress@sina.com