Asia Times: W(e)ary of wartime relations


	November 22, 2001	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

W(e)ary of wartime relations
By Nadeem Malik

ISLAMABAD - Beneath the celebrations of new aid commitments being showered by the international community on Pakistan for its unstinting support of the United States in the Afghan war, there are nagging fears within the country of being branded as a loser in the end game.

First there was the dramatic triumph of the much unwanted (in Islamabad) Northern Alliance in Kabul, then there were comments by some senior US and British officials on the composition of a new post-Taliban administration that sent shivers of anxiety through the camp of President General Pervez Musharraf, which could face extinction if he earns the tag of a defeated soldier.

There appears little possibility that whoever rules Kabul will accept a reduction in their power by embracing too many other parties. One of the fundamental motivations that pushed the fractious Northern Alliance to take over the capital - in disregard to calls from the US for restraint - was that it would strengthen its bargaining position on the ground, and eventually help it to lay claim to the biggest piece of the Afghan pie.

And even though Musharraf has been making the correct noises - from an international point of view - in calling for a demilitarized Kabul and a broad-based government representing Afghan groups according to their weight, what he really is thinking is that Pakistan wants a strong Pashtun presence.

Fortunately, the fragility and mistrust that exists among the various warlords under the umbrella of the Northern Alliance could help save face for Musharraf. With Ismail Khan (Hazara) in Herat, Abdurrashid Dostum (Uzbek) in Mazar-e-Sharif, and Mohammed Fahim (Tajik) in Kabul, leaving Pashtun groups in Nangahar and Jalalabad, and the Taliban militia in charge of Khowst, Paktia and Paktika, Uruzgan and Kandahar, the threat of a long, drawn-out civil war could be more real than any peace overtures.

Whatever emerges from the debris in Afghanistan, however, it would be Pakistan's loss of its so-called strategic depth in the country that many in the army would find hard to digest. Since the wholesale changes of October 7, when Musharraf consolidated his position by replacing six of the nine army Corps Commanders, as well as the director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence, his media team has been working overtime to squash any suggestions of unease. However, one would be naive to assume that the profoundly rightist army would simply melt away as the Taliban militia did in Kabul.

There is indeed a dangerous calm at present, but one step in the wrong direction could so easily unleash the storm. And these false steps would not come from Pakistan, which is almost a bystander at present, but from the parties in post-war Afghanistan that might or might not dance to the American tune, and from the policy options that the US adopts over Kashmir.

Just on Monday, US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz reaffirmed that the present campaign was against all global terrorist networks and the states that supported terrorism. "We are going to continue pursuing. Let's also remember we're going to continue pursuing the entire Al-Qaeda network, which is 60 countries, not just Afghanistan." He was responding to questions whether the US would chase Osama bin Laden if he entered Pakistan.

His comments followed a statement from Ari Fleischer, the White House press secretary, who said that there was no indication that bin Laden had moved across the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan, but there was concern over movement back and forth between the countries. However, he noted that Pakistan is doing everything it could to be helpful in halting this.

And just a day before this there had been reports that US fighter jets had dropped four bombs inside Pakistan's border on fleeing suspects. Fleischer said that the US had given $73 million to Pakistan to increase border security and to detect the movement of people into Pakistan. "I don't think they want Osama bin Laden operating on their land. No country does," he said.

However, the influential Washington-based Cato Institute questioned last week the role of Pakistan in a report titled "Terrorist Suspects: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China". Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies, wrote that many countries in the coalition contribute little of significance to the fight. "Even worse, the willingness of some members of the coalition to actually combat terrorism is doubtful. Indeed, given their record, some of those countries appear to be part of the problem, not part of the solution. That concern is especially acute with respect to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and China."

He termed the Saudi cooperation as minimal and grudging in the war. "The US government has warned that it will treat regimes that harbor or assist terrorist organizations the same way that it treats the organizations themselves. Yet if Washington is serious about that policy, it ought to regard Saudi Arabia as a prime sponsor of international terrorism. Indeed, that country should have been included for years on the US State Department's annual list of governments guilty of sponsoring terrorism," he maintained.

He claimed that Pakistan's guilt is nearly as great as Saudi Arabia's. He said that without the active support of the government in Islamabad it was doubtful whether the Taliban could ever had come to power in Afghanistan. "Pakistani authorities helped fund the militia and equip it with military hardware during the mid-1990s when the Taliban was merely one of several competing factions in Afghanistan's civil war."

Carpenter maintained that even now it was not certain that key members of Pakistan's intelligence service had repudiated their Taliban clients. "Afghanistan is not the only place where Pakistani leaders have flirted with terrorist clients. Pakistan has also assisted rebel forces in Kashmir even though those groups have committed terrorist acts against civilians. And it should be noted that a disproportionate number of the extremist madrassas [schools] funded by the Saudis operate in Pakistan."

The report says that China's offenses have been milder and more indirect than those of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. "For years, China has exported sensitive military technology to countries that have been sponsors of terrorism. Recipients of such sales include Iran, Iraq and Syria. Whenever the United States has brought up the exports issue, Chinese officials have sought to link a cutoff to a similar cutoff of US military sales to Taiwan, something that is unacceptable to Washington."

The report demanded severing of ties with the Taliban and "Kashmiri insurgents", who Islamabad regards as freedom fighters, and the cessation of funding to the madrassas that provide recruits to these organizations.

Jonathan Clarke, another associate of Cato, wrote in the Los Angles Times that America's allies have doubts about US foreign policy. "France is openly obstructionist over Iraq and Iran, Germany has questioned NATO's right to use force in Kosovo without prior United Nations authority, Japan is resisting US pressure to reflate its economy. Saudi Arabia has offered, at best, halfhearted cooperation on terrorism." He maintained that there was a "sense that the lion is wounded".

"Perfect consistency in a great power's foreign policy is neither expected nor desirable. But [some] accommodations undermine foreigners' faith in America's willingness to pay a price for its rhetorical principles. They conclude that America's big talk is mostly bluff," he maintained.

This is exactly what is being anticipated in Pakistan. Having pledged more than $1 billion in cash and promises of new loans, the United States has obviously made a good deal with Islamabad, which in turn traded away its rights on a years-old foreign policy.

Some independent political analysts believe that this bargain has gone too far, and that the government may have to pay the price soon. With a none-too-friendly regime in Kabul, troubles with India over Kashmir (among other things), and cold relations with Iran, Pakistan's economic and political stability hinges on the survival of its new wartime relations with the United States.

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