Page 2 of 2 US zeroes in on China's clout in Myanmar
By Brian McCartan
Following the suppression of pro-democracy demonstrators in 1988, China stepped
in with massive military aid enabling Myanmar's military to expand to some
500,000 men, the second-largest standing army in Southeast Asia. China has also
supported Myanmar in the United Nations, frequently blocking moves by the US
and its allies to censure the junta through the Security Council. In the latest
move, earlier this month, China agreed not to question rising civilian deaths
as a result of US bombing campaigns in Afghanistan in return for the US and its
allies refraining from focusing on Myanmar's political and human-rights
situation.
Like Cambodia and Laos, Myanmar has also become a major recipient of Chinese
economic assistance in the past decade. This help has often been in the form of
interest-free loans, grants, concessional loans and debt relief. China will
likely remain a key
source for this kind of assistance due to its "no strings attached" approach.
In return, China has been given preferential access to exploit Myanmar's
natural resources and port facilities along Myanmar's coast. China has become
Myanmar's largest investor, with junta figures claiming that 90% of recent
investment came from China. In addition, tens of thousands of Chinese have
migrated to Myanmar seeking work and business opportunities, especially in the
north and to the second city, Mandalay, which some Myanmar citizens refer to as
a "Chinese city".
Chinese investment also includes involvement in the controversial Shwe gas
project off Myanmar's western coast. Rights organizations say the offshore
project and a dual oil and gas pipeline being constructed from the coast up the
length of the country to the southern Chinese city of Kunming have already
resulted in human-rights abuses and will likely result in many more as the
projects progress.
China also views Myanmar as an essential component in its plans to develop its
landlocked southwestern Yunnan province. Beijing is keen to develop road
networks and port facilities to facilitate the transportation of goods through
Myanmar for export to the rest of the world. A new oil and gas terminal at
Kyaukphyu on Myanmar's western coast together with the pipeline will allow
China to import oil and gas without having to send its tankers through the
narrow and strategically insecure Malacca Straits.
Love-hate relations
The closeness of the relationship between Beijing and Naypyidaw, however, is
often overstated. A Myanmar army offensive against ethnic Kokang Chinese
insurgents in August along the China-Myanmar border was a case in point.
Despite clear warnings from Beijing against such a move, Myanmar's army went
ahead without providing China forewarning. China responded to the offensive
with a rare rebuke of the regime and called for stability. China also joined in
a call at the UN Human Rights Council on October 2 for the release of political
prisoners and a free and fair election process in 2010.
While China has been able to cultivate civil officials and military officers
and improve its image with the general population through high-profile cultural
projects, including the promotion of Chinese language studies and scholarships
to study in China, in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, Beijing's efforts in Myanmar
have run into a pervasive xenophobia and wariness of dependence on any singular
foreign power.
Knowing the limitations in its own relationship with Myanmar's generals, China
is reportedly watching developments closely to determine how serious the US and
Myanmar are about improving bilateral relations. A US-Myanmar detente would
undoubtedly be viewed as a threat to Beijing's strategic interests in the
region. A Myanmar more sympathetic to the US may be less willing to support
China's projection of power into the Indian Ocean and risks negating advantages
gained for the security of its sea lines of communication through avoiding the
Malacca Straits.
Chinese officials already suspect that the swift campaign against the Kokang in
August may have been motivated by signals allegedly given by US Senator Jim
Webb during his visit to Myanmar this month. If true, then China's leaders
would be justifiably concerned that Myanmar's generals may feel safe enough in
their dialogue with Washington to follow up with attacks against the other
ethnic armies along the border. Chinese authorities have already started to
build refugee camps should this happen.
In conceding that the engagement process will be long and slow, US policy is
aimed more at how Myanmar will change after the scheduled 2010 elections.
Should the elections result in a genuine move towards democracy, the US is
expected to increase its engagement beyond mere diplomatic exchanges towards
concrete assistance.
A repeal of some sanctions could soon put the US in direct competition
politically and economically with China for influence in Myanmar. And a sudden
move towards a democratic federal state would be at odds with China's apparent
preference for Myanmar's political scene to evolve through a gradual process
guided by a strong central government.
Already, Myanmar's regime has made some tentative signals that it is willing to
acquiesce to at least some of Washington's aims, at least in the short term.
Two meetings were held this month between the junta's liaison officer, Labor
Minister and retired Major General Aung Kyi, and pro-democracy leader Suu Kyi.
Consequently, Suu Kyi was allowed to meet with representatives from the US,
Australia and the European Union.
Her National League for Democracy (NLD) party has also been allowed to meet
with foreign diplomats, including a meeting on Tuesday with the US charge d'
affaires, Larry Dinger. United States officials announced on October 8 that a
senior Myanmar official - most observers believe it will be Prime Minister
Lieutenant General Thein Sein - will be at a November meeting held between
Obama and ASEAN in Singapore during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) summit.
What is not yet clear is why the generals have appeared to change their stance.
It may be yet another attempt to put off international pressure only to revert
back to repression and intransigence once attention has shifted elsewhere. Or
the generals may be purposefully playing the US against China, knowing that any
improvement in relations with Washington will improve its negotiating leverage
with Beijing.
Conceptually, the US makes for a perfect counterbalance to what the Myanmar
generals see partially as a threat posed by Chinese domination through its fast
expanding economic influence. The US also makes for a much stronger
countervailing weight in balancing China's influence than Beijing's current
major rival for influence, India.
A closer relationship with the US would certainly force China to revise its
relations with the regime in order to safeguard its interests in an area that
it previously had almost monopolistic control. US influence in Myanmar could
also go some way to negate the strategic advantages China has gained through
moves to turn Myanmar into a corridor for trade and oil and gas distribution to
its landlocked southwest and its ability to bypass the Malacca Straits, which
Beijing fears the US navy could blockade in case of any conflict.
One area that could see immediate change is China's support for ethnic
insurgents along its border with Myanmar. The junta is placing heavy pressure
on the ceasefire groups to become border guard units under army control and
join in the 2010 elections. Ethnic leaders have so far resisted the demand and
with a deadline set for the end of this month, civil war has become a real
possibility.
So far, China has been careful to provide only enough support to deter the
Myanmar army from making any rash moves and some have questioned the apparent
lack of Chinese support for ethnic Chinese Kokang insurgents who were routed in
September.
This may change, however, as closer ties with the US could push China to
maintain or even strengthen relations with ceasefire groups along the border in
a show of strength to safeguard its interests. Unless Myanmar's rulers are
serious about change in their country that conforms to US criteria, it will be
some time before relations between the two countries normalize.
In the meantime, the US now at least has a seat at the table with the generals
to discuss China's role in Myanmar, and with concessions could potentially
provide the regime with diplomatic and economic alternatives that gradually
shift the region's balance of power.
Brian McCartan is a Bangkok-based freelance journalist. He may be reached
at brianpm@comcast.net.
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