Asia Times: The incredible shrinking Russian nuclear force


	July 1, 2000	atimes.com

Central Asia/Russia

The incredible shrinking Russian nuclear force

WASHINGTON - The rationale for the United States keeping thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert is decreasing every day. Whether by treaty or unilateral action, President Bill Clinton could agree to dramatic nuclear arms cuts for one simple reason: Russia's forces are declining rapidly. Economic and physical limitations will reduce Russia's strategic nuclear weapons from thousands to hundreds over the next 10 years.

The Start II treaty limits each side to 3000-3500 deployed strategic warheads. In 1997, Clinton and former President Boris Yeltsin agreed that the next treaty's limits should be 2000-2500 warheads. Now, Russia is proposing even deeper reductions, to 1000-1500 warheads. Why? Because, absent a sudden and costly military buildup, that is the likely future size of Russia's strategic forces. In 1985, the Soviet Union deployed 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons. Today, Russia has fewer than 6,000. By 2010, it will likely have just over 1,000.

The size of Russia's future nuclear arsenal depends primarily on two factors: the production rate of its new missile, the SS-27 Topol-M, and the attrition rate for its submarine and bomber fleets.

Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, have operational lifetimes that rarely exceed 20 years. Without proper maintenance, a missile's lifetime may be as little as 10 years. Although sub-systems, like batteries and gas reservoirs, are relatively easy to repair, major components like rocket engines are simply too difficult and costly to replace. Compounding Russia's maintenance problems is the fact that key Ukrainian manufacturing plants have closed. Given that the last Soviet-era ICBM was deployed in 1991, it is anticipated that few if any of these older models will be operational by 2010.

Ten years from now, the SS-27 will likely be the only deployed ICBM in the Russian arsenal. Russian leaders originally planned on producing 30-40 of these missiles annually. But only 20 have been deployed over the past two years. Even assuming Russia is somehow able to slowly increase the rate of production to 20 missiles a year, it would still be able to field only about 200 ICBMs by 2010.

Meanwhile, Russia's ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) fleet is also aging. Budget constraints have decreased the frequency of routine maintenance on nuclear submarines, thereby reducing their 20-year lifespan. Because of these trends, it is likely that only the relatively new Delta IV fleet will be operational by 2010.

Each of the seven Delta IV SSBNs carries 16 SS-N-23 sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), for a total of 112 missiles. Each SS-N-23 has four multiple independent reentry vehicles, for a total of 448 sea-based warheads.

If Russia is able to resume construction of its new Borey-class submarine - which lays unfinished at the Severodvinsk Sevmash shipyard - Russia may be able to deploy it by 2010. The Borey class will probably carry twelve SLBMs, each with four warheads. By 2010, Russia's sea-based strategic nuclear force will likely be 124 missiles on 8 subs with 496 warheads. Russia has two types of strategic bombers, the Tu-95 Bear H and the Tu-160 Blackjack, both of which have 30-year operational lifetimes. Although production of the Bear H bomber stopped in 1991, production of the newer, Blackjack bomber has partially resumed. Several partially completed Blackjacks are at Russian production facilities and the first new bomber since 1991 rolled off the production line early last month. Nevertheless, the lack of routine maintenance for Russia's bomber fleet has significantly reduced its lifespan. By 2010, Russia is likely to have roughly 480 air-launched cruise missiles, carried on only 30 Bear H bombers and 10 Blackjack bombers.

In sum, attrition and limited operational lifetimes will increasingly take their toll on Russia's strategic nuclear forces. By 2010, in all likelihood, Russia will have between 290 and 464 missiles and bombers carrying 1100 to 2180 warheads.

The Soviet threat was the main incentive for the size, sophistication and alert status of the US nuclear force. With its steady decline, the United States could quickly reduce the size and alert status of its weaponry without any degradation in national security. Formal treaties could then lock in these substantial gains in nuclear safety and security.

(This article was distributed by The Global Beat Syndicate, a service of New York University's Center for War, Peace, and the News Media. (c) 2000 New York University. All Rights Reserved. For more information on Global Beat, check out http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat)