Page 2 of 2 Ins and outs of a China courtship
By H H Michael Hsiao and Alan Yang
Whether Beijing can guide this regional bloc through the global financial
tsunami is still in question, but the demand from ASEAN, nevertheless,
delineates that one cannot overlook the growing influence of China's soft power
in Southeast Asia.
Soft power core
For China, the core of soft power is the promotion of Chinese culture and
language. Since 2004, China has built more than 295 "Confucius Institutes" in
78 countries. A total of 500 will be established before 2010. Just in Southeast
Asia, there are 21 Confucius Institutes providing language courses. Thirteen of
these
institutes are located in Thailand, with others scattered throughout Indonesia,
Malaysia, Burma, Philippines, and Singapore [13]. These institutes perform as
sites for cultural transmission, intercultural exchange, and Chinese learning,
thereby enhancing China's soft power capabilities.
Specifically, the overseas Confucius Institutes have at least two purposes. For
educational ones, the institute has a function similar to that of Alliance
Fran็aise, Goethe-Institute, British Council, and Insituto Cervante,
which mainly deal with language and culture learning. Although Beijing
carefully heralds that the institute operates as a non-profit and
non-governmental organization, its principle and budget are guided and
sponsored by "the Office of Chinese Language Council International" affiliated
with the PRC's Ministry of Education. Such an orientation would naturally draw
the association with the underlying strategic implication of Confucius
Institutes, that is, an attempt to promote Chinese culture and thereby increase
China's soft power influence. Some thinkers have referred to such a policy as
"cultural imperialism" [14].
In terms of cultural imperialism, a great power will both employ its cultural
commodity to exploit an economic market, and aim to reconstruct a popular
culture in pursuit of ideological hegemony. Undoubtedly, the statement reminds
us of the US foreign policy since the 1950s. The US government advocated public
diplomacy by the United States Information Agency (USIA). The USIA exerted
influence on information sharing and made efforts in broadening dialogues
between the US and the rest of the world. Moreover, it has sponsored exchange
programs, such as the Fulbright Scholarship, to nurture overseas grantees with
American cultures and values.
Thus, public diplomacy and cultural promotion is another mission of the
Confucian Institutes. There are at least three kinds of soft power resources
employed. First, the very notion of Confucius Institute is to nurture a
worldwide cordial atmosphere which favors Chinese learning. Second, this
instrumental appeal for language learning will shape a popular culture
characterized by Chinese art, cinema, cuisine, fashion and lifestyle. The pop
culture itself may forge a sensational pro-China ambiance (ie the fervor with
Chinese language learning, with supporting the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, etc)
and reinforce the influence of Chinese soft power.
The institute also provides the "Chinese Bridge Fund," sponsoring the college
student exchange program and supporting the research and development of
overseas Chinese education. These funding programs and activities will
intensify Beijing's international cultural attractiveness and magnify its
influence of soft power at the grassroots level. Third, since 2004, China has
dispatched more than 2,000 volunteers and teachers in 35 countries to work on
Chinese education abroad, inclusive of ASEAN states such as Indonesia, Lao,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam [15]. These "civil diplomats"
become vital human resources in wielding cultural and social influence in the
region.
Beijing has continually reiterated the politically neutral standing of the
Confucius Institutes. However, political and ideological strings continue to
remain evident in organizational governance, relevant activities and
publications. For example, the grantees of the "Chinese Bridge Fund" may
reflect Beijing's strategic consideration based on national interests. In
addition, the disposition of 21 Confucius Institutes and hundreds of volunteers
in Southeast Asia are also decided in accordance with cultural intimacy and
political amity. China has made great efforts to project cultural transmission
to its neighbors in Southeast Asia in order to increase China's centrality in
this region. It is plausible that the "China Fervor" intensified by the
Confucius Institutes and relevant projects will continue to lay the solid
foundation for the perception of a "benign China" and foster an even closer
relationship between China and ASEAN states.
Conclusion
The discussion above unveils China's sophisticated soft power diplomacy toward
Southeast Asia. Beijing's non-military inducement to ASEAN states, encompassing
comprehensive cooperation and collaboration between different sectors and
policy areas, seems efficacious. By providing foreign aid, Chinese government
has maintained its indispensable leadership in cooperating with Indonesia,
Philippines, and Laos. In addition to assistance aid, China's economic foreign
policy with the help of the Chinese business community has triggered a large
scale economic and market integration with ASEAN strengthening China's
importance in this region. More critically, the Confucius Institutes and
thousands of language teachers demonstrate Beijing's flexible cultural
diplomacy of promoting Chinese social and cultural values to its southeast
neighbors.
Carefully employing these soft power resources, China will obtain more policy
choices to engage with ASEAN and its members, develop more channels of
communication with Southeast Asian people, and assiduously participate in
various issue-areas of regional affairs without sacrificing its economic and
political interests. China is no longer a "clumsy elephant" to its southeast
neighbors, but an "agile dragon" in the quest for restoring its regional
hegemony.
Notes
1. Alastair Iain Johnston, "Socialization in International Institutions: The
ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory," in G. John Ikenberry and Michael
Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p 110.
2. As Dominic Ziegler argues, the main concern of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) is to secure peaceful development of China which needs stable relations
with its neighbor states. Without achieving these objectives, the legitimacy of
CCP will be questioned, see Dominic Ziegler, "Asia's Great Game: ‘Soft' Power
Counts for More Than Hard," The Insight Bureau, No. 16 (2007).
3. Herman Joseph S Kraft, "Japan and the United States in ASEAN-China
Relations," in Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun, and Chin Kin Wah, eds, ASEAN-China
Relations: Realities and Prospects (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2005), pp 90-109.
4. S D Muni, "China's Strategic Engagement with the New ASEAN," IDSS Monoraph,
No. 2, (2002), p 17; Alastair Iain Johnston, ibid, p 110.
5. Eric Teo Chu Cheow, "ASEAN+3: The Roles of ASEAN and China," in Saw
Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun, and Chin Kin Wan, eds., ASEAN-China Relations:
Realities and Prospects (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2005), pp 61-63.
6. Thomas Lum et al, "Comparing Global Influence: China's and US Diplomacy,
Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the Developing World," CRS Report for
Congress (2008), p 33.
7. Joshua Kurlantzick, "China's Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,"
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief, No 47 (2006), p 3.
8. Pang Zhongying, "Playing By the Rules? China's Growing Global Role,"
Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, (2008).
9. Elizabeth Economy, "China's Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for Japan
and the United States," The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, (2005).
10. Rahul Sen and Sanchita Basu Das, "ASEAN's FTA Negotiations with Dialogue
Partners Identifying Strengths and Weaknesses in Business Opportunities," in
Dennis Hew, ed, Brick by Brick: The Building of an ASEAN Economic Community
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), pp 186-187.
11. www.aseansec.org/Stat/Table29.pdf (accessed on 2008/11/18).
12. www.aseansec.org/21346.htm (accessed on 2008/11/13).
13. www.hanban.edu.cn/en_hanban/kzxy_list.php (accessed on 2008/11/13). 14. A
recent discussion on China's advocacy of Chinese langue, see Sheng Ding and
Robert A. Saunders, "Talking Up China: An Analysis of China's Rising Cultural
Power and the Global Promotion of the Chinese Language," East Asia: An
International Journal, Vol 23, No 2, (2006), pp 3-33.
15. www.hanban.edu.cn/en_hanban/content.php (accessed on 2008/11/13).
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