Wahid's death buries Indonesian reform
By Gary LaMoshi
DENPASAR, Bali - Praise poured in to honor Indonesia's fourth president,
Abdurrahman Wahid, on his death last week at the age of 69. The richly deserved
tributes recalled Wahid's wit, his leadership of the country's largest
grassroots Muslim organization, and his commitment to pluralism.
There's even talk of declaring Wahid, affectionately known as Gus Dur, a
national hero. His usually reticent successor and some-time rival, Megawati
Sukarnoputri, said, "Gus Dur meets the requirements," and indicated that her
political party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), had
already endorsed his enshrinement.
But the plaudits ignore the dark side of Wahid's 21-month
presidential term, which marked the nation's definitive break with Suharto's
New Order authoritarianism. The national mourning for Wahid failed to examine
what has become of the reformasi (reform) movement that brought Wahid to
power, the backlash against his presidency, and why Wahid was the lone genuine
reformer to occupy Merdeka Palace and remain prominent as a reformer on the
political scene throughout the near dozen years since Suharto's fall in 1998.
Wahid's presidency set back the cause of reform, perhaps crippled it forever.
Ironically, his term in office strengthened the hand of Islamic extremists and
the military. It also set the stage for sectarian violence and terrorist
attacks that killed thousands and threatened unity across the archipelago. Most
important, Wahid's bungled presidency illustrated the potential cost of
democracy to the old guard before it stripped their power to derail reform.
Born in East Java in 1940, Wahid was the first child in a prominent family of
religious leaders and nationalists. His grandfather, Hasyim Asy'ari, founded
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), destined to grow into Indonesia's largest grassroots
Muslim organization with 50 million members. Wahid was chosen as NU chairman in
1984, a post that gave him a power base and a public pulpit to advocate
pluralism and personal choice in religion. NU took a liberal line on religious
matters through its acceptance of mixing pre-Islamic traditions with Muslim
practice. A 1998 stroke, brought on by diabetes, left Wahid nearly blind and
dogged by health woes throughout his remaining years.
Wahid's NU post drew him into politics, even though he'd withdrawn NU from
formal politics; like religion, politics was a matter of personal choice. In
the early 1990s, Suharto tried to recruit Muslim leaders as allies, but Wahid
was among those who resisted. That put him in conflict with Suharto's New Order
and made him a leading dissident figure at a time when there wasn't much
dissent. Wahid allied with Megawati; the daughter of Indonesia's first
president, Sukarno, she headed one of the officially sanctioned opposition
parties. Her popularity would make her a threat to Suharto and the focal point
of the burgeoning reformasi movement that gained momentum as the 1997-98
Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia.
Killing unarmed protesters and deadly riots of murky origin forced Suharto to
step down in May 1998. Wahid took a leadership role in the new National
Awakening Park (known by its Indonesian acronym, PKB) and was nominated as its
candidate for president in the 1999 election. Voters would choose 500
legislators, who, along with 200 regional and group representatives, would
select the president.
These were heady times, with reformasi thick in the air as Indonesia
held its first free general election since 1955. Predictably, Megawati's party
won the largest number of votes in the election, 34% of the total, while
Wahid's PKB finished third with 13%. Supporters of reform expected Megawati to
become president. PKB backed Megawati against the incumbent, Suharto's vice
president, BJ Habibie.
However, a coalition of Muslim parties, led by reform figure Amien Rais,
emerged to block Megawati's selection. Amid fervent backroom dealing
reminiscent of the Suharto era or mid-20th century Chicago, Wahid supported
Rais to head the legislature and Rais' coalition backed Wahid for the
presidency. In the vice presidential voting, Wahid prevailed on Suharto's
military chief General Wiranto to withdraw, clearing the field for Megawati to
get the executive consolation prize.
Reform's failure
Wahid took the presidency with a mandate for reform but failed to capitalize on
it. His reform movement never articulated a coherent program for reform, nor
set out a coordinated program for it. Some of that was the legacy of Suharto,
who had effectively stunted political development for more than three decades.
But some of the fault belongs with Wahid himself for failing to seize the
moment and rally popular support for the cause. His death revealed a well of
public goodwill that Wahid never managed to tap as president.
Wahid's presidency featured many admirable steps. He abolished Suharto's levers
of political control, including the Ministry of Information. He lifted a number
of measures that discriminated against the Chinese minority and declared
Chinese New Year a national holiday. He began to fight the endemic corruption
of the New Order by disbanding the Ministry of Welfare.
Armed with a keen intellect, acid tongue, and firmly convinced of his own
righteousness, Wahid wasn't ideally suited for a political life of compromise.
Even though he assembled a broad cabinet that included all factions, his forte
was getting out in front and expecting others to follow, rather than building
consensus and moving incrementally. That would cost Wahid dearly when he moved
to reform the military.
Throughout the transition from Suharto's rule, the military under Wiranto had
largely gone along with reform. Wiranto had prevented elements of the military,
reportedly including Suharto's former son-in-law (and Megawati's 2009 running
mate), Prabowo Subianto, from staging a coup as Suharto stepped down amid
street protests. Wiranto also cooperated with separating the military and
police, and supported disengaging the military from politics, earning him the
mantle of reformer. The withdrawal from East Timor, which voted for
independence in a 1999 referendum, was bloody and destructive, but it was
accomplished without a mutiny within the bitterly opposed ranks of the armed
forces.
Wahid appointed Wiranto as his Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security,
the second most important role in the government. Yet there's little evidence
that Wahid used Wiranto as a bridge to build support for change. Many in the
military would be happy to see a genuine separation between politics and the
armed forces, but it would be a separation running both ways - soldiers would
stay out of politics, but politicians would stay out of military affairs,
including alleged human rights abuses and the armed forces vast network of
businesses, legal and otherwise. (That appears to be the current modus vivendi
under incumbent president and former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.) But
when Wahid began to attack corruption within the military's business empire and
fired Wiranto after just three months on the job, the gloves came off.
The military moved to destabilize Wahid's government. It allegedly began
stoking and arming sectarian violence in Ambon and central Sulawesi. The
military also apparently supported coordinated church bombings on Christmas Eve
2000, and helped rehabilitate radical Islam that had been discredited under
Suharto.
Wahid's erratic governing style and lack of skill as an administrator left him
with few political allies. Rather than deriding the legislature as a
"kindergarten" and later a pre-school "play group", he could have advanced the
notion of legislative accountability. His presidency was characterized by
off-hand remarks and snap decisions that began to disillusion supporters of
reform - a process Megawati completed as his successor with a thoroughly
corrupt regime that harked back to the Suharto era.
The corruption charges against Wahid that led to his impeachment were trumped
up, but the sentiment that his presidency had failed was real and unfortunate.
Cornering the military dragon without the power to subdue it has let the armed
forces continue to occupy an outsized role in Indonesian society. Failing to
present a good government alternative to business as usual has doomed Indonesia
to another generation of endemic corruption and the widespread poverty that
goes with it.
Wahid was a fine man with a lifetime of lasting achievements, but with his
passing it is important to remember that he was no hero to Indonesia's
reformers.
Longtime editor of investor rights advocate eRaider.com, Gary LaMoshihas
written for Slate and Salon.com, and works a counselor for Writing Camp
(www.writingcamp.net). He first visited Indonesia in 1994 and has tracking its
progress ever since.
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