Page 2 of
2 ASIA HAND The politics of revenge in
Thailand By Shawn W
Crispin
criticized the hastily
passed legislation, which he likened to the
military "slamming the door" in the prime
minister's face.
A PPP-led Parliament
could also potentially open investigations into
the extraordinary rise in the military budget,
which was passed opaquely while its appointed
government was in power. Military outlays are
projected at 140 billion baht (US$4.6 billion) for
2008, up from about 29 billion baht prior to the
2006 coup, according to news reports. Any scrutiny
of that budgetary surge, however, would have to
take into consideration King Bhumibol Adulyadej's
2007 nationally televised birthday speech, in
which he recommended the military spend more on
military equipment
while
the Thai currency was strong.
Judicial
review The larger and more immediate
political drama surrounds the dizzying swirl of
pending corruption and electoral fraud cases
against Thaksin, his top allies, the PPP and its
coalition partners. The military has strategically
followed through on its extra-legal coup by using
the courts to bog down Thaksin and his top allies
in time-consuming litigation - similar to the
legal means Thaksin used while in office against
his political enemies.
Late last month,
Thaksin triumphantly returned to Thailand after
nearly 18 months in exile and has vowed to fight
the cases filed against him and his family by the
former military government in the courts. He has
characterized the corruption charges related to a
land deal involving his wife in a downgrade area
of Bangkok as trumped up by his political enemies
and pleaded innocent in the case's first hearing
this week at the Supreme Court. He has also
promised that he is finished with politics - a
claim few analysts, including myself, believe.
The electoral fraud case against his
former spokesman, Yongyuth Tiyapairat, who had
been appointed the new government's Parliament
president, seems more iron-clad and if fully
prosecuted that he was acting on behalf of the
party, and not personally, could lead to the
dissolution of the PPP party, which in turn would
bring on the coalition government's collapse.
There is a separate similar case being
heard on whether or not the PPP is a nominee of
the TRT, which if corroborated with evidence would
lead to the party's dissolution. Meanwhile, the
Election Commission's recommendation that PPP
coalition partners Chat Thai and Matchimathipataya
be dissolved on electoral fraud charges has also
complicated the political equation. A final
decision on that case, which would lead to new
elections for the 50 or so seats the two parties
hold, could recalibrate the political balance,
perhaps, ironically, to the PPP's advantage.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court's pending
decision on whether it will hear a case about
lottery irregularities held over from Thaksin's
tenure could lead to the suspension from duty of
Finance Minister Surapong Suebwonglee, Deputy
Transport Minister Anurak Jureemart, as well as
Labor Minister Uraiwan Thienthong. If so, the
suspensions could disrupt the implementation of
the government's bullish fiscal stimulus package,
which includes various big-ticket infrastructure
projects.
Academics such as Thai expert
Duncan McCargo have pointed to a growing trend
towards "judicialization", a supposedly
royally-promoted view that complex political
problems could not be solved through electoral
politics or by elected officials, but were best
left to the judiciary. He notes that Thaksin's
allies contend that the military appropriated the
"rule of law" for its own political ends and have
challenged the legal basis for some crucial
decisions, including, not least, last year's
disbandment of the TRT.
McCargo recently
wrote, "The trend reflected longstanding
conservative mistrust of political parties and
elections, mistrust that had only been exacerbated
by the rise of Thaksin. In its latest incarnation,
judicialization was an anti-Thaksin policy. If a
military coup was the blunt instrument used to
oust Thaksin from office, judicialization could be
seen as the means by which the [monarchic] network
sought to manage and reorganize political power in
the post-coup period." As events unfold, the
academic's assessment seems increasingly spot on.
Royal question Meanwhile, the
military's ham-fisted attempts to portray its coup
as a democratic coup clearly failed to convince
tens of millions of rural voters - mainly in the
country's northern and northeastern regions - who
overwhelmingly selected the PPP at last year's
polls. And the military's argument that Thaksin's
alleged rampant corruption motivated their putsch
has likewise rung hollow as military-appointed
investigators seemingly failed to find a smoking
gun large enough to justify the military's seizure
of power and abrogation of the 1997 charter.
Some now argue that the military's biggest
failure while in power was its inability or
reluctance to communicate to the broad population
that the main motivation for their putsch was
their perception that Thaksin represented a threat
to the monarchy and its future centrality in Thai
society. While Thaksin's popularity is still
strong in the rural countryside, it does not
remotely measure up to the adulation and
admiration the Thai people have for King Bhumibol.
Last year, the respected monarch turned 80 and his
health has declined significantly over the last
year.
Messages that Thaksin may have
crossed with King Bhumibol were received loud and
clear by many Bangkok-based voters, many of whom
in the runup to the coup attended or at least
watched on satellite television the street rallies
where firebrand speakers openly accused the then
prime minister of disloyalty to the crown. And
they voted overwhelmingly in favor of the
Democrats over the PPP at the December polls.
It is, of course, impossible to know what
specifically motivated Bangkok voter behavior
without polls that included questions about
Thaksin's perceived relations with the monarchy in
their surveys - and Thaksin has throughout
steadfastly maintained his loyalty to the crown
and denied that he harbors any anti-monarchist
sentiments.
Yet recently those concerns
have been resurrected in certain royal quarters as
word spreads about a certain senior PPP member who
has spoken openly and cryptically about the need
for a "great transformation" of Thai society after
King Bhumibol passes from the scene. The said
politician has talked about the pressing need to
reform monarchical institutions, including a more
democratic process in selecting Privy Councilors
and more transparency at the Crown Property
Bureau, which one academic study recently
estimated owns one-third of Bangkok's central
business district property.
Former Thaksin
spokesman and Prime Minister's Office minister
Jakraphob Penkair has in a break with past taboos
against criticizing Privy Council members has
repeatedly and publicly accused Prem of
orchestrating the 2006 coup and more broadly the
"aristocracy" for holding back the country's
economic development. He speaks openly about a
two-sided conflict in Thai society, pitting
pro-Thaksin and pro-aristocracy groups.
These charged comments, of course, come
against the backdrop of the still undecided royal
succession, a matter of intensifying national
anxiety. Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn is the heir
apparent to the crown, but some royal insiders
maintain there is still an off-chance that the
popular daughter, Princess Sirindhorn, could in
the end instead be selected. The military-drafted
2007 constitution notably includes provisions that
allow for a princess to take the throne.
In cases where the succession is undecided
when King Bhumibol finally passes, the
military-drafted 2007 constitution includes a new
provision which empowers the Privy Council to pick
a successor - a process which some royal insiders
predicate could intentionally take several years.
In that scenario, there is the possibility that
Queen Sirikit and then Princess Sirindorn play the
role of regent while the Crown Prince's
three-year-old son is gradually groomed to take
the vacant throne.
Questions surrounding
the royal succession are now and over the medium
term the biggest political risk factor looming
over the country. Many believe that when that day
finally arrives that the military could stage a
"precautionary" coup and hold onto power until the
delicate royal transition has come to what the
Privy Council views as a stable conclusion - that
is, one that maintains the institution's
centrality in Thai society.
It's a process
which would necessarily set back Thai democracy,
as well as a potential Thaksin comeback, by
several years - if not indefinitely. Depending on
how that uncertain process plays out, the degree
of military unity at that time and public
perceptions, it's not beyond the realm of
possibility that the "great transformation"
Thaksin's allies speak of will indeed one day be
pursued. But clearly not without a struggle, which
if not settled in the courts or through a
behind-the-scenes elite settlement, could very
well spill into the streets.
Investor
beware.
Shawn W Crispin is Asia
Times Online's Southeast Asia Editor. He may be
reached at swcrispin@atimes.com
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
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