Page 2 of 2 AN ATol INVESTIGATION Southern test for new Thai leader
By Brian McCartan and Shawn W Crispin
lack a centralized overriding command structure, he claims. This makes it
difficult for the military to gather intelligence against any group larger than
a single cell, much less eliminate or capture insurgent leaders.
Some security analysts, especially those based outside of Thailand, have
attempted to paint the insurgency as part of a "global jihad", driven by an
international Muslim militant network. This analysis, however, falters on the
on-the-ground facts. While often painted as a Muslim versus Buddhist conflict,
the strife is
actually driven more by local nationalism and a deep-seated feeling that the
central government in Bangkok has never had the interests of ethnic Malays at
heart.
Perceived Thai chauvinism coupled with decades of economic and educational
neglect have engendered a deep-seated resentment across the predominantly
Muslim region. One Muslim community and school leader, who because of his
position requested anonymity, said, "The central government wants to make
people Thai, speak Thai, have Thai culture. Thai-Malays are a different people,
[with different] religion and culture."
That resentment is felt especially among underemployed young Muslim males, who
are often poor and undereducated. A Malay-Muslim village leader who requested
anonymity told Asia Times Online that lack of education and the desire to be a
"hero" play as much a part as extremist ideology in the recruitment of young
men to the insurgents' ranks. While insurgent leaders may be fueled by
ideology, for the actual shooters and bombers it is often a mix of superficial
ideology combined with a youthful craving for excitement, he claimed.
After four years of hostilities, including violent insurgent attacks on state
targets, including the assassination of Bangkok-appointed schoolteachers and
officials, some analysts wonder if the situation has not reached the point of
no return. Behind-the-scenes talks mediated by foreign third parties have
stalled under successive governments, while insurgent leaders question whether
Thai officials can be trusted to negotiate in good faith.
"The problem has become so militarized that the political option is
non-existent," said Chaiwat Satha-anand, dean of political science at Bangkok's
Thammasat University. "The Democrats need to identify the situation as a
political problem that requires a political solution."
Autonomy debate
Many believe that would entail granting greater autonomy for the region, or at
least a wider degree of decentralization of power from Bangkok over official
appointments and finances. Successive Thai governments have refused to even
consider such measures when broached, fearing it would be the first step
towards full-blown secession.
Those official blinders have so far short-circuited third-party attempts to
mediate the conflict and begin meaningful negotiations towards a political
settlement. One local community leader in Yala said the conflict was neither a
matter of religion nor separatism, but rather a widely held desire to resolve
problems locally rather than through Bangkok's generalized policies for the
entire country. Pointing to the many massive buildings erected by the central
government in Yala town, he said, "There is nothing for the people, no
community centers."
That's largely because development policy is currently under the military's
jurisdiction, with funds earmarked for the region funneled from Bangkok through
the ISOC. Critics claim a 10 billion baht (US$289 million) development fund was
allocated for the region by the central government without concrete
requirements on how the budget was to be used or disbursed. Community leaders
in the south claimed that many government and security officials were making
money off the conflict situation, while one human-rights monitor purported that
"greed is driving the war".
Another four-year plan endorsed by the government in May will provide US$1.7
billion for the development of a new economic zone that will entail initially
developing the rubber industry and setting up a halal food center in the
three southernmost provinces. Critics of the plan note that while the region
needs economic development, the plan's provision to allow the military to
co-invest in businesses represents a conflict of interest.
Wan Mohammad Nor Matha, a Yala native and one of Thailand's most prominent
Muslim politicians who has in the past served as speaker of parliament and
Interior minister, says the problem is rooted in participation. "The main point
is that people must be involved and participate to solve the problem, not only
the government," he said in an interview. "The government must trust the people
and the people trust the government.”
Over 80% of the three southernmost provinces' population is Muslim, but only 5%
of government officials are locals, he claimed. "When people communicate with
the government, they only see people from elsewhere. People not born in the
area cannot understand the situation - only local people can understand it. The
central government should give more autonomy to locals, and a greater budget."
Politicians who have advocated such autonomy-granting initiatives have been
stonewalled by the bureaucracy and military. For instance, when Chalerm
Yubumrung, then serving as interior minister, announced this year that special
administrative zones established in conflict areas in other countries would be
studied as possible models for the south, he was quickly and harshly admonished
by then-prime minister Samak, who called the ideas "half baked", according to
news reports.
Former prime minister and army commander Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who served
briefly as a deputy prime minister in the recently dissolved Somchai
government, reportedly had devised a plan to provide for more self-government
in the south, but was forced to resign over his role in violently suppressing
anti-government protesters in Bangkok on October 7 before he could begin to
implement the policy.
Grand civilian plans
Whether Abhisit's Democrat Party-led government will have better luck in
pursuit of a political solution is uncertain in light of the military's growing
power. Thailand's southern regions are the party's electoral stronghold, though
the party has not always swung votes from the three southernmost provinces.
Islamic religious leaders and local businessmen have already voiced their
support for Abhisit's leadership and called for him to bring an end to the
conflict.
In a statement following his royal endorsement last week, Abhisit announced
that he had a "grand plan" for reconciliation, boosting the economy and
restoring the country's international image, but he notably failed to mention
the southern conflict in particular. Analysts note that his past pronouncements
on the conflict while in the political opposition and recent statements made by
new Foreign Minister Kasit indicate the new Democrat-led government will at
least bid to take a more conciliatory approach than his recent predecessors.
Abhisit has already taken guarded swipes at military operations in the region,
saying that the economic, cultural and education aspects of the conflict were
beyond the measures being carried out by the police and military and that his
government intended to fill the gap. Political analysts note that Abhisit's
Democrat Party has a long history of opposing and checking the military. Former
Democrat prime minister Chuan Leekpai, Abhisit's personal mentor, implemented
various measures in the late 1990s aimed at reining in the military's power and
commercial influence.
The military has since enjoyed a resurgence following the 2006 coup and has
benefited from the increasingly large budgets allocated to suppress the
southern violence. Abhisit's choice of General Prawit Wongsuwan as his defense
minister indicated to some that he did not have full authority over the
portfolio's appointment. As chairman of the Class 6 Armed Forces Academies
Preparatory School alumni, Prawit hails from the same class as 2006 coup leader
General Sonthi Boonyaratklin.
Prawit is also known to be close to both Anupong and Prayuth, although he was
appointed as army commander under Thaksin's government in 2004. In that post,
he declined to punish three army generals, including the 4th army division
commander, implicated in the suffocation deaths on October 25, 2004, of at
least 85 Muslim protesters who died while being transported in a poorly
ventilated military vehicle traveling from Narathiwat to Pattani.
Restoring justice and making the security forces accountable for their actions,
which would necessarily entail revoking martial law and amending both the
emergency decree and internal security acts, will be crucial if Abhisit is to
reassert civilian control over the conflict. Whether he is able to take the
reins of ISOC is now being viewed by outside analysts as a crucial indicator of
future policy direction.
Another reorientation, which the Democrats advocated while in opposition to the
Samak administration and one that will likewise be met with military
resistance, would entail making the SBPAC answerable directly to the prime
minister's office rather than the ISOC. The proposal, made under a draft law
submitted by the then-opposition Democrats, would give the SBPAC status as a
government agency empowered to coordinate officials from different ministries
free of military interference.
Abhisit could sidestep a clash with the military by instead establishing a new
agency, supervised by him or a deputy prime minister, to play such a
coordinating role. An International Crisis Group report released in August said
that while the SBPAC has had some success in dealing with reports of abusive
officials, its subordinate position to the military was a hindrance to its
other various hearts-and-minds initiatives. The proposed new law would give the
SBPAC access to government funds without having to go through ISOC and the
power to transfer officials without having to consult the military.
Anupong and the army can be expected to oppose any such move. A prior attempt
to pass a law giving the SBPAC legal status was blocked during former army
commander Surayud Chulanont's government by parliamentarians linked to the
military. Faced with these many obstacles, including resistance from
high-ranking soldiers many believe had a hand in creating the new government,
Abhisit faces a crucial uphill battle in ending the conflict and achieving the
broad national reconciliation he has so eloquently promised.
Brian McCartan, a freelance journalist based in Chiang Mai, reported from
Yala and may be reached at brianpm@comcast.net. Shawn W Crispin,
Asia Times Online's Southeast Asia Editor, reported from Bangkok and may be
reached at swcrispin@atimes.com.
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road,
Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
