BANGKOK - Thailand's community of Buddhist
monks, the Sangha, has traditionally occupied a
ubiquitous and hallowed place in Thai society.
However, globalization and decades of rapid
economic development have challenged the Sangha's
traditional position, seen in its dwindling
membership, plethora of scandals and diminished
role as educators and conflict resolvers.
The country's current political divide has
further strained the Sangha, exposing rifts and
presenting hard dilemmas for an institution that
is in many ways struggling to adapt to modern Thai
society. Increasingly, Thailand's Buddhist monks
face a stark trade-off: risk further
marginalization by remaining on the sidelines of
entrenched political conflict or wade into the
struggle in a way that could compromise their
transcendental legitimacy.
Political
leaders face a related choice of whether to
recruit monks to their cause and employ their
Dharmic rhetoric to push their
agendas. While it may bolster
the illusion of their moral authority, they risk
accusations of hypocrisy and exploitation given
their clear worldly power agendas and often less
than saintly conduct.
During Thailand's
political upheavals in the 1970s, including the
climactic military crackdown on student protestors
in 1976, the state-backed Sangha's "Council of
Elders" took a strong position supported by most
Buddhist lay groups. It criticized monks for
taking political sides and made clear involvement
in politics represented a contravention of Sangha
rules of discipline.
In recent times,
particularly with the emergence of competing
color-coded protest movements, monks in both rural
and urban areas have taken political sides. Some
were involved in storming the gates of parliament
with royalist "yellow shirt" protesters in 2008
while others openly participated in "red shirt"
protests that devolved into armed violence last
year. Monks have also routinely featured in both
protest groups' sponsored media and have appeared
on rally stages in Bangkok and upcountry.
Some monks have claimed to participate in
protests to reduce the possibility of violence
against demonstrators. Other monks, however, have
openly professed political affiliation and claimed
that their role as monks mandates them to fight
for truth, justice and against human suffering
brought about by misrule.
While the Sangha
Council issued orders in both 1995 and 2006
against monks becoming involved in politics,
follow-up statements condemning violators have
been few and far between. The silence could stem
from a perception that the council's central calls
would not be heeded by peripheral monks.
Because of the council's close association
with traditional Thai power structures, some of
which have recently been pulled into the political
fray, calls for non-involvement or threats of
punitive actions could similarly be perceived as
taking political sides.
Ahead of general
elections scheduled for July 3, the government's
Office of National Buddhism (ONB) recently issued
a warning for monks and novices across the country
to steer clear of political activities. Nopparat
Benjawatananant, the ONB's director general, said
the warning was issued in reaction to reports that
monks had started to canvass on behalf of
candidates in their localities.
The most
overt political linkages in the conflict have
emerged from the rapidly growing evangelical sects
that have broken with the state-backed Sangha. An
off-shoot of the "yellow shirt" movement hails
from the evangelical Santi Asoke religious sect
which claims Chamlong Srimuang, a core "yellow
shirt" leader, as their political representative.
With their symbolic support, the "yellow shirts"
have presented themselves as fighting for
explicitly Dharmic goals of countering Thai
politicians' corruption and the thirst for power
they allege former prime minister Thaksin
Shinawatra embodied.
Composed of
self-sufficient ascetic farming communities across
the country, Santi Asoke split with the official
Sangha in 1975 and overtly supported a political
party, the Palang Tham, in the late 1980s and
1990s. The party employed Buddhist concepts of
purity to differentiate itself from mainstream
political parties and ironically through
coalition horse-trading brought Thaksin to
national prominence as foreign minister in 1994.
The current "yellow shirt" protest against
interim prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's
government has undermined Santi Asoke's claim as
an effective rallying force judging by the small
numbers gathered at their protest site outside of
Government House.
Another evangelical
sect, based at Wat Dhammakaya on the outskirts of
Bangkok, has strong links with Thaksin and many of
his business cronies. Dhammakaya's teachings
emphasize a gospel of prosperity that has captured
the imagination and aspirations of segments of
Thailand's middle and upper classes.
In
the mid-2000s, the temple's leaders allegedly
leveraged their connections to Thaksin to beat
corruption charges and many senior members of the
sect have remained important financial and
political backers of the pro-Thaksin movement.
Earthly behavior, holy criticism Another dimension of Buddhist involvement in
Thai politics is the self-styled "socially
engaged" Buddhist movement led by prominent
intellectuals such as Sulak Sivaraksa.
Sulak was an outspoken critic of Thaksin's
free-trade policies and large-scale development
projects that forced villagers from their land and
damaged the environment. The contentious Sulak has
on several occasions faced lese majeste
charges and has been alternately critical of
"yellow shirt" leaders for being arrogant but also
supportive of the movement's promotion of Dharma
in politics. Opposition from renowned
charismatic monks plagued Thaksin throughout his
six-year tenure. Luang Ta Maha Bua, a revered
forest monk who famously raised donations to help
the country weather the 1997-98 Asian financial
crisis, frequently denounced what he perceived to
be Thaksin's self-interested approach to politics.
Thaksin attempted to silence the criticism
through a defamation lawsuit but dropped the
charge after royal admonishment. Queen Sirikit and
Abhisit were among the tens of thousands who
turned up at Maha Bua's cremation ceremony in Udon
Thani province, a Thaksin political bastion.
One of the motivations for the earliest
street protests against Thaksin in 2005 stemmed
from accusations that he had overstepped his
authority by conducting rites and rituals reserved
for royalty at Thailand's holiest temple, Wat Pra
Kaew.
Thaksin also faced "yellow
shirt"-spread rumors that attacks on holy relics,
including Bangkok's Erawan Shrine, were a part of
his plan to maintain power through the use of
black magic. Others interpreted the shrine's
destruction as a bad omen for Thaksin, one that
contributed to perceptions that his political
authority was deeply compromised.
The
symbolism of the wat, or temple, as a place
of peace and protection was violated last year
when at least six protesters and a medic were shot
and killed at Bangkok's Wat Pathumwanaram during a
military crackdown operation on "red shirt"
demonstrations.
Witnesses allege shots
were fired by military snipers into the temple
against unarmed protesters from the elevated sky
train platform. Earlier "red shirt" militant
leader Khattiya Sawasdiphol, alias Seh Daeng, had
used the temple as his protest site base,
indicating an attitude of using the temple, and
perhaps by extension Buddhism in general, as a
tool for tactical gain.
In the past,
politicians in situations similar to the
self-exiled Thaksin would have likely ordained for
a short period in a bid to show humility and
re-ingratiate themselves with society. The current
conflict, which has resulted in scores of deaths
and thousands of injuries, has in comparison seen
very few acts of repentance or remorse.
Religion has also played a central role in
Thailand's other major crisis in the deep south
region, where an ethnic Malay Muslim insurgency
has contributed to some 4,700 deaths since January
2004. While previous iterations of the conflict
were fought along similar ethnic lines, the new
generation of insurgents has adopted more explicit
violence against Buddhist monks, including several
cases of beheadings, and temples as part of their
fight against the Thai state.
Buddhist
militia groups set up to protect minority Buddhist
populations in the region have come under
criticism for targeted killings and exacerbating
communal violence. This has raised vexing
questions about the inclusiveness of Thai national
symbols, especially the Sangha, which in the deep
south is viewed by some as more of an obstacle
than bridge to finding a sustainable resolution to
the conflict.
From a longer-term
perspective, the diminished role of the Sangha is
arguably an important causal factor in Thailand's
crisis. Both sides of Thailand's political divide
are in competition for the loyalty of the rural
masses, who are in the process of questioning old
assumptions about legitimate authority, political
passivity and traditional methods of dispute
resolution.
The monastery is no longer the
only crucial center of village life and monks
increasingly play more ceremonial than mediating
roles. As the political conflict plays out, how
the Sangha reacts will be a crucial determinant of
Thailand's post-crisis socio-political order.
Seth Kane is a visiting research
fellow at the Bangkok-based Institute of Security
and International Studies.
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