Asia Times: Putin's policies remain a puzzle


	April 1, 2000	atimes.com

Central Asia/Russia

Putin's policies remain a puzzle
By Maxim Shitov

MOSCOW - ''Old times have gone,'' Vladimir Putin told voters in a nationally televised address a few days before he was elected Russia's new president. What he failed to say, however, is what the new times will be like.

Now that the election campaign is over, many are trying to guess what the country's future will be like under the new president. The average citizen wonders whether prices will remain stable or skyrocket and whether the United States dollar, Russia's unofficial second currency, will be banned from circulation.

Russia's regional elite wonder about the future of the federation and the constitution. Most expect some type of drastic change. Regional governors in the future may be appointed, rather than elected as they are now. This would certainly restrict democratic procedures and consolidate the power of the Kremlin.

Business leaders wonder about the future of the economy, particularly in the areas of taxes and export-import regulations. An outline of the government's new economic policy isn't expected until mid-April and is currently being drafted by the Moscow-based Center for Strategic Developments, headed by Gherman Gref.

There is already the strong suspicion among liberal economic experts that the ''new program'' will be nothing more than an artificial mixture of previous economic projects. The new president's doctrine is expected to call for greater state regulation of the developing market economy.

Indeed, during the campaign, Putin offered many such seemingly contradictory policies. His recipe for developing a civil society in Russia, for example, calls for the protection of democratic values and rights through the firm enforcement of ''commonly acknowledged rules of behavior'' and the ''dictatorship of law.'' In an open letter to the nation, Putin argued that ''the stronger the state, the freer the person''. Much of his presidential campaign was comprised of such bumper-sticker slogans, including listing the battle against corruption and organized crime as one of his top priorities.

What was missing, though, were any specifics on how he would implement such policies.

What most observers do expect, however, is the rapid replacement of many advisors and high-ranking administrators within the Kremlin. Putin's first comments following his election promised as much. It seems certain that most Yeltsin-era officials, many of whom were supported by the Boris Berezovsky, will be replaced by the new president's proteges, in particular those who were his colleagues in the KGB.

It also seems clear that Putin is likely to strengthen the role of the central government. Speaking of his policies towards Chechnya, for example, Putin said that ''this is only the first step that may be followed by others.'' Now that he's received an electoral mandate, he can be expected to beef up various state institutions and enforcement agencies, not only to combat terrorism and corruption but also to exert greater control over other aspects of the society as well.

Among those expected to benefit under a Putin administration are the military (which is only natural in view of their efforts in Chechnya), state security forces, the Interior Ministry's troops and the police. After all, these are the pillars of a ''strong state''. Putin supporters say that such a reliance on military might does not signal a return to the Cold-War era or a sign of Russia's increased aggressiveness. Putin himself said ''It is unwise to be afraid of strong Russia. But it shouldn't be ignored.''

Liberals worry, however, that the emphasis on strengthening state institutions runs the risk of taking a totalitarian turn, leaving Russia isolated from all but the rogue states of the world anxious to unite under an anti-American banner.

Too pessimistic? Maybe. But Russia's new foreign policy , adopted just two days before the elections, made clear that Russia won't seek confrontation with the West - except on matters of principle to the country. Just what those matters of principle might be, however, remains vague.

Kremlin supporters, on the other hand, note that the government's statement demands that ''foreign policy shall contribute to solving problems at home: ensure foreign investments and make it easier to get credits in the West.'' This, obviously, will require some type of partnership with the West. And with the cost of servicing both domestic and international debts making up the single largest item in the fiscal 2000 Russian federal budget - nearly 29 percent of total state expenditures - such partnerships, and the resulting Western loans, are crucial to the nation's survival.

The mere promise of change was enough for most Russian voters to support a political newcomer. While voting at his polling station, Yeltsin summed up the public's expectations. ''Everyone wants changes,'' he said. ''And, of course, they are necessary and will take place. But the main direction will be preserved.''

President Putin may not be a democrat, but the changes that have occurred in Russia over the past decade may prevent him from becoming a dictator. At least that is the hope here.

(This article was distributed by The Global Beat Syndicate, a service of New York University's Center for War, Peace, and the News Media. (c) 2000 New York University. All Rights Reserved. For more information on Global Beat, check out http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat)