January 27, 2000	atimes.com

China ANALYSIS: The China-Taiwan military balance PART TWO China's failure to close the technological gap China's leaders decided in 1985 that China was unlikely to face a major war in the foreseeable future, therefore, they further cut current weapons production to concentrate on developing more modern weapons in an effort to close the technological gap between China and potential adversaries. Chinese leaders expected that modernization of the civilian economy would also facilitate military modernization and that closer cooperation with the West would include transfers of military technology. Both these expectations have been frustrated. The civilian economy has been greatly stimulated by a combination of decentralization and privatization. However, these same processes have undermined China's military-industrial complex. Numerous military joint ventures with the West were canceled after the Chinese government's violent suppression of the Tiananmen Square protest in June 1989. Most of these projects have never recovered. The most important were the J-10 fighter, which was to be equipped with advanced Western jet engines and electronics, and the largest and most capable of China's warships, the two 'Luhu'-class destroyers. With the cessation of Western help, the J-10's development has been so delayed that it is now not expected to enter service before 2003, yet it is now likely to be inferior to the imported Su-27s in service more than ten years earlier. Since 1989 China has turned to Russia for military technology no longer available from the West. China has been disappointed, however, by Russia's preference for sales of complete weapons systems rather than technology transfer. So far, Russian help has done little to advance China's capacity for indigenous development of sophisticated weapons. During the first 30 years of the People's Republic of China (1949-78), the nation's economic development focused on state planning to produce the basic means of subsistence for the population and, beyond that, military equipment and related industries and research facilities. Seven of China's eight Ministries of Machine Industries were devoted mainly to military projects. Most research was organized to support priority military projects under the umbrella of the National Defense Science and Technology Commission and the National Defense Industry Office, combined in 1982 as the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). However, because of the severe disruptions of the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and especially the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), Chinese military research made little progress beyond copying the 1950s technology inherited from the Soviets. The big exception to this was China's autonomous development of nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. This nuclear effort was pursued at enormous cost. Meanwhile, except for a few spin-offs from the nuclear program, such as the nuclear submarines, most projects to develop new weapons systems floundered in the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Deng's economic reforms promised to restore progress, which they have certainly done for the civilian economy. Yet two cornerstone's of Deng's economic reforms -- decentralization and privatization -- have substantially eroded China's defense industrial base particularly because they have redirected talent and resources away from military research and development (R&D) and thereby stifled progress toward autonomy in military technologies. Privatization and decentralization have encouraged a brain drain from military to civilian research, a shift of production from higher-tech to lower-tech products, and starved the remaining military industries and research facilities of funds, particularly hard currency, to develop a wide range of state-of-the-art military technologies. China's recent arms purchases from Russia are more a symptom of the failure of domestic R&D than they are evidence of China's military modernization. Market incentives have generally replaced the old system of conscription of talent, leading to a brain drain from military R&D to the booming private civilian sector. The China National Science Foundation (CNSF) was formally inaugurated in 1986 as the civilian counterpart of COSTIND, and soon began to eclipse it as a sponsor of scientific research. CNSF awards funds by competitive peer review, in contrast to COSTIND's military-bureaucratic fiat. Because of the generally low profitability and uncompetitiveness of military-industrial sector, it now has difficulty recruiting and retaining experts. The best scientists and engineers are no longer attracted to the isolated defense sector, but to the open and booming civilian economy. During Cultural Revolution, many military-related research facilities and factories were built or relocated to the so-called "Third Front", the mountainous interior of China, to be secure in case of Soviet or American invasion of northeastern China or the populous coastal region. Many Third Front sites have little infrastructure and harsh living conditions. Today it is difficult for such remote facilities to attract and retain skilled researchers when much more promising economic opportunities beckon in the more comfortable and prosperous coastal cities. Even though most of China's arms are not particularly sophisticated, they are high-tech relative to most of the civilian products that China's industries have converted to producing. Given China's abundant labor and low average standard of living, China's comparative economic advantage lies in producing low-tech consumer products such as clothing, processed food, household appliances and construction materials. Indeed, industries such as these have flourished. In the more high-tech industries, such as electronics and aerospace, the greatest expansion has occurred not in the autonomous development of new high-tech products, but rather in the assembly of imported components and the manufacture of the simpler components, such as aircraft fuselages. This pattern of development is not likely to stimulate much improvement in military-related technologies. The inferior quality of China's arms is highlighted by the experience of two important (former?) export customers. During the 1980s Thailand contracted to buy Chinese warships and army equipment, including tanks. The Thai navy began a rapid expansion with the purchase of six Chinese-built frigates. Thailand wanted to buy only the hulls from China, and equip the ships with Western weapons and electronics. China insisted on providing complete warships, offered a good price, and delayed its own warship programs to prioritize the Thai order. Thailand agreed, but was soon disillusioned with its choice. The workmanship was so poor the ships had to be overhauled as soon as they arrived in Thailand. The diesel engines proved so unreliable that Thailand has had to confine the ships to coast guard duties. Thailand insisted that the final pair be delivered as empty hulls, which were fitted in Thailand with GE gas turbines, German diesels, and weapons and electronic equipment from the US, as originally planned. The Thai army was similarly disappointed with Chinese Type-69 tanks and 130mm artillery. The 130mm gun barrels wore out too quickly. The tanks' inferior diesel engines belched black smoke, rendering them too conspicuous on the move. They are now in storage. Thailand now prefers to buy surplus US Army M60 tanks rather than newly manufactured Chinese models. Myanmar (Burma) has had a similar experience. After the army violently crushed the pro-democracy movement there in 1988, China was one of Myanmar's few foreign friends. From 1990 China sold Myanmar over $1 billion worth of warships, planes, tanks, and other weapons. Now, however, Myanmar is trying to diversify its sources of military hardware. The Burmese are complaining about the poor quality of the Chinese equipment, as well as problems with maintenance and spare parts."[11] Other major Chinese arms customers, such as Pakistan and Iran, now prefer to buy most of their weapons from more sophisticated producers: France and Russia, respectively. After China's honeymoon with the West ended in June 1989, US and French arms exporters more than made up for the loss in mainland Chinese business by massive sales to Taiwan, including sophisticated weapons such as the F-16 fighter and the Harpoon anti-ship missile previously denied to Taiwan to avoid offending Beijing. The honeymoon with China probably would have ended eventually even without Tiananmen, if not so abruptly, because the logic of Chinese arms sales guarantees some friction with the West and, with the demise of the Soviet bloc, the original motivation for US strategic partnership with China?s a counterweight to Soviet power?as disappeared. China, which seemed the bold market reformer during the 1980s, now looks, by the standards of the 1990s, like a political anachronism. Even as memories of Tiananmen fade, the military cooperation of the 1980s is unlikely to be reestablished. In reaction, China has revived arms purchases from Russia, suspended for almost 40 years. However, the known deals with Russia are less tailored to developing China's indigenous military production and technology than those contracted in the West during the 1980s. The deals with Western companies did not require large purchases of complete weapons. Many manufacturers were willing to help the Chinese improve their weapons design and manufacture, and to sell China only those sophisticated components most necessary to upgrade China's existing weapons and new designs. Taiwan has benefited extensively from such technology transfer in developing its own arms industry. On the other hand, Russia, chronically short of foreign exchange itself, has insisted that China must purchase substantial quantities of completed weapons (such as the Su-27, Su-30, and 'Kilo' class) with hard currency before Russia will consider licensing Chinese firms to produce such weapons themselves. Nevertheless, because of the failure of so many indigenous Chinese weapons projects, the PLA seems increasingly to prefer importation and licensed production of small numbers of high-tech foreign weapons rather than buying cheaper, but obsolescent, Chinese designs. China's offensive military capabilities are limited Despite the nervousness in abroad about the "modernization" of China's huge armed forces, China's offensive capabilities remain quite limited. The most talked about scenarios involve Chinese armed action against Taiwan or against rival ASEAN claimants for the islands and waters of the South China Sea. A successful invasion of Taiwan would be impossible. More limited harassment of Taiwan or ASEAN by sea and air is possible, but China's ability to prevail is questionable. With the more rapid build-up and modernization of the military forces of Taiwan and ASEAN, China's capability to gain from military action in the East or South China Seas is actually declining. Many commentators focus on China's acquisition of certain modern capabilities, without noting that modernization is not affecting the vast bulk of the Chinese forces. Taiwan, on the other hand, is procuring more new weapons than China. During the 1990s Taiwan is re-equipping virtually its entire navy, air force, and army with new warships, missiles, combat aircraft, and tanks China's military, especially the navy and air force, lack combat experience and adequate training. The army fought fierce border wars with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979, and a border battle with the Soviet Union in 1969. On the other hand, the navy experienced only limited combat against Taiwan's navy in 1954 and minor skirmishes with Vietnam in 1974 and 1988. The PLAAF has not engaged in significant combat since it battled Taiwan's air force in 1958.[12] During PLA's 1979 incursion across its border with Vietnam, "China had deployed a large number of aircraft [over 700] to border airfields, but she relied on heavy artillery barrages to prepare the attack, perhaps because her obsolete air force would have been no match for the more sophisticated Vietnamese air arm."[13] Three-quarters of the PLAAF strength today--21 years later's still the same aircraft considered too obsolete to fight the Vietnamese in 1979! The age and unreliability of many Chinese ships and aircraft restrict the time spent in training. On average Chinese combat pilots fly less than half as many hours per year as American, Indian, Japanese, Taiwanese, and South Korean pilots. Many Chinese navy vessels seldom put to sea. Chinese military maneuvers are smaller and less frequent than those of most major powers. It is difficult to judge the overall impact of such inexperience, but it should at least increase doubt about China's ability to coordinate and execute successfully complex offensive operations. Four scenarios of possible Taiwan-China conflict are worth considering: 1) a blockade of Taiwan, including harassment by air and missile attacks; 2) Chinese invasion of the offshore islands of Kinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu); 3) Chinese invasion of Taiwan itself; and 4) missile attacks alone (with or without nuclear weapons). A blockade is unlikely to succeed, since China probably cannot gain control of the sea and air around Taiwan. China and Taiwan could both damage each other's overseas trade and military forces, but a decisive result is unlikely. A massive Chinese military build-up over a period a decade or so might suffice to give China the capacity to mount a serious blockade and possibly even to conquer the Taiwanese-held offshore islands, however, even in that case, and even without foreign military intervention on its behalf, Taiwan itself is secure. China's inability to invade Taiwan China's weak naval and air forces provide it no ability to invade Taiwan. If Taiwan were not an island, China might be able to threaten it with its large (but inefficient) army. To invade Taiwan across the 80-mile-wide Taiwan Strait, China would first have to win control of the sea and air. This would be extremely unlikely, as I argue in the next section, given Taiwan's considerable qualitative advantage in naval and air forces, even if the US did not aid Taiwan. Taiwan's qualitative advantage has increased recently. If China could gain control of the sea and air, a blockade of Taiwan might be possible, though it would almost certainly require direct confrontation with US ships defying the blockade. However, even if China somehow could gain complete control over the sea and air in the Taiwan Strait, for example, by nuclear strikes against Taiwan's naval ports and military airfields that somehow avoided US intervention, a successful invasion of Taiwan would be virtually impossible because of China limited sea and air lift capability relative to the size of the defending forces. Amphibious invasions can succeed only if the attacker can land enough troops by sea and air either to overwhelm the defender in the initial attack, or, more usually, to hang onto a beachhead long enough so that reinforcements can be landed before the defender can build up overwhelming strength to crush the beachhead. Ports are usually too strongly defended to be attacked directly, so supplies must initially be brought in by the same means as the troops: by parachute, helicopter and, mostly, by specially-built amphibious warfare vessels landing on a beach. Once a port and airports are secured and repaired, forces and supplies can be landed more efficiently using regular transports, cargo ships, and large air transports. Thus it is not the size of China's army, or even its navy or air force, that ultimately constrain its ability to invade Taiwan, but its capacity to transport troops and supplies to a hostile beach and nearby air landing sites. Much attention in the West has been directed at the recent reorganization of the Chinese army so that 12 "rapid-reaction" divisions, including three as central national reserves, can mobilize more quickly than the bulk of the army. These have been compared to the highly mobile forces used by the US and its allies in the Gulf War. This is entirely inappropriate. China has very limited air and sea transport capability. Most rapid-reaction" units must rely on rail transport, and thus could not deploy outside of China itself, and certainly not across bodies of water like the Taiwan Strait. These units are probably designed more to counter internal security threats[14]rather than to provide China with a large external intervention force. The PLAAF has limited ability to transport troops into combat theaters. Long-range air transport units (using about 80 Y-7/An-24, Y-8/An-12, and Il-76 aircraft) could transport and paradrop one airborne brigade (about 3,000 troops, one third of a division) over a distance of at least five hundred miles, presuming that China possessed near total air superiority and could suppress most ground-based anti-aircraft defenses, which would be difficult against virtually any neighboring country. Short-range transports (300 antique Y-5/An-2 biplanes) could drop another brigade of airborne troops a couple hundred miles from friendly bases. China has enough helicopters to transport a couple thousand troops over distances of less than a hundred miles, though it would be difficult to concentrate most of the helicopters in any one region, since they have many support functions for the ground army. It would take weeks to transport all three airborne divisions by air, let alone their supplies. A RAND study, noting the limited use of PLAAF air transports in the conflict with Vietnam and in military exercises, concludes, "these numbers are so small that it is hard to imagine air transport influencing the outcome of any major action." Using both military and civilian transports will allow the PLAAF airborne troops quick access to any internal trouble spots. Their ability to be delivered into combat on China's periphery has not been greatly enhanced, reflecting the true mission of these forces."[15] China has not prioritized procurement of new transports to replace these aging planes or to expand airlift capability. China's military sealift capability is also limited. The PLAN could transport two brigades (each with one infantry and one tank regiment) by ship across the open ocean to land on an enemy beach. In calm seas, over distances of less than 200 miles, small landing craft could add enough capacity to transport, at most, two infantry divisions reinforced by two tank regiments (about 28,000 troops with over 300 tanks). Additional troops could be landed in multiple trips, but would require several days for each round trip. As more and more troops are landed, a greater and greater portion of amphibious capacity would have to be devoted to resupply these rather than reinforcing them, at least until a major port could be captured so that civilian shipping could be used to land supplies at regular docks. Despite China's interest in recovering Taiwan, it has not invested in expanding its amphibious warfare fleet since the early 1980s. Thus China could potentially land about three divisions in Taiwan initially given: 1) enough time to concentrate all available air and sea transport, 2) fair weather, and 3) complete control of the air and sea. Unless a major port could be quickly captured, the build up of troops in the beachhead would be slow and transport losses heavy. It is hard to imagine any circumstances under which Taiwan's army of 24 divisions would not quickly overwhelm the invaders. By comparison, the Allied invasion of France in 1944 crossed a much narrower body of water and landed 10 strong divisions on the first day and four more in the next few days. They faced seven German divisions initially. By the end of the first week 16 Allied divisions faced 14 German ones. At no time did the Germans concentrate superior force against the beachhead. Whereas France is seventeen times bigger than Taiwan and most of the German forces there had little motor transport, and thus had to walk to the front line, Taiwan's entire army is motorized and could concentrate its full force against any beachhead in a matter of days. Since the 1970s, technological advances, particularly portable, easily concealed anti-aircraft and sea-skimming anti-ship missiles, favor the defender in amphibious invasions. Even an attacker with complete control of the sea and air would suffer heavy losses from such missiles, which Taiwan manufactures. Any Chinese attempt to launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would almost certainly be an unmitigated disaster for China. Even use of nuclear weapons would not make it possible for China to invade, since the number of nuclear weapons necessary to neutralize Taiwan's army would render Taiwan inhospitable if not uninhabitable. China is not capable of successfully invading Taiwan now or in the foreseeable future, even assuming a substantial increase in China's air and naval weapons procurement enough to win an arms race with Taiwan. Amphibious operations, that is, transporting troops across open sea to land on a hostile beach, are among the most complex and difficult of all military operations. Only two powers have substantial accumulated experience in this form of warfare: the US and Britain. (Russia has more limited experience, but also has significant transport capability). Today the US is the only country with any substantial fleet of amphibious warfare vessels, yet even the US would have difficulty landing troops on an island as well defended as Taiwan (even assuming proximate bases). After mobilizing its reserves, Taiwan has a well-equipped army of over a million soldiers. Even if China were to give high priority to expanding its air, naval, and amphibious capability, it would be unable to gain the capability to invade the main island, though the offshore islands could perhaps become vulnerable. PART THREE: Taiwan is increasingly secure

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