Page 2 of 2 Blood flows freely in Pakistan
By Amir Mir
Perhaps this is no surprise. Ishaq was flown from a Lahore jail to the garrison
town of Rawalpindi by the military on a special chartered flight to hold talks
with fidayeen (suicide) attackers of the TTP, led by Dr Aqeel alias
Mohammad Osman, who had stormed the general headquarters building on October
10, 2009 and taken hostage 42 people, including several military officials.
The terrorists had listed demands and expressed their desire to directly hold
talks with the chief of army staff General Ashfaq Kiani. The hostage-takers
also gave a list of jailed militants belonging to some Sunni Deobandi militant
and sectarian groups, seeking their release, failing which, the hostages were
threatened to be killed one by one.
As a time-buying tactic, negotiators roped in key leaders of jihadi
and sectarian groups to hold talks with the terrorists. Special planes were
subsequently flown to Lahore, Bahawalpur and Rahim Yar Khan to bring to
Rawalpindi Ishaq, Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, Maulana Fazalur Rehman
Khalil, the amir of the Harkatul Mujahideen, and Mufti Abdul Rauf, the
younger brother of Maulana Masood Azhar who is also the acting amir of the
Jaish-e-Mohammad.
The attackers were subsequently killed in a successful rescue operation, except
for Mohammad Aqeel, alias Dr Usman, a former army man who had already been
sentenced to death.
Interestingly, these same four jihadi leaders had been roped in by the Pervez
Musharraf regime in July 2007 to negotiate with the hardline clerics of the
infamous Lal Mosque (Red Mosque) in the heart of the capital, Islamabad. The
military later launched a raid on the mosque to flush out militants who had
taken sanctuary there.
The clout that Ishaq enjoyed even while in jail can be gauged from the fact
that he was not only allowed to use a mobile phone, he continued to receive the
regular monthly stipend from the Punjab government that bega when Shehbaz
Sharif became provincial chief minister in 2008.
Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, the current chief of the SSP, claimed during
a media discussion almost a year ago that he had met Ishaq in jail at the
request of Sharif, offering Ishaq a conditional release if he remained peaceful
for the rest of his life.
If close acquaintances of Ludhianvi are to be believed, following intense
backdoor diplomacy at the beginning of 2010, the SSP chief and Sharif, who is
the younger brother of former premier Nawaz Sharif, held a clandestine meeting
in Mecca in Saudi Arabia to sort out their long-drawn-out differences.
The bone of contention was the killing of 36 activists of the SSP and the LeJ
in fake police encounters by the provincial government in the first quarter of
1999 when Nawaz was prime minister. Shehbaz was subsequently nominated by the
Lahore police in the murder case of the SSP workers, but was eventually
acquitted by an anti-terrorism court after the complainants withdrew the
charges against him.
During his last days as premier, Nawaz Sharif, whose own life was under threat
from the SSP and the LeJ and who had already survived an assassination attempt
by them in Lahore, went public in naming Afghanistan as the country providing
shelter and training to SSP and LeJ hit men. On January 3, 1999, the two
sectarian groups had attempted to blow up a bridge on the Lahore-Raiwind road,
close to Nawaz Sharif's farmhouse, shortly before he was due to pass by.
Returning to the Mecca meeting between Shehbaz Sharif and Ludhianvi, once the
two had reached an understanding they reportedly swore on the Holy Koran while
standing inside the Holy Kaaba to bury their grievances and not to go against
each other.
Although Sharif family circles strongly deny these reports, the fact remains
that the slain governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, had accused the Sharif
government of courting the SSP in the Jhang district of south Punjab to
safeguard its vote bank in the Pakistan People's Party in a March 2010
by-election for a vacant seat in the Punjab provincial assembly.
Taseer, who was gunned down by his bodyguard for his liberal views, in
Islamabad on January 4, 2011, had subsequently written a letter to Shehbaz
Sharif on March 5, 2010, demanding drastic action against Law Minister Rana
Sanaullah for his public meetings and addresses to rallies in Jhang accompanied
by known terrorists of the SSP.
The rise and rise of the SSP
The LeJ was launched in 1996 by a breakaway faction of Sunni Deobandi
extremists of the SSP, including Ishaq, Riaz Basra and Akram Lahori, who walked
out of the outfit after accusing the SSP leadership of deviating from the
ideals of its founder, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, who was killed by his Shi'ite
rivals in February 1990.
But terrorism experts believe that the SSP is in fact the mother organization
that has provided human fodder to the cauldron of the region's multi-layered
violence in the name of Islam.
The SSP - Corps of the Prophet Mohammad's Companions - is a violently
anti-Shi'ite Sunni sectarian group responsible for targeting the Shi'ite
minority in Pakistan. The ultra-fanatic sectarian SSP emerged in central Punjab
in the mid-1980s as a response to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, seeking
proclamation of Pakistan as a Sunni state. Having ideological affinity with the
Taliban, the SSP aims at restoring the caliphate system and has declared the
Shi'ite minority to be non-Muslim.
The SSP and the LeJ, which is considered to be the military wing of the SSP,
were once the strategic assets of the state of Pakistan and have linked with
al-Qaeda as its ancillary warriors, killing Pakistani citizens and targeting
the security forces to dissuade Pakistan from fighting the "war against terror"
as a United States ally.
The LeJ today has deep links with al-Qaeda and the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban
and is considered to be the most violent terrorist organization operating in
Pakistan, with the help of its suicide squad. As with most Sunni Deobandi
sectarian and militant groups, almost the entire LeJ leadership is made up of
people who have fought in Afghanistan with the backing of the Pakistani
security establishment and most of its cadre are drawn from the numerous Sunni madrassas
(seminaries) in Pakistan.
The Lashkar stands out for its secrecy, lethality and unrelenting pursuit of
its core objectives - targeting Western interests in Pakistan and the Shi'ite
community as a way to the eventual transformation of the country into a
Taliban-style Islamic state. It has become the group of choice for hard-core
militants who are adamant in pursuing their jihadi agenda in Pakistan.
The LeJ consists of loosely coordinated cells, of approximately five to eight
militants each with limited contact with one another, spread across Pakistan
with self-regulating chiefs for each of them. The operational successes of the
group over the years are attributed to its multi-cell structure.
While not much is known about its structure of operations, intelligence reports
indicate that, after each attack, Lashkar cadres disperse and subsequently
reassemble at various bases/hideouts to plan future operations. The LeJ's
presence has been reported from locations as varied as Lahore, Rawalpindi,
Gujranwala, Multan, Islamabad, Jhang, Khanewal, Layyah, Bhakkar, Sargodha,
Rahimyar Khan, Orakzai, Sahiwal, Karachi, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kohat,
Sukkur, Bajaur, Parachinar, Kurram, South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Hangu,
Hyderabad, Bahawalpur, Nawabshah, Mirpur Khas, Chitral, Gilgit and Quetta.
Although sporadic crackdowns by the security forces since late-2001 have had
some success, the LeJ continues to make new recruitments to replace those
arrested or killed. And great care is taken in recruiting cadres, while
considering both religious conviction and the skill and commitment to carry out
attacks.
While Shi'ites remain the primary target of the LeJ, the group has, since 2002,
broadened its focus to include other civilian, government and Western targets
in Pakistan.
Despite the involvement of the LeJ and its parent party, the SSP, in sectarian
violence since its inception in 1996, the Pakistani state has failed to
neutralize either group. Being part of a broader jihadi movement with Deobandi
ideological affiliation, the LeJ has links with other jihadi groups, including
the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Harkatul Mujahideen and the Harkatul Jehadul Islami.
The LeJ also maintains close operational links with the Afghan Taliban and
al-Qaeda. There is, in fact, sufficient evidence to indicate that the LeJ has
been transformed into a significant al-Qaeda affiliate, which provides not only
back-up support but also takes part in terrorist attacks linked to al-Qaeda.
Yet, the group stays focused on its home turf and its stated goal of
radicalizing Pakistan.
Most terrorism experts agree that LeJ operatives are the most highly trained
and equally vicious killers the world of terror has to offer. Intelligence
sources say the LeJ has finally moved to center stage and the past claims by
Pakistani agencies of its demise after the capture of its salar-e-Aala (commander-in-chief)
Akram Lahori have proved to be wide off the mark. This is evident as the group
has already started a fresh recruitment drive to form new cells at the district
and provincial levels, especially following the release of Ishaq.
Amir Mir is a senior Pakistani journalist and the author of several books
on the subject of militant Islam and terrorism, the latest being The
Bhutto murder trail: From Waziristan to GHQ.
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