Flood relief and politics in Pakistan
By Brian M Downing
The world is seeing a tragedy unfold as monsoon rains swell the expansive Indus
River and flood large parts of Pakistan from Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa province to
the Arabian Sea. Whether directed by Pakistanis or outside agencies, relief
will not always be a straightforward humanitarian effort - neither in intent
nor result; it will be tempered with civil-military issues, international
politics, and concerns with Pakistan's very future.
Civilians and soldiers
Pakistan has alternated between civilian and military governments since its
inception in 1947. Neither established a record of capable government in the
eyes of the people and according to polling data, neither enjoys substantial
support - Pakistanis are not supportive of rule by heavy-handed authoritarians
or grasping oligarchs.
Politicians and generals are vying for popular support not on the
hustings but through relief programs. Campaign promises and legitimizing
slogans have been pushed aside as each side must either deliver food, water and
medical aid to millions of displaced Pakistanis or face reduced support, if not
open opposition.
The military has the edge in this competition, though an appearance of
cooperation will be maintained. It is the army that has the trucks and
helicopters, the logistical skill in moving large quantities of goods into
place, large-scale medical resources, and the hierarchical command structure.
Paradoxically, perhaps, many of the resources and skills of modern warfare are
essential for relief work.
There is little likelihood that the military will once again seize power in the
near future. The military will, however, present itself as a competent
institution embodying the principles of national honor and aspirations.
Whatever new presence it establishes in stricken districts will be used to
enhance its prestige. Depending on its success in relief operations, the
military will be able to maintain its position in public affairs and resist
efforts by civilians - and the US - to exit from politics altogether.
US efforts
American diplomacy has alternately supported civilian and military governments
- sometimes out of geopolitical necessity, sometimes out of the government's
incompetence or brutality. At present, the US supports the civilian government
of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, but the
floods will require it to work closely with the military on logistical, medical
and other matters.
The US has been leaning on the Pakistani military, especially Inter-Services
Intelligence, to end its support for militant groups such as the Taliban, the
Haqqani network, Lashkar-e Taiba and even al-Qaeda. American diplomats and
military officials have been decrying military support, formal and informal, to
these groups and pressing the Pakistani generals to force the Taliban to the
bargaining table.
But this pressure will likely be reduced as the immediacy of the disaster and
the need for cooperation on relief take precedence. And cooperation may well
strengthen the Pakistani military's standing in the country.
The US will seek to enhance its abysmal image in a country where
anti-Americanism and related conspiracy theories abound. Results on this score
are unlikely to be impressive. Hostility is simply too deeply embedded in the
culture and the US presence in relief work will be often seen as an effort to
dominate the country, probably in conjunction with India.
United States relief efforts will in some respects mesh with those of
Pakistan's other geopolitical partner, China, but in other respects the two
powers will be competitive if not antagonistic. The US wishes to contain
China's influence in Pakistan as it might lead to sharper tensions between
Pakistan and India, which has a decades-long hostility toward China and which
opposes any expansion of Chinese influence in South Asia.
China has longstanding cooperation with the Pakistani military, including arms
sales and military planning. China is less ideologically motivated in its
approach to Pakistan. It cares little about civil-military rivalries and looks
chiefly for a stable partner to oppose India and to exploit the mineralogical
wealth of Afghanistan. Insomuch as China already operates an immense copper
mine above the Af-Pak border - with little if any insurgent obstruction - one
might suspect that China and the Pakistani military formed at least the basis
of a partnership on this regard some time ago.
Pakistan's future
The deluge is of such a magnitude as to pose a risk to the country's stability
and unity. The military's resources are formidable but not limitless, even with
the influx of foreign help. Relief efforts will take resources away from the
campaign against the Pakistani Taliban in the northwest and related development
programs in the region.
This will afford related groups - the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda among them -
to enjoy greater freedom of action in the region and in Afghanistan.
Resources may also be reallocated from Balochistan - the country's restive
western province where a separatist movement has been gathering momentum.
Separatists may avail themselves of the state's attention being shifted to the
Indus valley and use it to further their cause.
A more serious challenge has already been launched by al-Qaeda. A year ago or
so, al-Qaeda was of limited importance in Pakistan. Its forces were thought to
be withdrawing from the region for more promising campaigns in Yemen, Somalia
and elsewhere outside South Asia.
More recently, however, with open fighting between the Pakistani military and
its erstwhile client group known as the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan - TTP), al-Qaeda has regrouped and made common cause with the TTP to
effect the country's break with the US and support, even more openly, the
Afghan Taliban in order to drive the West out of the region.
Al-Qaeda has been notably effective in establishing itself in the port city of
Karachi, which has a large Pashtun refugee population that could be used to
interdict North Atlantic Treaty Organization supplies there.
Perhaps of less immediate concern is the potential for discontent in the Punjab
region to develop into another insurgency. Land ownership is highly
concentrated in the area - a longstanding problem that the country's political
elite, which contains numerous big landholders, has neglected. The Punjab's
century-long tradition of military service would provide an insurgency with
experienced leaders and a rank-and-file with military knowledge.
The monsoon rains are expected to continue for several weeks.
Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst and author of The
Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and
Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam. He can be reached at
brianmdowning@gmail.com
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