Central Asia/Russia


	May 17, 2002	atimes.com

Central Asia/Russia

COMMENTARY
Rebuilding Afghanistan: A Sisyphean task?
By Ehsan Ahrari

Attending a conference under the aegis of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris early in May on the reconstruction of Afghanistan was an experience that every student of Third World development should have.

That international organization performs a great service in bringing together aid agencies and members governments and facilitating the formulation of economic strategies to rebuild war-ravaged and conflict-torn countries around world. Given that its focus is on economic development, it must find "rational" and "optimal" solutions to carry out those awesome tasks. The Western participants in such meetings are driven by the notion of transforming war-ravaged countries into democracies. For most of them, democracy remains a "silver bullet" for resolving all conflicts and stabilizing societies. That purpose is also in perfect harmony with the national security objectives of the United States--its dominant member. Thus, a primary theme of the discussion was how to make a "Scandinavian" country out of Afghanistan, so to speak!

In principle, the democratization of Afghanistan might not be an unreasonable proposition. But in war-ravaged societies, the emergence of democracy requires patient nation-building for at least a decade or so. Even then, if internecine conflict were to break out, the international community would be faced with the Sisyphean task of making massive economic investments once again, with little or no guarantee that democracy would still take root.

And Afghanistan requires lots of capital, and even more uninterrupted nation-building by an international organization such as the OECD, whose commitment to such an intricate task reflects the collective patience and commitment of its members. This is not meant to be a criticism of the OECD's approach, but only to underscore that the commitment of the international community to rebuild Afghanistan is not at all a done deal. It is still likely to come apart if major donor countries' resolve falters, or if their attention is diverted to other equally urgent international crises in the coming years.

When I view Afghanistan, I still see a society divided against itself, a society where ethnic differences may best be described - in the larger context of South Asia - as "ethnic communalism". That phrase, at least in India, is used to describe the acute religious bigotry that Hindus and Muslims - and Hindus and Sikhs, as well as Hindus and Christians - periodically manifest toward each other in the form of riots, where human beings are slaughtered because they worship different gods. And, often, the term "communalism" is used to express the same type of contempt as "anti-Semitism" in the West. In the case of Afghanistan, ethnic communalism is very much alive and well, and is being kept under check largely because of the presence of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

I don't believe that ethnic communalism will either dissipate or disappear any time soon from that country. That very factor would hamper all efforts in facilitating its emergence as a unified nation. The Pashtun constitute about 40 percent of the entire population. When the Taliban, who were Pashtun, ruled most of Afghanistan, they remained at war with the Northern Alliance, which comprised Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. Since the conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance resulted in the dismantlement of the Taliban regime - the US military campaign was almost entirely responsible for that reality, to be sure - the issue of domination by the Pashtun became too sensitive for the succeeding government to tackle immediately.

The interim government of Hamid Karzai, which emerged as a result of the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, has not taken the ethnic proportionality into consideration yet. The issue of Pashtun representation is likely to be addressed during the loya jirga (grand council) scheduled to be held in June. However, since the Northern Alliance perceives itself as the lead entity that ousted the Taliban, it is highly unlikely that the ethnic groups comprising it will be content with playing a secondary role in the permanent government.

The economic problems faced by Afghanistan - a country ravaged by war for more than 23 years - are of enormous proportion. All infrastructure has been destroyed. Most of its indigenous talent fled the country and settled all over the world. Its main source of revenue for the past two decades has been the opium and heroin trade. Its female population has been systematically forced into a medieval style of living since the emergence of Taliban rule. Afghanistan is also a country whose two most recent governments - the mujahideen government of Burhanuddin Rabbani and then the Taliban regime - enjoyed no era of peace and tranquillity.

Most important of all, Afghanistan has been one of the cradles - the other being Pakistan - of the jihadi culture since 1996. That culture has emphasized the primacy of jihad for Afghanistan and for the neighboring states, a development that has made a major contribution to the instability of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Even China's northwestern province of Xinjiang has been affected by the jihadi insurgency since the late 1990s. Now that the interim government is in existence, there are high hopes that its transition into a permanent government at the conclusion of the loya jirga will enable Afghanistan to continue its march toward some sort of moderate Islamic governance. It is even hoped that some type of stable democratic form of government will eventually emerge.

One dominant theme of the OECD conference was how to make Afghanistan a Western-style, liberal democracy. I am not sure how many participants were well versed in the history of that troubled land. But the notion of making a Western (also read "secular") democracy out of an Islamic polity should be approached with utmost care and sensitivity. And given the recent record of religiosity of the Taliban rule, attempting to secularize Afghanistan would indeed be a dangerous proposition.

The first and most immediate task ought to be figure out the modalities of instituting a moderate Islamic government. The immediate task of that government ought to be to incorporate cautious and incremental policies of institutionalizing Islamic moderation in all walks of life, starting with the education system. The revision of Afghan textbooks recently gained high visibility when the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) came under criticism for spending US tax dollars on promoting moderate Islamic education. The US critics, oblivious to the Islamic nature of the Afghan polity, were wrongheadedly arguing for instant incorporation of secular education in Afghanistan. Needless to say, that particular issue needs careful analysis and debate among Afghan specialists. Donor countries and bankers might have to await the outcome of such a study.

There was a short discussion of the emergence of "civil society" in Afghanistan. However, in a country where the evolution of a legitimate national government faces an enormous uphill struggle, the notion of creating a civil society - that is, where numerous autonomous networks compete for power and influence - is indeed problematic.

Another overarching concern of all participants was the creation of a secure environment within Afghanistan. The US version of that concern is still excessively embroiled with the destruction of the remainder of the Taliban and the al-Qaeda network. But the Afghan participants were troubled about the resurgence of warlordism and its implications for the continued evolution of the authority of the interim government. They were rightly concerned that the ominous nature of the resurgent warlordism would escalate misgivings and doubts among the donor countries that their economic assistance is not being properly applied toward the emergence of a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.

Moreover, the Afghan participants of the conference were concerned that Western business enterprises, as well as the expatriate Afghan business community residing in Western countries, might also decide to stay away, thereby indefinitely postponing the rejuvenation of private business activities in their homeland.

The implications of regional politics took up most of the last day's discussion and debate. One important suggestion was for the rejuvenation of cooperative activities of the so-called "6+2 group" - which includes Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, China and the United States. The basic premise underlying that suggestion was that Afghanistan and its immediate neighbors are so inextricably linked that whatever happens in one country is likely to affect the entire neighborhood. That reality emphasizes that Afghanistan's neighbors had better start their earnest endeavors to move away from the conventional patterns of "regional politics and rivalries as usual", for the contemporary circumstances in their neighborhood are highly unusual and require unusual and imminent multilateral endeavors.

But at the same time, it might not be easy for some of those countries simply to sweep their acute differences under the rug. For instance, the United States, the only extra-regional - albeit very important - power of the 6+2 group, has long-standing and acute differences with Iran. Even though there appeared a growing thaw in the frigid ties between the two last December, President George W Bush's "axis of evil" speech - in which he lumped Iran with Iraq and North Korea - dealt a serious blow to that. Iran and Pakistan are reported to be edging toward initiating a trilateral dialogue that would include Afghanistan. That was indeed an important development and promises to stabilize the region if evolved to its fullest potentials.

All conferences must end on a positive note, and this particular one was no exception. The participants were cautiously optimistic about the progress made and hopeful that the chances of serious setbacks were minimal, especially given the continued presence of the United States.

However, a report this week on the reconstruction of Afghanistan contained both good and bad news. The good part of that report stated that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has already achieved "phenomenal success" in assisting over a million Afghans "on their return journey home this year". That was "over 54 percent of the UN refugee agency's goal for 2002". The bad news was the reported sluggishness on the part of donor countries in releasing the funds that they had already promised for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The report gloomily stated, "Of the US$271 million the UNHCR needs over the period ending December 2002, only $171 million has been received. And with current monthly operational costs of more than $20 million, those funds will soon be exhausted."

Ehsan Ahrari is a Norfolk, Virginia, US-based strategic analyst.

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