Asia Times: Sea change in Georgian-Russian relations?



	January 12, 1999	atimes.com

Central Asia / Siberia

Sea change in Georgian-Russian relations?
by Liz Fuller

Over the past five years, Russian-Georgian relations have been characterized by tension, threats, recriminations, and mutual suspicion.

Most Georgians suspect individuals or interest groups in Moscow of doing everything in their power to undermine Georgian sovereignty, torpedo domestic political stability, and prevent the economic upswing that is expected to result from the export via Georgia of Azerbaijan's Caspian oil. Many Russian observers, for their part, view with misgivings what they perceive as Georgia's unequivocally pro-Western orientation. In particular, they impute to Georgia the ambition of wanting to join NATO.

But in the course of the last several months, there are indications of changes in this relationship. If these changes continue, they are likely to have a major impact on the role of both Russia and Georgia in the future.

Despite an obvious asymmetry in their abilities to affect outcomes, each side has at its disposal levers that can be brought into play in order to rein in, or extract concessions from, the other. Georgians systematically accuse Moscow of encouraging the secessionist Abkhaz leadership to delay indefinitely any settlement of that conflict that would create secure conditions for the repatriation of an estimated 200,000 increasingly angry and militant displaced persons, for whom the Georgian government can provide neither jobs nor permanent homes. The Georgian parliament, for its part, refuses to ratify a 1994 agreement on the status of Russian military bases on Georgian territory until Moscow helps to restore Tbilisi's jurisdiction over Abkhazia and the unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia.

Over the past two months, however, Russian and Georgian leaders appear to have reached a series of interrelated agreements possibly intended to pave the way for a less confrontational relationship. In early November, Georgian and Russian officials signed a formal agreement whereby Georgia would assume full control over guarding its sea borders as of Jan. 11999 and gradually take over full responsibility for protecting its land borders, currently guarded jointly by Russian and Georgian contingents. The Georgian parliament, which has been consistently more outspoken in its condemnation of alleged Russian interference in the country's internal affairs than has President Eduard Shevardnadze, had passed a law in July 1998 calling for Georgia's border guards to have full control over the country's land frontiers within two years.

But there may have been a quid pro quo for this apparent Russian concession to Georgian demands. During talks with senior Russian officials in Moscow later in November, Georgian Minister of State Vazha Lortkipanidze reportedly agreed that the Russian military bases in Georgia should not be closed (another maximalist demand by the Georgian parliament), as they constitute a ''stabilizing factor'' in the Caucasus.

Less easy to evaluate is Russia's role in the most recent failure of Georgian and Abkhaz leaders to sign documents intended to address the aftermath of the 1992- 1993 war. In early fall, both sides expressed confidence that President Shevardnadze and Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba would meet in November to sign a protocol on peace and confidence-building measures and an agreement on Georgian economic aid for Abkhazia and on terms for the repatriation of Georgian displaced persons to Abkhazia's southernmost Gali Raion. By the end of the month, however, Tbilisi and Sukhumi were accusing each other of sabotaging the meeting by seeking radical amendments to the previously agreed texts.

Interviewed by ''Nezavisimaya gazeta'' in mid- December, Abkhaz Prosecutor-General and presidential envoy to the peace talks Anri Djergenia suggested that the Georgian leadership may in fact have no interest in reaching an agreement with Abkhazia, as the unresolved conflict serves as a unifying factor in Georgian political life. He said that in late November, unnamed Russian mediators had tried to persuade the Abkhaz to soften their position, which inclined him to suspect that Moscow and Tbilisi had concluded some kind of secret deal. Pointing to previous occasions when an agreement appeared to be within reach, Djergenia observed that ''whenever problems arise in relations between Russia and Georgia, Tbilisi adopts an openly anti-Russian stance, and we, in turn, begin to step up the negotiation process and try to achieve some kind of results, after which Georgia alters its position vis-a- vis Russia and begins to play tactical games with [Russia], then Moscow begins to pressure us and Abkhazia becomes a bargaining chip."

It is possible that, having wrested agreement from Tbilisi that Russian military bases should remain in Georgia, Moscow is now prepared to allow the current stalemate in the Abkhaz negotiating process to continue indefinitely. A recent comment by Shevardnadze indirectly corroborates both that hypothesis and the suggestion that the Georgian leadership considers the unresolved conflict advantageous since it diverts attention from acute social and economic problems, especially in the run-up to the Georgian parliamentary elections due in the fall of 1999. The Georgian president told journalists in Tbilisi on 31 December that he considers it unlikely that a political solution to the Abkhaz conflict will be reached this year and that such a solution will depend largely on the outcome of the Georgian presidential elections next year (in which he intends to run for a second term). But Ardzinba's presidential term also expires in 1999, and it remains unclear whether he will run for re-election. How a change of leadership in Sukhumi would affect either the negotiating process or the shifting relations between Russia, Georgia, and Abkhazia is difficult to predict. (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)

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