Page 1 of 2 AN ATOL INVESTIGATION
A bid to buy Thai Muslim hearts and minds
By Brian McCartan and Mark Oltmanns
YALA and NARATHIWAT - Thailand's government has initiated a program to build on
what it considers to be success with its "surge" tactics in the country's
insurgency plagued southernmost regions. The four-year pacification and
spending program aims to win hearts and minds even while militants appear bent
on upping the tempo of their violence.
Those claims of success were put to the test at the end of April when a series
of coordinated attacks were carried out across the restive region. Deadlier
attacks occurred in June and July, resulting in the killing and wounding of
security forces, teachers and both Muslim and Buddhist civilians. Figures from
Deep South
Watch, a monitoring group at Prince of Songkla University in southern Pattani
province, indicate a rise in the number of casualties since the beginning of
the year and point to intensifying violence.
The military contends that the upsurge in attacks was brought on by the success
of the "surge" and the result of insurgent attempts to maintain influence in
what Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) spokesman Colonel Parinya
Chaidilok describes as a "competition for the people's support". "The
insurgents think that if they cannot make things happen, then they will lose
the support of the people," Parinya told Asia Times Online.
The government claims it will be able to win that competition in three years
through a recently announced 63.1 billion baht (US$1.85 billion) security and
development program for the region. The fund, which will draw money from the
budgets of relevant ministries, was approved by a special Council of Ministers
for the Development of the Five Southern Border Provinces Special Region, known
locally by the Thai letters ror chor tor, established in February and
headed by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.
The program is scheduled to disburse 8.5 billion baht this year, 18.2 billion
next year, 19 billion in 2011 and 17.4 billion in 2012. According to Parinya,
funds earmarked for 2009-2010 will largely go to ISOC to bolster security, but
in 2011 more money will go towards development projects. Depending on the
success of those outlays, he says, most of the 2012 budget should go to
development.
Programs in the south have come under criticism because of ISOC's control over
the budget for the civilian-led development coordinating body, the Southern
Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC). According to SBPAC figures, the
agency will be budgeted 1.5 billion baht, 1.85 billion baht and 1.6 billion
baht over the next three years - a small proportion of the overall budget
announced by the government.
Critics say that ISOC's control over the cash flows has put the military in the
driver's seat for political and development affairs on top of security issues.
Some observers of the armed conflict have postulated that the large amounts of
cash being sent to the south gives the army too big a stake and provides
monetary incentive to sustain rather than end the conflict. It's a sentiment
that many Malay Muslims and some Buddhists in the region echoed during
discussions with Asia Times Online. Most felt that they would see little, if
any, of the government's development funds.
Political military
Under an initiative Abhisit has dubbed "politics-led military", civilian
control of the region's development is to be reinstated through a new
administrative body known as the Southern Border Areas Administrative Center
(SBAAC). As planned, the new center would receive its funding separately from
ISOC and be nominally headed by the prime minister.
While the SBAAC is scheduled to take over SBPAC's role over development and
politics, ISOC would remain responsible for security. Although the idea has
gained cabinet approval, laws to establish the agency have yet to be passed by
parliament, leaving ISOC in control of the purse strings.
The military claims that the volatile security situation in the region
necessitates that soldiers are also involved in political and development work.
"This is our policy that we call 'politics leading the military'," says
Parinya. "But in reality the soldiers are the ones doing the political work,
meaning they are building understanding with the people in order to prepare
them for the development that will follow."
A mid-level officer not authorized to speak to the press described his view of
the army's role in the region: "Politics here isn't about local politicians.
It's not going out and looking for votes; it's not about politicians
campaigning. Politics means developing the area and building understanding with
the villagers, have them understand the role of the army and who is working to
help the people ... Of the 60,000 forces we have down here, 80% are used to
look after and protect the people and 20% are used to go after the insurgents."
Sensitive to allegations that it is taking most of the money earmarked for
development and reconciliation programs, the military says its role in the
south is often misunderstood. They claim that most of their budget goes towards
the support of villages and the soldiers that protect them rather than to
security operations.
"The money is still going to the people, it's just that it comes through the
military; the military is distributing it," Parinya said. "This is what we are
doing in those villages where SBPAC can't go to yet. They can't go there
because there is still [insurgent] movement there ... But we are not doing it
permanently; we are doing it to help them get by and keep the insurgents out.
After we have chased out the insurgents, SBPAC can come in and take over the
development programs."
To jump-start development and understanding in insurgent-controlled or "red"
villages, the army has begun a program it refers to as Serm Sang Santisuk
(Sahm Sor), or the three S's program. Under the program, serm -
"to enhance" - aims to improve security, education and economic opportunities, sang
- "to build" - will upgrade the region's infrastructure, both towards the aim
of creating the third S, santisuk, or peace.
To carry out the program, 31-man army Peace Development Teams have been
stationed in each of the 217 villages identified as being under insurgent
control. Rather than seeking out and confronting insurgents, the soldiers are
assigned to build understanding and foster development projects such as fish
ponds and raising poultry. They also provide security to the villages and
better coordination between the villages and ISOC. The teams will remain in the
villages for two years, after which the situation will be re-evaluated to
determine if it is safe enough for SBPAC to commence its own development
programs.
According to SBPAC sources, the development budgets are divided between
politics, culture, education, economic and social programs. A foreign affairs
element is also included to coordinate projects with neighboring Malaysia for
border villages. Money is also allocated for Village Defense Volunteers to
cover training and non-military equipment such as flashlights and rice cookers.
Weapons, on the other hand, are provided by the army.
The military claims that ideas for development projects come from the villagers
themselves. According to one army officer in Yala province, "We can't force it
on them and say, 'You need to have this and that.' We need to know what they
want." Villagers are also expected to give input into their own security by
setting conditions for soldiers in the villages and by joining the army-trained
Village Defense Volunteers.
Strategic shift
The new policy is the brainchild of 4th Army Region commander Lieutenant
General Pichet Wisaichorn, who is also ISOC's chief for the three southern
border provinces. Security analysts say his approach is markedly different from
previous strategies for the south, which were largely based on patrolling areas
and holding discussions with villagers about their health, economic,
communications and education needs.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road,
Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
