Asia Times: Musharraf faces two-faced diplomacy demand



	October 22, 1999	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

Musharraf faces two-faced diplomacy demand
STRATFOR.COM
Global Intelligence Update
October 21, 1999

Summary:

Gen Pervez Musharraf's decision to remove Pakistani forces from the border with India was an international public relations coup for his government. However, Musharraf must complete the equation and do something to appease his domestic constituency, especially the Muslim fundamentalists. In his efforts to balance the powerful international and internal forces, a policy of outward reconciliation with the West and quiet support of insurgency may emerge.

Analysis:

Pakistani army chief Gen Pervez Musharraf announced on October 17 that the Pakistani military would unilaterally ''de-escalate'' border tension with India by withdrawing ''all forces moved to the borders in the recent past''. This unexpected decision went a long way toward alleviating the growing international concern and condemnation over the military coup. However, Musharraf must also move to satisfy the powerful fundamentalist elements within Pakistan. His solution to this paradox may be an outward engagement with the West, combined with quiet support for Muslim militants.

Musharraf's decision to withdraw troops from the Indian border was described by some observers as a ''diplomatic coup''. The move alleviated international concern that his government would be militarily aggressive, placing Pakistan in the role of peacemaker. As an added bonus, it probably caught the Indian government off guard.

Be that as it may, the decision carries more weight symbolically than militarily. The withdrawal will only be along the ''international borders'', not the contested Line of Control in Kashmir, and will affect only troops that have been moved to the area recently. Furthermore, the possibility of significant military confrontation along the international border is currently relatively low. This move is also easier for Pakistan to make than India, since India's border is threatened by numerous militant groups based in Pakistan. Pakistan faces no such concerns.

For all his efforts to distance himself from Nawaz Sharif, Musharraf must still respond to the same problems that plagued Sharif. If he appears to be pandering too much to the West he will be labeled a puppet by fundamentalist elements within Pakistan. Although Musharraf theoretically holds enough military power to suppress fundamentalist dissent, such a cure could prove to be more destabilizing than the disease, especially considering that the army has its own fundamentalist elements.

Another option for Musharraf's efforts to curry favor with the fundamentalists is to support a certain amount of militant activity. This would serve two purposes. First, it would appease the fundamentalist factions within Pakistan. In addition, it would keep a significant number of them busy. Encouraging guerrilla-style insurgency does not appear to be too much of an ideological stretch for Musharraf, considering he spent the beginning of his military career as a behind-the-lines commando. Furthermore, there are several unconfirmed reports that he has stressed the military utility of low-level warfare against a numerically superior opponent in the past.

The only caveat to this plan is that militant operations before the coup were evidently run by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. The rivalry between the ISI and the military appears to be greater than normal institutional rivalry would warrant. The ISI appears to have played a large part in Sharif's efforts to fire Musharraf. The month before Sharif was ousted, the ISI had been steadily increasing its influence with Sharif, under the direction of Gen Khawaja Ziauddin. These efforts became so intense that Ziauddin accompanied Sharif virtually everywhere and acted as his de facto second-in-command. It was apparently Sharif's appointment of Ziauddin to the position of army chief that triggered Musharraf's decision to take over the government.

With Ziauddin reportedly under guard, there is a question of whether the line ISI forces will cooperate with Musharraf. We don't think this will be a problem for the simple reason that Musharraf will be careful to appoint an ISI head who will be loyal to him. Furthermore, the ISI simply does not have the manpower or firepower to compete militarily with the army.

Musharraf may not even need to work with the ISI at all. Jane's Information reported that Musharraf spent much of the 1980s training the Afghan mujahideen in their war against the Soviets. During that time he established contacts with several fundamentalist groups, such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Harkat ul Ansar, both of which reportedly support Muslim guerrillas in Kashmir. It is possible that Musharraf has his own network of militants apart from the ISI.

Musharraf's position is much stronger than Sharif's was, but he is by no means omnipotent. Musharraf is obviously supported by the military, but he must still please both an international constituency and a domestic constituency with opposing agendas. A good way for him to do so is by publicly advocating a non-aggressive foreign policy, while quietly encouraging small-scale insurgency.

(c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc.

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