Asia Times: Sri Lanka: The politics of trust and generosity


	January 9, 2002	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

Sri Lanka: The politics of trust and generosity
By Jehan Perera

The peace process after December's general election in Sri Lanka is proceeding faster than most people could reasonably have expected. The unilateral ceasefire by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) within a fortnight of the new government's election was followed within a week with a similar reciprocation by the government.

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's letter to his Norwegian counterpart Kjell Magne Bondevik requesting a resumption of Norwegian facilitation of the Sri Lankan peace process has been reciprocated by LTTE leader Velupillai Pirapaharan. A Norwegian delegation headed by Bondevik met last week in London with top rebel official Anton Balasingham. Norway's Foreign Ministry called the talks "constructive" but gave no details.

The LTTE have been waging war since 1983 to divide the island nation of 18.6 million people along ethnic lines. The conflict has killed more than 64,500 people and displaced at least 1.6 million others. An estimated 350,000 Tamils live in areas under rebel control.

The government has taken other generous unilateral gestures in furtherance of the peace process. These include the decision to lift most of the economic embargoes on LTTE-controlled areas and the removal of most security barriers in Colombo and elsewhere. These actions appear to commit the government to an irrevocable peace process, the breakdown of which would cost it dearly.

Perhaps the government is going as far as it is on the reasoning that the country cannot afford to lose more years of economic development. Instead of growing by 7-10 percent, which it is potentially capable of doing, the economy last year shrank by almost 1 percent. With its intellectual support base strongest among the business class, the new government's focus will tend to be the economy, above all other considerations.

But there could also be another reason for the positive unilateralism of the government with respect to the LTTE. There may be an appreciation of the orientation of the LTTE leadership that makes it prefer unilateral actions to the politics of bargaining. In the past, on several occasions, the LTTE has taken positive unilateral actions. It has released prisoners of war and has declared ceasefires. But the previous government spurned these actions, seeing in them a cunning design.

It is likely that with its rejection of democratic politics, the LTTE also rejected the untrustworthy bargaining that accompanied it. The LTTE arose in a context of parliamentary politics in which in which political agreements made, after much haggling and bargaining, were never kept. Therefore, it is unilateral action that the LTTE may be favoring, in which there is no mutual bargaining, but only evidence that words and action conform to each other.

Key features
After 18 years of war, the government and LTTE have little reason to trust each other. With nearly five decades of experience of broken post-independence promises between successive governments and Tamil parties as the background, the problem of trust becomes more deep-rooted. It appears that two key features of the government's strategy to satisfy the LTTE and bring it to the path of peace would be to remove the ban placed on it, and to set up an interim council for the northeast province.

The next major phase of the peace process will be the commencement of direct talks between the two sides. The LTTE has made the removal of the government's ban on it a prerequisite for such talks to commence.

From the LTTE's perspective, there are at least two reasons why it would seek to have the ban removed. By removing the ban on the LTTE the government will be conceding that the LTTE is not a mere terrorist organization, but that is a military and political formation that embodies Tamil aspirations that have a long history. This would be likely to satisfy the LTTE leadership's sense of nationalism and destiny. It will also gain the LTTE sufficient legitimacy to contest the increasing number of bans being slapped on it internationally.

In 2001 alone, the LTTE fell foul of bans placed on it in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, which added to the bans already imposed by India and the United States. The gradual expansion of these international bans and the tightening of their implementation could have serious implications on LTTE fund-raising activities in different parts of the world. Second, when its negotiators sit with those of the government, they would want to be doing so as parties that enjoy parity of status at the negotiating table.

With the present ceasefire and removal of security barriers in Colombo and elsewhere, the government has effectively taken the position that terrorist violence against either politicians or civilian targets is not going to take place. This is the larger risk because the possible loss of life in the case of any violation of this trust is irreversible. On the other hand, the removal of the LTTE ban can always be reversed should the LTTE breach the trust that has been placed on it.

This ban was placed on the LTTE immediately after it bombed the sacred Dalada Maligawa in January 1998. Without trying to bargain with the LTTE regarding lifting the ban, it is likely that the government will once again make a unilateral gesture in lifting the ban. Of course, this is likely to generate a great deal of opposition from sections of Sinhalese nationalist opinion.

Anticipating a governmental move to lift the ban on the LTTE, the Marxist nationalist JVP (which was once banned itself as a terrorist organization), has been plastering the streets of Sri Lanka with posters warning the people against such a measure. There is likely to be a build-up of opposition to the government's actions in the days and weeks ahead.

LTTE reciprocation
In this regard, the LTTE could make the government's position more sustainable by making a public declaration of its own that it will renounce what the world has called terrorism, even if it does not agree with that definition of the term.

Such a declaration by the LTTE could take the peace process to a new level, in which the politics of trust and generosity prevail, rather than those of fear and selfishness. This will help the government to continue with the peace process in the present positive spirit and manner. Besides, a renunciation of non-battlefield violence can help the LTTE gain more international credibility than it currently enjoys.

Most foreign countries that have banned the LTTE have done so for reasons of their own, possibly fearing an LTTE connection with other international terrorist organizations. The two key examples would be India in 1992 and the US in 1996, both of which banned the LTTE even before the Sri Lankan government had imposed its own ban. Therefore, it is unlikely that the government should suffer any international reversal as a result of lifting its own ban on the LTTE. On the contrary, the international community is likely to be supportive of a Sri Lankan decision to lift the ban to pave the way for peace talks. They would prefer that terrorism ends through political means rather than through military means.

A few days after the US declared its war against terrorism on September 11, the US embassy in Sri Lanka made a statement that a negotiated settlement was the way in which to end the country's conflict. If the United States could take this stand, then it is clear that most of the world will also be supportive of the Sri Lankan government's commitment to the cause of peace.

In India this week, British Prime Minister Tony Blair has made clear his belief that the Kashmir dispute and its associated terrorist problem should be settled politically and not militarily. It is most unlikely that the international community will use a lifting of the Sri Lankan government's ban on the LTTE to disadvantage the government in any way.

(EelamNation)