The imaginary 'axis of evil'


	February 28, 2002	atimes.com

Central Asia/Russia

The imaginary 'axis of evil'
By Ehsan Ahrari

US President George W Bush's "axis of evil" speech makes one wonder whether this is an exercise in idle, but catchy, phrase-making or, worse yet, whether the United States is in the process of establishing a framework for conducting its global "war on terrorism" for the rest of this decade. Those who remember George Kennan's 1947 article that carried the byline "X" may also recall that the United States' policy of containing the Soviet Union evolved from it.

Kennan's argument was known for its articulation and for the fact that it was based on the then-prevailing reality - the Soviet Union was bent upon becoming a global exponent of communism, and that its implosion was largely brought about because of the inherent fallacy of communism as an ideology. So even the exaggerated version of the Soviet global ambition that was captured in the Truman Doctrine had a strong believability factor, even among those who were unimpressed by its shrill rhetoric. The same, alas, may not be said about Bush's recent adventure in phrase-making.

Bush came out with his "axis of evil" at a time when the post-Cold War notion of "dual containment" had proved itself quite hollow, especially on the part of European allies who were more than willing to do business with Iran, one of the intended targets of that silly policy. In the Middle East, dual containment never had many, if any, takers. Similarly, the European allies minced no words in their criticism of Bush's attempt to lump Iran, Iraq, and North Korea into some sort of an axis or an alliance a la fascist Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1940s. Russia and China were equally explicit in their disdain of that phrase, and especially of the potential military action that is perceived to be associated with that sort of rhetoric.

For Iran, the phrase manifests the "arrogance of power" that the United States is regularly accused of demonstrating toward it. After all, despite an uphill struggle with the Islamic hardliners within its domestic politics, the government of President Sayed Mohammed Khatami was cooperating with the United States in its "war" against global terrorism.

Two variables seem to weigh heavily in the calculation of US decision-makers for condemning Iran as a part of some axis. First, Iran had not eased up its support of Lebanon's Hezbollah. The Bush administration's one-sided condemnation of Yasser Arafat for the deteriorating state of affairs in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had to be extended to other hardliners in the region. Thus, Hezbollah and its chief backer (Iran) stood out in America's continued search for scapegoats.

Second, Iran's ongoing endeavors to exert its influence in those areas of Afghanistan that are contiguous to its own borders further irritated the Americans. The political process of enhancing the status of the interim government of Hamid Karzai faces increasing challenges as "warlordism" - which was the sine qua non of the pre-Taliban Afghanistan - appears to be resuscitating. The United States refuses to recognize the legitimate attempts of Iran to exert its influence on its neighbor, and categorizes it as support of terrorist groups. Iran is clearly not indulging in the latter form of activities, but is not about to stay aloof from the still-evolving intra- and inter-ethnic power politics in Afghanistan. Thus, the Bush administration concluded that Iran is "qualified" to be condemned as a part of the "axis of evil".

Iraq, by refusing to allow United Nations-sponsored inspections, stands out as a major source of irritation for the United States. It is also suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Thus, the hawks inside and outside the Bush administration have been fervently arguing that it is not only a next "legitimate" target, but also a part of the "axis of evil".

North Korea is another regime that defies America's attempts to enforce global nuclear non-proliferation. It not only actively proliferates ballistic missiles worldwide, but it is also suspected of having a small nuclear arsenal of its own. In the pre-September 11 global environment, negotiating with North Korea to dissuade it from selling ballistic missiles and persuading it to freeze its nuclear program were important aspects of conventional diplomacy. However, post-September 11, taking military action to destroy North Korea's missile and nuclear capabilities has emerged as a real option and labeling North Korea as part of the "axis of evil" is seen as a rhetorical barrage preceding potential US military actions. In this sense, the United States is treating Iraq and North Korea very similarly, except that in the case of the former, the chances of conducting a military campaign appear increasingly high.

But is there really an "axis" - which implies collusion, if not an alliance - among those countries? The fact of the matter is the "axis of evil" is purely imaginary and has no basis in reality. Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are three very different political systems. The first one is an evolving Islamic democracy, the second is a ruthless dictatorship, and the third has long been referred to as a Stalinist state.

However, they do share two very important characteristics. First, all three are determined to develop missile and nuclear capabilities. Second, all three not only reject US primacy in their respective neighborhoods, but also aspire to emerge as major regional actors.

Therein lies the proverbial rub. As the United States remains focused on maintaining its dominance in the Persian Gulf and East Asian areas, those countries are viewed as emerging threats. The term "rogue states" was the legacy of the Clinton administration and, during its last year in office, the phrase "states of concern" was bandied about. However, the Bush administration stayed with the now familiar label of "rogue states". In addition, the Rumsfeld Commission, headed by Bush's Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, had already established an alarmist tone of heightened missile threats from the rogue states back in 1998. Rumsfeld is now an official proponent of sustaining the alarmist rhetoric of his commission. That rhetoric only complemented the rationale for the national missile defense (NMD) bandied about by George W Bush, even during the last presidential elections.

The post-September 11 environment became suitable for institutionalizing the alarmist rhetoric. And the "axis of evil" was quite suited to serve that purpose. Not much attention was paid to the reality that, their endeavors to develop WMD notwithstanding, none of the so-called "rogue states" (or to use the current phraseology, the "axis of evil") stood much of a chance of surviving America's devastating retaliation if they were mad enough to carry out a missile or a limited nuclear attack on the world's now lone superpower.

The institutionalization of this unpleasant phraseology has already caused a considerable amount of dissension among America's allies and friends. Whether or not such an environment prevails will depend upon whether Bush learns from his mistakes and adopts calmer rhetoric on which to base future policies toward a number of countries that are unpopular with the United States, or insists on confronting them further with inflamed rhetoric. Or, worse yet, by taking military action against one or more of them.

Ehsan Ahrari is a Norfolk, Virginia, US-based strategic analyst

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