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Myanmar's military as a Ponzi scheme
By Norman Robespierre
YANGON - Rank inflation and an ever-expanding flag officer corps are unable to
provide sufficient promotion opportunities within Myanmar's military, known as
the Tatmadaw. The civil government structure is at risk of further
militarization as the country slowly moves towards the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC) military regime's unique interpretation of
democracy.
On September 17, 1988, the day before the Myanmar military staged a coup and
formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), there were only two
officers above the rank of major general in the entire Tatmadaw. They were
General Saw Maung, the defense forces chief of staff, and then-Lieutenant
General Than Shwe, the army's vice chief of staff.
In current nomenclature, these positions would be referred to as CINC (defense
forces) and CINC (army). Today, the Tatmadaw has no less than 24 senior flag
officers serving in lieutenant-general or above billets on active service (See
Table).
The 1,200% increase in senior flag ranks far outpaces the approximate 250%
increase of the entire Tatmadaw over that same period. This expansion of the
upper tier has been central to Senior General Than Shwe's ability to stay
firmly in control.
By expanding promotion opportunities within the Tatmadaw, Than Shwe has
successfully ensured continued loyalty of the officer corps. The expansion of
the flag ranks provides more opportunities for advancement, allowing Than Shwe
to dangle the carrot of self-interest that often entices officers' to continue
to support the system.
Expansive reorganizing
Illustrative of Than Shwe's efforts to expand promotion opportunities was the
reorganization of the Tatmadaw in November 2001. According to a senior Myanmar
military official intimately familiar with the Ministry of Defense's planning
process at the time, the major reorganization of the Tatmadaw was done to
expand promotion opportunities for the officer corps and reduce the power of
regional commanders.
The morale in the Tatmadaw had been particularly poor in the late 1990s. A 500%
raise for the military granted on Armed Forces Day in 2000 improved the
situation somewhat. However, according to the source, there remained an
undercurrent of dissatisfaction among field-grade officers over the scarce
opportunities for advancement.
That was caused in part by the long tenures of regional commanders, who used
their positions to consolidate significant powers. They were essentially
warlords and controlled virtually all of the weaponry and manpower of Myanmar's
ground forces, which were engaged in combat with ethnic insurgent groups. Than
Shwe could not risk taking action against any one regional commander as the
others might band together and stage a mutiny against him.
At the time, the regional commanders were also members of the SPDC, a
designation which made them technically higher than ministers. As a result,
ministerial decrees were difficult to implement, with regional commanders
deciding on which decrees to enforce or ignore. The dilemma was resolved then
by luring the SPDC-member regional commanders from their fiefdoms to accept
promotions within the War Office. In a policy shift, new regional commanders
were not made SPDC members.
To ensure allegiance of the new regional commanders, they were not selected
from the corps of officers next in seniority. Instead, Than Shwe promoted
officers from several rungs down the ladder. The rationale apparently was that
an officer next in line by seniority would have assumed the position with the
attitude he had earned it through his own hard work. Conversely, one promoted
early would recognize the value of his mentor's assistance and be indebted with
a sense of loyalty.
The plan required considerable expansion of the lieutenant-general positions to
accommodate the regional commanders. A number of lieutenant-general positions
were opened up by a variety of means: two lieutenant-generals were terminated
for corruption just before the 2001 re-organization. The Bureau of Special
Operations (BSO), which co-ordinates operations across regional commands, was
separated into four entities.
Additional billets also were created with the new position chief of staff
(army, navy and air force) and by forming Offices for Defense Industries, Air
Defense and Training. In the Myanmar military, offices are headed by
lieutenant-generals and directorates by major generals. The creation of offices
to justify a third star was done previously.
In August 1993, the Office of Special Studies (OSS) was created to justify the
promotion of the former head of intelligence, Khin Nyunt, to the rank of
lieutenant-general. The OSS's function and personnel were not readily
distinguishable from headquarters staff of Khin Nyunt's Directorate of Defense
Services Intelligence (DDSI).
A former military intelligence officer said in an interview that outsiders and
Western analysts attached too much significance to the formation of the OSS, as
it was essentially a paper shuffle to justify Khin Nyunt's third star.
Rank inflation
The November 2001 reorganization is just one factor in the subsequent expansion
of the Tatmadaw's flag officer corps. Creation of new ranks, development of new
positions, and military infiltration of the civil service has fostered rank
inflation and growth of the flag officer corps.
The trend toward a larger flag officer corps was established just 18 months
after the SLORC seized control of the country, when mass promotion of generals
and some colonels took place in March 1990. To maintain a pyramid structure to
military command, Than Shwe's predecessor, Saw Maung, elevated himself to the
newly created rank of senior general.
The creation of a new rank was repeated in September 2002 when the regime's No
2 man, Maung Aye, was knighted with the rank of vice-senior general, equating
to 4.5 stars. The new rank allowed him to maintain rank superiority when his
rival Khin Nyunt put on his fourth star.
Khin Nyunt's promotion to general required a paper shuffle similar to that
associated with his previous promotion. To justify his fourth star, Khin Nyunt
was designated special advisor to the senior general. Later, his appointment as
prime minister justified the rank. Khin Nyunt fell from power in a 2004
internal purge and is currently being held in house arrest.
While justification of Khin Nyunt's promotions may have been an exercise in
paperwork, operational positions have been created to expand the flag ranks.
Following the precedent of the November 2001 reorganization, two more BSOs were
activated: BSO-5 covering Yangon Division and BSO-6 with responsibility for
Rakhine State and Magwe Division.
The most recent lieutenant-general position to be created is that of Defense
Services Inspection and Auditor General. While there may be some operational
utility to the creation of the BSOs, the latest created position appears to do
little more than add an additional layer of bureaucracy.
The military bureaucracy has likewise expanded below the lieutenant-general
grade. The formation of new regional commands, an increase in the number of
operational control commands, and inception of division-level control commands
for artillery units and armor, has significantly contributed to the expansion
of the flag-level officer corps.
Bloated civil service
Parallel to the regime's expansion of the military bureaucracy is an
ever-expanding civil bureaucracy. Shortly after the SLORC took over in 1988,
the government consisted of the Office of the Prime Minister and 18 ministries
led by nine ministers. Of the nine, eight were military officers serving in
positions under the Ministry of Defense.
Since then, the civil bureaucracy has grown to provide additional opportunities
for Than Shwe to reward kleptocrats for their support of the system. Today, in
addition to the Prime Minister's Office, there are 32 other ministries, each
headed by its own minister. Only seven ministers are "civilians" and most have
prior military service, including a few ex-generals.
According to a Myanmar source with close connections to senior military
officials, during a 2004 meeting of senior officers discussing manpower issues,
Than Shwe directed an end to the practice of ministers holding multiple
portfolios in order to provide additional promotion opportunities.
The practice came to an end last June when Major-General Maung Maung Swe
relinquished the Ministry of Immigration and Population portfolio. While U Aung
Kyi is Minister for Labor and Minister for Relations, the latter is purely
titular with no actual brick-and-mortar ministry. With the exception of the
Minister of Defense, no minister holds an MOD operational position.
While the creation of new ministries has broadened the avenues for advancement
to military personnel, it threatens to saddle the country with an even more
bloated and inefficient bureaucracy. If the reins of power do some day pass to
a democratically elected government, as envisaged in the upcoming 2010
elections, it will likely find its ability to govern handicapped by a
dysfunctional ministerial structure developed under military rule.
Moreover, the infiltration of the civil bureaucracy by military members is
likely to increase in both depth and breadth. The appointment of four brigadier
generals to the Civil Service Selection Board in 2006 foreshadowed the expected
increased military involvement in the civil service sector.
According to a recent Internet report, students of the National Defense College
(NDC) were reportedly warned by an instructor that due to increased class size,
graduates can no longer count on being rewarded with postings at regional or
division commands. Instead, they may have to accept postings at the
director-general level in ministries outside the MOD.
Fractures in the pyramid
In some respects, Than Shwe has run the Tatmadaw like a typical pyramid or
Ponzi scheme.
Early investors in a pyramid scheme are paid with the investments of newcomers
and everyone benefits as long as the pyramid continues to expand. When the
pyramid ceases to expand, the early investors have reaped huge rewards and the
latecomers have little or nothing to show for their investment.
The current regime leadership invested their loyalty in the system early and
has been rewarded with lucrative positions and concessions. As the recent NDC
graduates have discovered, individual rewards become smaller as the upper tiers
of the pyramid become more crowded.
The Ponzi-like nature of the system has maintained pressure for the Tatamadaw
to expand. In some units, soldiers are not allowed to retire until they have
recruited two replacements from training. This pressure has increased unsavory
practices of shanghaiing bystanders and recruiting child soldiers. A new
directorate of recruitment was added to the Tatmadaw in 2007, either to address
these issues or to focus on achieving recruitment goals.
Further manipulation of the military and government structure to provide more
promotion opportunities for military officers is likely as the regime moves the
country toward its own version of democracy. Past methods could be repeated to
create more billets. Several of the current BSOs could be split to provide
additional three-star positions.
New regional commands could be sprouted in Magwe Division, in Karrenni State or
in Karen State, boosting the number of two-star and one-star positions.
Eventually rank inflation may see BSO chiefs move up to the position of general
and the regional commanders become lieutenant-generals.
The further infiltration of military officers into the civilian government
structure, and the creation of new branches of the bureaucratic tree, threaten
to saddle Myanmar with an ineffective government structure under continued
military domination in the name of democracy. From where the resources to
sustain this bloated system will arise is another important question for
Myanmar's political future.
Norman Robespierre, a pseudonym, is a freelance journalist specializing
in Southeast Asian affairs. He may be reached at normanrobespierre@gmail.com
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
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