Page 2 of 2 COMMENT
How Australia can help Myanmar
By David Scott Mathieson
In essence, such support is keeping alive thousands of people in desperate
situations, something the Myanmar military and their routinely brutal campaigns
to interdict livelihoods in conflict areas want to stamp out. These military
operations often represent brazen breaches of international humanitarian law.
Many other donors already support such initiatives and they don't advertise it
for security reasons. Australia can take the same approach very easily, by
recognizing that even a little money goes a long way to supporting people to
survive.
Target sanctions effectively
Lastly is the vexed issue of sanctions. It is impossible to conclude that
international sanctions have had their desired effect: for the SPDC to respect
the human rights of the Myanmar people. Yet they retain a certain symbolic
utility, reminding the regime of how their reprehensible actions transgress
international norms of acceptable behavior. Removing the sanctions too fast
sends the wrong message, especially when the SPDC makes their repeal
such a prominent condition for negotiation. Sanctions, therefore, have a prime
usefulness, and should be scrapped only incrementally in line with significant
concessions from the regime.
The list of targeted officials and individuals by the Reserve Bank [5] updated
in October 2008 lists 463 people who substantially benefit from military rule
in Myanmar. This all sounds great, but its only half-way there. Australia has
measures it is not yet using - for example, Australia's sanctions regime
currently applies to hundreds of designated Myanmar individuals but not any of
the companies under their control or others known to underwrite the junta's
abusive rule. The list of sanctions targets should be extended to cover
companies owned, controlled by, or substantially benefiting Myanmar's military.
This information is readily available if the resources are directed to
investigate it.
Also, Australia specifically blocks transfers of funds or payments involving
designated persons, yet does not bar other types of financial services and
transactions. Most notably, Australia's current measures do not fully freeze
assets held by such persons in Australia, nor clearly block dealings with those
individuals that involve Australian persons and institutions operating from
other countries. Firm steps are needed to fully enforce sanctions so that key
Myanmar officials named as targets are not able to derive benefit from assets
in Australia or handled by Australian institutions.
Australia must not wait for evidence of genuine concessions from the SPDC to
repeal its present sanctions, it should wrest the initiative back from the
regime by re-calibrating its targeted measures now. It can do this in two
important ways. First, by tightening up its list of SPDC officials and by
including specific key companies or Myanmar military controlled entities with
direct links to the regime. Second, Australia can make more effort in
coordinating sanctions with the US, European Union, Switzerland, and Canada to
target key individuals, both military and civilian, who bear responsibility for
abuses and whose considerable financial support of the SPDC could undermine
these sanctions. These individuals are at the apex of the system inside Myanmar
and susceptible to this kind of pressure.
More effective coordination could also lead to greater support from other key
states such as Japan, Singapore and Thailand. Australia should work with
European and other countries to adopt full financial sanctions and encourage
other governments to impose complementary measures. Slow implementation by
sanctioning governments, including Australia, and poor coordination
internationally have undermined financial and other sanctions, and kept them
from realizing their potential. Australia can remedy this by taking a more
robust multilateral leadership in coordinating one list of persons and
companies for all sanctioning countries to agree on, making it small, effective
and adaptable for maximum effect.
Listen to the Lady
In a letter sent by Suu Kyi to President Than Shwe on September 25, the
detained democracy leader urged negotiations on the lifting of sanctions, and
specifically requested leave to consult with the Australian ambassador in
Yangon, something she did recently (albeit with a lower official because the
ambassador was on holiday at the time), as well as the UK ambassador and a
representative of the European Union.
This is an important step, and countries with sanctions already in place should
consult not just with Suu Kyi but many other opposition figures and business
leaders to think of a gradual repeal of sanctions - but only when there is a
complete release of political prisoners and genuine progress on opening up the
political system to encourage community participation ahead of the elections in
2010.
In the interim, tightening specific targeted sanctions is one way of focusing
the SPDC's attention on what they stand to lose from treating enhanced talks
with the international community with their instinctively cynical
self-interest, and importantly on what they should be considering: the welfare
of their own people and a real chance to start a genuine process of national
reconciliation. A more effective sanctions regime, targeted, nuanced, adaptive
and effective, also sends clear messages to sanctions-skeptic countries such as
Singapore, Japan, Thailand, India and China, that they can have an effect and
also disrupt the flow of SPDC funds and regime members' private finances.
Recent sanctions called for by the Burma Campaign Australia, supported by the
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), on Australian-owned budget airline
JetStar Asia flights between Singapore and Yangon, and some textiles imports,
hark back to the consumer boycotts of the 1990s and not on the sort of
better-targeted measures designed to genuinely impact on the regime rather than
the people of Myanmar, who have suffered enough.
There is also the sanctions option that no state in the international community
has seriously considered: a multilateral arms embargo on Myanmar through the UN
Security Council. Australia is probably the best placed of Western countries to
support this initiative, potentially with Canada, within the UN system.
Australia's Myanmar policy should be lauded for its considered balance and the
continued expression of support for a free and democratic Myanmar by most if
not all members of the federal parliament. With just a few policy tweaks, a
little more money, and a substantial investment in multilateral diplomacy,
Australia could provide the kind of renewed international and regional guidance
on engaging Myanmar that is now desperately needed.
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