The quest for balance in Eurasia


	February 7, 2002	atimes.com

Central Asia/Russia

The quest for balance in Eurasia
By Francesco Sisci

BEIJING - A very sharp North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) general, Fabio Mini, noted some weeks ago the dangers of the sudden and orderly flight of the Taliban warriors from Kabul. Furthermore, he underscored the very difficult predicament of the United States and its allies in the country:

There is no tradition of democracy in Afghanistan, said Mini, and democracy can't be transplanted overnight.

The US and the British are not welcome in Afghanistan. They are there for the short term, and nobody has given them long-term permission to remain.

The US can't stay in Afghanistan through sheer force, otherwise they will be drawn into a very complicated local struggle.

The US presence in Afghanistan forces America to seek political accommodation with China, Russia and India, besides, of course, Pakistan, which was for decades the pillar of the very existence of Afghanistan.

To try to unravel this knot we should start from the beginning: There is no tradition of democracy in Afghanistan. Without a semblance of democracy providing the necessary political transparency, the US and the West will feel uneasy about Afghanistan. Local stability will be provided by constantly shifting compromises by the heads of government toward the many chieftains, who will be as loyal to the new prime minister as they were to the Taliban.

Western troops forced the Afghans into submission and implanted a new government. This strategy was militarily very efficient, because it avoided the mire of a prolonged war on the ground and allowed the US to declare victory quickly. But it leaves the US largely unable to control the territory, where large swaths of land may still be in the hands of pro-Taliban forces. The geopolitical black hole of Afghanistan is no longer, but the situation is like a Swiss cheese, full of smaller black holes where the infantry has not set foot and where nobody is very clear about what is happening. A colonial police force is not an option: history has taught the West about the dangers of a colonial predicament. Therefore the risks, and opportunities, of Afghanistan are in the new political accommodation that the US must seek with neighboring countries.

As the world's only superpower the US has the unique opportunity to play one country against another, as all countries need access to the US, because of its economic and technological prowess, beside its military might. In the ensuing relationship, Russia, China and India could become mere puppets, or they could try to reduce their dependence on the US by improving bilateral relations. The combination of the two - the need for strong ties with the US as well as strong bilateral relations among the Eurasian giants - could create a new balance of power in the continent, in which a single actor could not determine the whole scenario, but in which consultations among all can keep a geopolitical balance and thus constrain the dangers of major insurgency disrupting the complex order.

The balance of power in Eurasia is comparable to the balance of power in Europe before World War II. But in Europe the danger was the growth and ambition of single powers against other existing powers, Germany or Russia or even France and England or Austria against the others. But in Europe the ambition of Greece or Serbia or Poland, while dangerous for the status quo, did not have direct implications for the whole European scenario. There were issues driven by the romantic pursuit of nationalistic goals of independence that created friction among the major players.

In today's Eurasia the issue is completely different. There are large territories where the official government has no power - geopolitical black holes where anything can happen. Thus it is in the interest of all existing powers to bring these territories under control. It is not a situation like that at the beginning of the 20th century, when Germany and Russia had an interest in prodding Serbia one way or another for their competing goals of domination of Europe. Today, the large powers have an interest in filling the black holes. This, in the context of the integrated global economy, would enhance economic development, which is the goal pursued by all countries. There is also a common interest in checking the threat of Islamic extremism, which disrupts the economic order and could enlarge the geopolitical black holes.

There are several points that might help this bringing together of the main Asian continental powers and the US:

Bringing the black holes under control.

Developing the Asian economy.

Checking Islamic extremism.

These are long-term goals, as it could take 10 years or so to bring all the black holes under control and develop the local and continental economies. These objectives also assume no friction among the Asian powers or with the US. Any kind of friction here would push back the goal, just as any bilateral and multilateral success would bring the goal closer at hand.

However, such frictions are inevitable, both in the short and long term, as countries are wary of one another for their own security, and especially if a country changes its economic, and thus military, status. But the lesson of September 11 should help the main countries to keep in focus, as the main, direct danger to their own welfare and stability does not come in the short term from other powers but from the black holes. This will entail a complex political architecture in which all Eurasia is taken into account as a whole.

The upcoming visit of US President George W Bush to China could provide an important first agreement for the new Eurasian architecture.

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Tomorrow: Part 2: An axis of uncertainty