Asia Times: India/Pakistan


	May 3, 2002	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

Tigers leave room to move at peace talks
By Sudha Ramachandran

BANGALORE - Into its fifth month, the peace process in Sri Lanka seems to have slowed in pace. Talks between representatives of the government and the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamileelam (LT TE) to find a solution to the decades-long conflict in the island that were expected to begin early this month have been put off to mid-June.

The LTTE has made it clear that it will not come to the negotiating table unless the government lifts its ban on the organization and fully implements its obligations under the truce agreement. Notwithstanding these hiccups, the talks will take place. It is in the interest of both the government and the LTTE to negotiate a deal now.

In Thailand, where the talks will take place, the two sides will be looking to finalize an interim solution. They are expected to discuss the modalities for the setting up of an LTTE-run interim administration in the north and east of the island. Looking for an interim solution first is acceptable to both as talks on these are likely to be less difficult, and therefore less likely to break down. An interim solution does not need amendment of the constitution or parliament's approval. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has only a slender majority in parliament.

For the Sri Lankan government, an end to the fighting is essential if it is to revive its battered economy. It needs to attract tourists and foreign investment back into the country and for that it needs to keep the peace process going for as long as possible. An interim arrangement in the northeast will keep the LTTE from returning to the bunkers for some time. Should the LTTE walk away from the negotiating table or from the interim administration, the government will look to the United States, which has extended its clear support to the government, to act to crush the Tigers.

For the LTTE, an interim set-up it runs in the northeast will not only accord the organization legitimacy, but also increase the area it controls. The LTTE-run set-up could mean administering areas it claims as part of Tamil Eelam that are under Sri Lankan army control at present - such as Jaffna peninsula.

"The interim administration seems a done deal," writes Nirupama Subramanian in the Indian fortnightly newsmagazine, Frontline. "The Sri Lankan government is preparing to legalize the LTTE ahead of the talks in Thailand, where the two sides might only give formal shape to arrangements that have already been agreed upon. The only uncertainty now is whether [Tiger leader Velupillai] Prabakaran will assume a public role or rule from the shadows."

Given the present international mood against terrorism and the opposition of not only Sri Lanka but also India and the US to the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam, an interim solution that gives the LTTE de facto control over the area it has claimed as Tamil Eelam is not a bad alternative. By calling this an interim solution, the LTTE has ensured that it cannot be accused of compromise. More important, it can continue to work toward its goal of an independent Tamil Eelam.

The LTTE might have changed its strategy; it has not changed its goal. During his meeting with the international media three weeks ago, Prabakaran said, "I don't think the necessity and situation have arisen now for that [a consideration of an alternative to Eelam]. It is our people who put forward this demand for Tamil Eelam. The people gave a mandate to the Tamil United Liberation Front [TULF] for this as early as 1977. We, therefore, with the people's support, are fighting for Tamil Eelam till now."

At the meeting, journalists from around the world were told that any solution acceptable to the LTTE and the Tamil people would need to be based on three core principles - recognition of the Tamils as a distinct nationality, recognition of the Northern and Eastern provinces of the island as the traditional homeland of the Tamils, and of the territorial integrity of this homeland and recognition of the Tamils' right to self-determination. (These principles were put forward by six Tamil organizations, including the LTTE, in July 1985 ahead of talks with the government, held in the Bhutan capital Thimpu.)

Clarifying what the LTTE meant by self-determination, its spokesperson Anton Balasingham said that it meant the right of people to decide their own political destiny. Self-determination, he said, could also mean autonomy and self-government and if these were given to the Tamil people that would be "internal self-determination". However, if the government rejected the Tamils' demand for autonomy and self-government, they would opt for secession, which "also comes under self-determination" as a last resort.

There are sections in Sri Lanka and abroad that argue that the LTTE is now ready to scale down its goals to "realistic levels" - that is, less than Tamil Eelam. Its willingness to consider "internal self-determination" is evidence of this, they point out. Prabakaran's statement that the demand for Tamil Eelam continues to be relevant is tough talk to be expected ahead of negotiations, they argue.

The LTTE's seeming moderation of its demands is nothing new. It has several times in the past expressed willingness to consider "a substantial alternative to Tamil Eelam". The Tigers have never clarified what they mean by this, cunningly leaving it to the government to agonize over what they might accept.Significantly, the LTTE has expressed willingness to consider alternatives to Tamil Eelam only when it is under pressure and needs respite from fighting. Once the pressure has eased it has gone back to espousing Tamil Eelam. Willingness to consider alternatives to Tamil Eelam has been an interim tactic that has helped it out of sticky situations. The on-going ceasefire, the upcoming talks and the likely interim administration are similarly useful steps in its march towards Tamil Eelam.

The LTTE justifies its stand on the ground that any solution that it accepts must be worthy of the large number of lives lost for the cause. In its opinion, only the creation of a separate state is commensurate to this sacrifice. Its cadres have been indoctrinated that Tamil Eelam is a matter of time.

But most important, having labeled anyone who compromised on Tamil Eelam as a traitor, it can hardly do the same. It cannot accept less than what its rivals were willing to settle for and for which they were damned by the LTTE.

The powers of the interim administration and the area over which it has jurisdiction will have to be more than that which the North Eastern Provincial Council (NEPC) government, which the LTTE's rival, the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) ran from 1988-90. The EPRLF government administered the temporarily merged (the merger was to be confirmed at a referendum) Northern and Eastern provinces.

Will Prabakaran head the interim administration? Unlikely. He was offered the chief minister's post way back in 1987 when the interim administrative council under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was being discussed, a post he scornfully rejected then. The LTTE chief has greater ambitions. Even if international pressures, advancing age and his reported desire to lead a normal civilian life might have prompted him to moderate his stand, Prabakaran will find it difficult to compromise and accept what his LTTE's rivals had accepted years ago - less than Tamil Eelam. The LTTE is a prisoner of its own accusations.

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