Asia Times: Hidden dangers in constitutional changes


	April 24, 2002	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

Hidden dangers in constitutional changes
By Jehan Perera

One of the Sri Lankan government's main achievements since its election last December has been to obtain the support of the United States. There have been repeated US statements, both by the State Department in Washington and the US embassy in Colombo, that the US is committed to a united Sri Lanka.

These statements have served to reassure the majority Sinhalese population that the concessions granted to the Liberation Tigers of Tamileelam (LTTE) in terms of the ceasefire agreement agreed to in February are not a blank check to the LTTE to achieve its ultimate goal of an independent state.

So far the concessions made by the government to the LTTE have helped to maintain the momentum of the peace process, which reaches a key junction with peace talks scheduled for Thailand in June. Even a partial violation of the ceasefire agreement by the LTTE in not fully opening the road to Yaazhppaanam has been glossed over by the government. The most recent statement of the United States was that a lifting of the ban on the LTTE by the Sri Lankan government to take the peace process forward would not translate into a similar US concession. This statement was obviously meant to help the Sri Lankan government to meet this LTTE prerequisite for peace talks to commence.

However, while the government's relationships with those parties external to the polity remain better than anticipated, its relationship with the opposition continues to deteriorate. The opposition's proposed no-confidence motion against three ministers of the government and a planned mass demonstration against the ceasefire agreement are indications of increasing political polarization. At this early stage of the peace process, where matters are proceeding relatively smoothly, such opposition actions are unlikely to harm the ongoing peace process. But if such actions continue, the government's ability to take the peace process forward will be weakened.

It is not surprising that the increased flurry of opposition activities coincides with the preparations by the government to pass the 18th amendment to the constitution in parliament. Proponents claim that it is based on the principles of good governance. However, the passage of this constitutional amendment is unlikely to provide a comprehensive answer to the government's problems of dealing with the opposition. The 18th amendment envisages that the president's power to arbitrarily dissolve parliament after one year is taken away, that MPs can vote according to their conscience without being subordinate to party discipline, and that parliamentary executive committees to promote opposition participation in decision-making will be formed.

On the face of it, the 18th amendment is a praiseworthy piece of legislation. Each of its three components consists of positive reforms. It will be difficult for the government to function effectively after a year, when the president can dissolve it at a moment's notice for narrowly partisan reasons. Increasing the participation of opposition members in decision-making through the committee system can take away the all-or-nothing nature of present politics, which has been the bane of politics in the country. Permitting MPs to vote according to their conscience without losing their parliamentary seats is another laudable concept.

Short-term gains
However, the underlying political motivation in the 18th amendment seems to be in its provision to facilitate the crossover of opposition MPs to the ranks of the government. It is not so much a matter of conscience as that of easing the crossover of parliamentarians from one power bloc to another. As it stands today, the constitution causes MPs who do not vote according to their party line to lose their parliamentary seats if they are sacked by their parties. The 18th amendment, on the other hand, would permit them to remain in parliament even if their parties sack them.

The successful passage of the 18th amendment would no doubt lead to short-term gains for the government. It will secure a two-thirds majority for the government in parliament, eliminate the presidential power of arbitrary dissolution and pave the way for the government to further amend the constitution in pursuit of the peace process. But what will also happen, without any doubt, is that those left behind in the People's Alliance (PA), headed by President Chandrika Kumaratunga, will be less inclined to cooperate with the government on any matter, let alone the peace process.

One of the key elements in the peace process is the establishment of an interim council for the north and east. There is discussion about the composition of this council. There are questions whether it will consist solely of LTTE nominees or whether representatives of other political parties in the north and east will also be included in it. Whatever may be the outcome of government-LTTE negotiations on this score, President Kumaratunga will have to put her signature in some document or other for the interim council to take legal effect.

For instance, Kumaratunga's cooperation will be essential if a governor who is acceptable to the LTTE is to be appointed to the north-east interim council. In terms of the 13th amendment to the present constitution, the president is empowered to appoint the governor of the provinces. The governor has a potentially powerful role to play in the functioning of any provincial council, as the exercise of executive power is either directly through the governor, or through ministers, or through officers subordinate to the governor.

On the other hand, if the negotiations between the government and LTTE lead to an interim council with formal powers that go beyond the 13th amendment, the constitution will need to be amended. Any constitutional amendment that has implications pertaining to the ethnic conflict will be much more controversial among the general population than a matter pertaining to issues of good governance alone. If the PA (or what remains of it after the passage of the 18th amendment) joins hands with the Marxist People's Liberation Front (JVP) to oppose such a constitutional amendment, a dangerous situation could arise.

Mounting challenge
Already the government faces a mounting challenge to the peace process, with influential Buddhist monks registering their concern at some LTTE statements and at their demand for being de-banned prior to the commencement of peace talks. At one level, the government has ensured that the de-banning of the LTTE will only be a formality. According to the ceasefire agreement that has been in effect for about two months, unarmed LTTE cadres can enter into government-controlled territory, conduct political activities and even open their offices. At present, only a limited number of cadres can cross over into government-controlled territory, but in another month there will be no limitation at all. This is a virtual legalization of the LTTE, at which there has been little or no public protest.

However, the formal lifting of the ban is likely to provide an occasion for public protest by people who are concerned that the flow of concessions is only one way. Kumaratunga's statement that the LTTE should agree to human rights provisions has been well received in this context. The LTTE's continued extortion of funds from the general public in an ad hoc manner, child recruitment and restriction on the movement of people within its areas of control can be seen as measures to strengthen itself militarily.

Further, the political alliances apparently being forged by the LTTE with leaders of other minority communities are sending alarm bells ringing among sections of the Sinhalese. Instead of the customary complaint that the LTTE are seeking one-third of the country, the territory under threat is now being expanded to two-thirds, including the central hills, where Tamils of Indian origin live. When all of this is coupled with reports of several LTTE arms shipments, a disturbing picture emerges that those opposed to the peace process can seek to exploit.

Historical lesson
On several occasions in the past, most notably in 1957 and 1965, efforts to resolve the ethnic conflict failed not because of mistrust or betrayal between the leaders of the Sinhalese and Tamil communities, but because the Sinhalese leaderships could not contain the protests from within their own community.

Both prime ministers S W R D Bandaranaike and Dudley Senanayake wished to honor the agreements they had made with the Tamil leader S J V Chelvanayakam, but they could not because of the opposition from the rival Sinhalese-dominated political parties. At present, it appears that Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has established a positive relationship with the LTTE leadership, which accounts for the rapid forward movement of the peace process. It would be tragic if the premier were unable to take the process forward because of opposition from the south.

The 18th amendment will not do anything to allay the fears and apprehensions among the Sinhalese. Even if a sizeable section of the opposition consisting of PA parliamentarians do cross over, utilizing the provisions of the 18th amendment, the voter base of the opposition will not cross over in the same degree. Most of them will continue to remain with the opposition. If the PA's ranks in parliament are depleted because of a crossover, there is a very strong likelihood that those remaining will become more hardline in their opposition to the government's peace process. In such an event, the PA could provide the insurrection-prone JVP with the mass base it currently lacks.

A renewed PA-JVP alliance (as in the administration previous to the present one) that takes the ethnic conflict as its focus for joint action could lead to a major people's challenge to the peace process from the bottom upward. It is important that an alternative to the 18th amendment be found in which the principles of good governance it is meant to uphold can be obtained with the full concurrence of the opposition. An acceptable solution might be for the PA to agree to have the president's power to unilaterally dissolve parliament be amended as proposed in the 18th amendment. Alongside this PA concession, the government could enter into an agreement not to impeach the president for any acts she has committed up to the present time.

The need for these compromises arises from the historically reiterated fact that the willing cooperation of the major opposition party is imperative for the peace process to be stable in the longer term. In particular, Kumaratunga needs to be held to her word, given before local and international audiences, that she wishes to be a constructive partner in Sri Lanka's peace process - and she needs to be given a genuine opportunity to prove it.

(EelamNation)