Asia Times: Afghanistan quagmire or strategic deception?


	October 30, 2001	atimes.com

Editorials

Afghanistan quagmire or strategic deception?

Asia Times Online analyst Marc Erikson wrote on October 19 of the danger that ill-conceived political considerations might override military logic in Afghanistan and that "only a fast and decisive defeat of the hardline Taliban forces holds any hope for ... avoidance of a situation in which it's not Mullah Omar's Taliban, but American and allied forces that become trapped in a drawn-out Vietnam-style quagmire".

This was in reference to apparent United States and Pakistani concerns that all-out military support for a drive by forces of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance on the strategic northwestern town of Mazar-e-Sharif and the Afghan capital of Kabul might lead to the installation of an unrepresentative government of minority ethnic groups and forestall a lasting post-Taliban political solution.

Well, first off, what of the felicity of the term "post-Taliban"? Reports from Taliban stronghold Kandahar (CNN) and elsewhere in Taliban-held territory (Al Jazeera) say that "there are no indications of a breakdown in Taliban morale". These same reports say that it's the civilian urban poor, those without means to flee, who are taking the brunt of US air attacks and are dying by the dozens, perhaps hundreds, but that the Taliban militia and its military capabilities are largely unaffected. So, what's this "post-Taliban" talk when no military victory is in sight, when thousands of Pakistani jihadis are crossing into Afghanistan to fight side by side with the Taliban, and when the intelligence and control capabilities of the Taliban government are sufficiently intact to have captured and executed key oppositionist Pashtun leader Abdul Haq during his mission to recruit presumed dissident factions? Not only Erikson 10 days ago, but numerous US and other commentators now say, "Win first, talk later." But a determined military push still doesn't seem to be in the offing as Northern Alliance commanders complain that US bombing of Taliban frontline positions remains ineffective.

Second, while the Taliban militia by most available accounts is not losing the war in Afghanistan militarily, it may well be winning it on the propaganda and political fronts. As civilian casualties mount, a Red Cross center is accidentally (?) bombed for the second time in two weeks and the stream of refugees reaches tidal wave proportions, even US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was prompted to say on Sunday, "We have to be more careful." And being careful is certainly the watchword for Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf, who now counsels that, absent quick victory, political solutions will have to be tried. His ambassador to the United Nations, Shamshad Ahmad, told a World Economic Forum conference in Hong Kong on Monday that a prolonged US air campaign could have "phenomenal consequences" for Pakistan, the region, and the world at large.

Such observations and concerns are countered by US and British government spokespersons and military leaders, saying that they always expected this to be a "long war" and that it was being fought for the "right reasons". But that's beside the point. Few doubt that the war on terror is in pursuit of a just cause. Questions arise not from why but from how it is fought and whether campaign goals are being met. Why have vaunted US special forces, in the region for nearly a month now, been used in only one night-time "intelligence gathering" raid? And again, why has military support for the Northern Alliance remained lukewarm?

These are legitimate questions - but only if the strategic goals of the Afghanistan campaign are in fact as limited as publicly stated, ie, to get Osama bin Laden and topple the Taliban government. It can't be ruled out - indeed, we rather strongly suspect - that dragging out the Afghanistan action may be intentional and serve a broader strategic purpose. The US political and military leaders now in charge were profoundly shaped in their thinking by the Vietnam experience. They know a quagmire when they see it and they have both the popular support and the military means to avoid it. So, what's really going on?

The Afghanistan campaign is strategically multi-faceted, we'd suggest. After September 11 and President George W Bush's declaration of war, something had to be done. Afghanistan was the obvious place to get things started. It had the further advantages of tying up the Al-Qaeda network and of avoiding action in the politically much more sensitive Middle East. Now it has the continuing advantages of buying time and of possible strategic misdirection and deception.

US leaders have said from the outset that the war on terror would be long and comprehensive, comparable more to the Cold War than the Gulf War, not limited to one theater, aiming to end terror for good and the states supporting it. Focused on what's most visible and in the short term more newsworthy, US and international media are now all but identifying the war on terror with the war in Afghanistan, ignoring the Bush administration's repeated assertions and policy pronouncements to the contrary.

But meanwhile, the US, Britain and several of their North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies are beefing up forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Gulf region. Meanwhile, as well, the US is acting on a comprehensive economic agenda deployed against anti-globalization forces. The first battle on that front will come in Doha, Qatar, starting November 9 with the fight for a new round of World Trade Organization trade and investment liberalization talks. When and where the next military front in the war on terror will open is anyone's guess. But surely open it will - and the apparent Afghanistan quagmire will in the meantime direct attention elsewhere.

For those already war-weary in only the fourth week of hostilities in Afghanistan and those innocently suffering the consequences, prolonged war is no happy thought. The very real possibility of the wider war we foresee is no more appealing. But it bears to keep in mind that the consequences of not fighting it would almost certainly be more dire still.

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