INTERVIEW A parting salvo in the Philippines
By Fabio Scarpello
MANILA - Philippine Secretary of Defense Norberto Gonzales was often the brains
behind the brawn of outgoing president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's security
policies. Known for his behind the scenes influence over national security
affairs, he has already said that he will not serve in president-elect Benigno
Aquino's administration.
In one of his last in-depth interviews before the new government takes over,
Gonzales met with Asia Times Online contributor Fabio Scarpello in his Manila
office to discuss the Armed Forces of the Philippines' (AFP) ongoing
modernization program, the military's progress in its ongoing struggles against
the New People's Army (NPA) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) and other security challenges Aquino will face. Excerpts follow:
Asia Times Online: The AFP modernization program has been going
on since 1995. What have been the results in terms of troop combat readiness?
Reports are still emerging that soldiers are ill equipped on the frontlines.
Norberto Gonzales: Well, you are right. There are not too many
visible resources. We have a law that defines our organizational programs.
Unfortunately, this law is expiring this year. And it's been 15 years.[1] The
law says that we can spend up to 330 billion pesos [US$7.1 billion] for
upgrading and modernizing the AFP. Unfortunately, the AFP only received 28
billion out of the 330 billion, or 5 billion a year. We cannot blame anyone.
It's a consequence of the financial condition of this country.
Another problem has been that we have been given funds on a yearly basis,
linked to the budget approval. This has made it difficult for us to program.
Things only changed this year, when we finally got the Multi-Year Obligation
Authority, but we do not have much time left in office. However, we can still
lay the foundation for what will come. [2]
ATol: How are you going to do that?
NG: The recommendation of the army is that they want to re-equip
some divisions, mostly in Mindanao. So this will be one thrust. At the same
time, it should be noted that our country is in between internal and external
defense. We cannot totally neglect our external defense. We have a big army,
but we have an air force and a navy that are totally ill equipped. We would
like to have a balance of all three forces, given that we are an archipelago.
So what we really need is to upgrade our navy and air force, while still trying
to upgrade our army.
In terms of priorities then is to re-equip some of our army divisions, and
maybe add a little firepower. For example, we are still using 105 mm cannons
instead of 155 mm, maybe we can get some 155 mm for the army. But looking at
our navy, we need to give our navy some new ships. To my mind, it will take two
to three years to get those ships. We are acquiring some from Singapore and
probably [South] Korea. But I'm looking at the kind of equipment that our ships
already have and how to upgrade them.
ATol:: I understand that the AFP's main duty should be that of
external defense, but this has not been the case in the Philippines. So would
it not make more strategic sense to focus on the internal needs first so to
better cope with the clear threats you face? Considering that your main
potential external threat is China, especially in respect to the Spratly Island
issue, the geopolitical context and your closeness to the US would seem to
deter China from attacking.
NG: The problem is that in the meantime that we do not address
our external threats, they are there. China is not attacking us, but they are
insulting us.
ATol:: Let's return to the internal threats. In terms of the
Maoist insurgency, how is the AFP response progressing?
NG: If you look at the holistic approach, I think that we now
need more political action than military action. The military has done enough
in terms of reducing the area of the threat to a degree where political actions
could, probably, do the job better.
Unfortunately the communist front is going through a leadership change and this
makes it difficult to understand who to talk to. In the past, we were able to
talk to the central leadership, but now we don't know who the central
leadership is. So what we are trying to do is to talk to everyone.
We are asking every local official to initiate localized peace talks. What is
important is that we have enough funds to take care of the rebels that decide
to lay down their weapons. This is what our fight with the communists comes
down to.
ATol:: Under what conditions would you accept sitting at the
table with whatever new central leadership from the NPA, the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) and the National Democratic Front (NDF)?
NG: I'm not very optimistic on this because the position of the
NDF remains the same: they want a transition. I do not think that they would
accept anything short of a coalition government. But this was the position of
Jose Maria Sison. Now, from what we gather, the potential new leadership simply
wants to take over. So it is a fight to the end. That's what they want.[3]
ATol:: Left-wing parties have been the most active in using the
Party List system implemented in the country.[4] This is now part of the
democratic process, but factions within the army are very much against these
parties. Would it not make political sense to involve these people in the
political context so that, slowly, they become a part of the democratic
process? Some of them are using the system at the moment for strategic gains,
but I am thinking about the long-term objectives.
NG: You know, it is not an official position that we oppose the
communists. Actually, we have helped some left-wing parties in the past, for
example with funding. I cannot go into details, but we did that in 2004 and
2007. But you cannot blame our own forces for being against them because they
have clearly made the House of Representatives a very active tool for their
struggle, even reversing some of the laws that could have favored ending the
insurgency. But I personally agree with you that it is better to attract them.
ATol:: This opposition to the left-wing parties is also evidenced
by the fact that not many security officials that I spoke with condemned the
extrajudicial killings, which some non-governmental organizations have
estimated were higher than 1,000 during Arroyo's administration.
NG: Extrajudicial killings are a very different context. We are
opposed to that.
ATol:: Institutionally I understand that you are opposed to
extrajudicial killings, but I want to emphasize that the lack of condemnation
comes through.
NG: Part of the problem is that we have ongoing rebellions and
subversions, but we have no specific laws to fight rebellion and subversion.
Even the Human Security Act, which is intended to fight terrorists, is not
intended for political activists. Extrajudicial killings happen when you arrest
an NPA and you know that he will be released soon after and he will be back to
shoot at you again.
Out of frustration, sometimes, extrajudicial killings happen. It is sad. The
way we had addressed this was through the creation of the Inter-Agency Legal
Action Group (IALAG), but we were pressured by the UN [United Nations] to
dismantle this because of the big international campaign. What I have tried to
say to the UN is that the IALAG is a measure to prevent extrajudicial killings.
[5] I am trying to restore it, but this is very sensitive for the international
community. However, this is testing our laws and sometimes we need to put our
foot down. I would also like Congress to produce laws against rebellion and
subversion.
According to me, the absence of these laws is preventing us from ending this
fight. In the past, it was clearly defined who was involved in the military
struggle with the NPA and who was involved in the political struggle. Now it is
a different case. There is no clear distinction anymore. They are mixed. This
makes it very difficult for us.
ATol:: Another factor in the high number of extrajudicial
killings, according to some sources, is that AFP commanders are unofficially
given a quota of insurgents they have to neutralize. While this is easily
accomplished in the 'red areas' (NPA strongholds), it is not as easy to
accomplish in the 'white areas', where the communist struggle is conducted via
political means.
NG: This could have been the case before I was installed, but
this is no longer the case. We clearly emphasized that this is not right.
ATol:: In terms of the southern island of Mindanao, what sort of
new policy direction are you trying to implement?
NG: We face many dilemmas there. For example, in terms of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), we have agreed on this with the
MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), and it was not disarmed. Then the MILF
asked for the same thing in the same area. Originally, when we started about
nine years ago, what we wanted was for the MNLF and the MILF to negotiate
between them and tell us their position. That was the original effort.
But, (their respective leaders) Nur Misuari and Salamat Hashim would not accept
each other. So the negotiation proceeded with the MNLF. Now the MNLF no longer
controls the ARMM and they are left with nothing, while the MILF asks for the
same territory. It remains a difficult situation, but the important
developments that we have achieved are that we were able to maintain both
groups' engagement in the peace process, and the involvement of international
monitoring teams. What I would admit as a failure is that we should have taken
advantage of the years of peace, relatively speaking.
For me, one thing that is really lacking in the south is leadership. The MNLF
failed during its time in control of the ARMM. Now the MILF wants the same
thing, but I do not think it would do much better than the MNLF. The Muslim
society is very feudal; it goes by the example of the leaders. It works on the
Datu system, but this is not wrong in itself for me if the Datus are good
leaders.
ATol:: If it came to the establishment of the Bangsamoro Judicial
Entity in the ARMM as part of a peace deal with the MILF, who do you think
should guide the system in terms of the governance structure?
NG: I think we should guide the process.
ATol:: And what sort of governance system do you have in mind?
NG: Like in the rest of the country, a democratic system.
Notes
1. Gonzales referred to Republic Act No 7898.
2. The MYOA allows the Department of National Defense (DND) to enter into
multi-year contracts for its projects, including the procurement of military
equipment. In its absence, it was difficult for the DND to order expensive
equipment because it could not offer the guarantee that there would be a budget
available the following year.
3. Sison is the founder of the CPP and its ideological leader. The split
allegedly underway may see the militaristic Benito Tiamzon take over the
movement.
4. The PLS representatives constitute 20 (or one-fifth) of the total number of
representatives, including those under the PLS. The idea behind the PLS was to
enable participation from citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors - those who lack well-defined political
constituencies, but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation - to become members of the House of Representatives.
5. The IALAG was established in 2006 and dismantled in 2009. In his 2007
report, Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions wrote that "The central purpose of IALAG is to prosecute
and punish members of the CPP and its purported front groups whenever there is
any legal basis for doing so. I received no evidence that it was designed or
generally functions to plan extrajudicial executions. However, IALAG's
proactive legal strategy requires drawing up lists of individuals who are
considered enemies of the state but many of whom will not be reachable by legal
process. The temptation to execute such individuals is clear, representatives
of the AFP and PNP with the capacity to do so participate in IALAG bodies at
all levels, and there is circumstantial evidence that this has sometimes
occurred."
Fabio Scarpello is the Southeast Asia correspondent for Adnkronos
International. He may be contacted via www.fabioscarpello.com.
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