New
battlelines in Thailand By
John Cole and Steve Sciacchitano
A major
reshuffle of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra's
cabinet this month threatens to put her government
on a new collision course with the powerful and
emboldened military.
While much of the
commentary on the new lineup has focused on the
ruling Puea Thai party's bid to restore its
sagging popularity after last year's flooding
disaster, the significance of the appointment of
the new defense minister, Air Chief Marshal (ACM)
Sukampon Suwannathat, has not been properly
weighed.
Sukampon's provocative
appointment signals a potentially extremely
dangerous new period, one possibly on par with the
lead-up to the 2006 military coup that toppled
then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Yingluck's
brother. To understand why,
consider the major
differences between the new and old defense
ministers.
Outgoing defense minister
General Yuthasak Sasiphrapa, who has been kicked
upstairs to become the deputy prime minister in
charge of security affairs, is regarded within the
largely anti-Thaksin military as a professional
soldier who would not support a policy of revenge
against those military officers who staged and
supported the 2006 coup.
New defense
minister Sukampon, on the other hand, may have
different views on the matter. He is an Armed
Forces Prep School (Class 10) classmate and
long-time confidante to the Shinawatra family. He
is also known to have suffered personally from the
coup because of his loyalty to Thaksin, which some
believe denied him subsequent promotion to air
force commander.
It is also important to
consider the change in political climate since the
selection of Yingluck's original cabinet last July
and now. Yuthasak was appointed in the aftermath
of Yingluck's and Puea Thai's decisive electoral
win, when the opposition in general and the
military in particular were demoralized and to
some extent leaderless. Puea Thai was then in a
position to push its agenda through strictly
political means without provoking a direct
confrontation with the military.
This was
also in line with the secret agreement reportedly
reached between the military and Thaksin
interlocutors before the election, in which the
self-exiled Thaksin promised not to move against
the coup leaders or military interests in return
for a military vow not to try to interfere with a
Puea Thai election victory. In these
circumstances, Yuthasak was the perfect compromise
choice for defense minister.
Six months
later, the political landscape looks very
different. Puea Thai has by certain measures
suffered a significant loss in public support due
to its mishandling of the floods, and the military
has correspondingly risen in popularity because of
the public perception that it responded
effectively to the crisis. In particular, Royal
Thai Army (RTA) commander General Prayuth
Chan-ocha, a staunch opponent of Thaksin and one
of the leaders of the 2006 coup, has rebuilt his
personal reputation within the army.
Now
more unified and energized, the military stands in
a rough political equilibrium with the
democratically elected Puea Thai. In these changed
circumstances, Thaksin and his advisors seem to
have concluded that time is running out for them
to push their agenda and abiding by the
pre-election agreement merely risks further
strengthening the hand of the military. Thus
removing Yuthasak and appointing Sukampon was
viewed as necessary to counter the military's
recent gains.
Several senior Thai military
officers consulted for this article have reported
that significant changes within the Ministry of
Defense are now also being contemplated. Over the
course of the next few months, a number of new
defense weapons and equipment acquisition
contracts could be announced that would both act
as a way to build pro-Thaksin support within the
armed forces, and present lucrative new commercial
opportunities for Puea Thai politicians.
Much more important could be an attempt by
the end of the year to bring the army's leadership
under the civilian control of the Ministry of
Defense. The most decisive way for Yingluck to
accomplish this would be by pushing an amendment
to the law governing the military's annual senior
officer promotion and reassignment process (the
mid-year and annual October reshuffle lists)
through parliament.
Even if the law is not
amended, however, Prayuth's position is certainly
at risk - and a precedent for dealing with him
already exists. In 2002, then-army commander
General Surayud Chulanont was faulted for making
key personnel decisions without asking premier
Thaksin's advice. As a result, Thaksin decided
that Surayud was urgently needed as the Armed
Forces Supreme Commander, a largely powerless
position compared to that of army commander.
Underscoring the tension, Surayud was later made
premier under the 2006 coupmaker's short-lived
appointed government.
The future of
current army commander Prayuth will likely be the
same, with Defense Minister Sukampon moving to
transfer him to the Supreme Command during the
annual autumn reshuffle later this year. Military
insiders familiar with the situation believe that
Sukampon would not have the slightest qualms about
making such a controversial move. While Prayuth
could be moved as early as the upcoming mid-year
reshuffle, which will become effective on April 1,
moves of this importance are usually made in
October.
The new defense minister will
also likely begin to move the culture of the
ministry away from its current orientation as a
major staff organization to a kind of secure
operating base for Thaksin's military allies and
classmates in their struggle with the army.
Thaksin's Class 10 allies, many of them out of
work retired senior officers, as well as former
subordinates of Thaksin loyalists who lost after
the 2006 coup, will again have a place of
influence to organize and plan.
Some
senior officers who communicated with the writers
even fear that the ministry could be used to
exercise control over Thaksin allies outside the
military, akin to the infamous "war room" and its
three Class 10 managers who, while still on active
duty, effectively guided the armed street battles
with government forces in 2010.
Royal
complications What could make this already
serious situation into a potential crisis is that
the threat to transfer Prayuth, who was appointed
in large part because of his unquestioned loyalty
to the royal family, occurs at a time the palace
is making sensitive preparations for the eventual
passing of the widely revered King Bhumibol
Adulyadej.
Although the 84-year-old
monarch's health has reportedly recently improved,
his extended hospitalization since 2009 makes this
eventuality an immediate concern among royalists.
One key to a smooth succession to heir apparent
Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn will be the
maintenance of the army's absolute loyalty to the
crown. Many in the palace believe that Prayuth is
best suited to maintain that loyalty during what
will be a delicate royal transition. Several
of the authors' Thai classmates say that Thaksin
and his advisors believe that they will be able to
successfully orchestrate Prayuth's transfer later
this year, as they did with Surayud in 2002. With
the stakes now so high, including in connection
with the royal succession, it raises the prospect
of an eventual standoff between the two sides from
which neither will be able to afford to back down.
Whether Thaksin ultimately decides to
provoke such a confrontation with the army and
palace will depend on the course of events over
the coming year and thus cannot be predicted with
certainty. Two things, however, are clear.
First, even if Prayuth is allowed to serve
out his remaining full term as army commander
before retiring in September 2014, the other
coming changes in the Ministry of Defense will
create a base for Thaksin and his allies within
the military. Second, the modus vivendi
that was quietly reached between the military and
Puea Thai has now run its full course, with
potentially dire consequences for future political
stability.
The strains that this
unprecedented situation will put on the army as an
institution will be enormous. In the past, only
senior officers were normally held responsible for
their actions before and during a major political
crisis, most notably in the many coups carried out
previously. As long as lower-level commanders
could say they were following orders they were not
punished for winding up on the wrong side of a
coup.
The one notable exception to this
general rule was the failed April Fool's Day coup
of April 1981. The course of events during that
botched putsch hints at the likely consequences
for the 2006 coupmakers should Thaksin decide to
provoke a confrontation.
In 1980, the
tenure of then-prime minister and army commander
General Prem Tinsulanonda was extended at the
bequest of Queen Sirikit past his normal active
duty retirement date so that he could remain in
command of the army. This action provoked the
Young Turk group of mid-level officers into
attempting the April 1981 coup. During the course
of the coup, Prem was captured by the Young Turks,
but in contrast with past coups, King Bhumibol
refused to speak with the rebel officers, and in
fact ordered that Prem be immediately released,
which he was.
Prem then traveled with the
royal family to Korat, in the northeast, to the
2nd Army Region's headquarters, from where Prem
orchestrated a successful campaign to retake
control of Bangkok. Following the coup attempt, in
contrast to past practice, Bhumibol refused to
issue a blanket pardon for the coup participants
and those who had remained neutral. Both Bhumibol
and Prem understood that the problem during
previous coups was not so much the relatively
small number of actual coup participants, but the
very large number of officers and soldiers who
remained neutral.
To counter this
fence-sitting, during the coup attempt, Prem
issued a royal command over Radio Thailand
directing all military officers on active duty to
travel to Korat to personally pledge their loyalty
to Bhumibol. Later, in stark contrast to prior
coups, a massive purge was carried out by Prem
throughout 1st Army Region in Bangkok, including
all commanders from the highest to lowest levels,
as well as key staff from royal guards units.
The divisions within the military that
resulted from these actions were deep and in some
ways still remain. With fundamental interests of
the palace now potentially again at stake, the
pressure on Prayuth will be correspondingly great.
John Cole and Steve
Sciacchitano spent several years in Thailand
while on active duty with the US Army. Both were
trained as Foreign Area Officers specializing in
Southeast Asia and graduated from the Royal Thai
Army's Command and General Staff College. They are
now retired and the views expressed here are their
own.
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