Re-elected Rajapaksa has tough job ahead
By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa is poised to be re-elected
to another six-year term. While he can heave a sigh of relief that his gamble
to advance elections by two years paid off, his second term in office is likely
to be more challenging than the first. Besides finding a political solution to
the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic conflict, he will need to contend with deep political
polarization among the Sinhalese.
On Wednesday, with state television declaring a victory for Rajapaksa although
vote counting had not been completed, Rajapaksa sent the army to surround the
hotel where his rival and former army chief, Sarath Fonseka, his family and key
opposition leaders were staying. According to government sources, about
400 army deserters were in the hotel with Fonseka.
A senior military source and presidential aide said Fonseka had been put under
watch. "The government doesn't want him to take the first step towards a coup,"
the military officer was quoted by Reuters as saying.
"We don't know what their motive is, and as a protective measure we have
deployed troops around the hotel," a military spokesman, Brigadier Udaya
Nanayakkara, told the Associated Press news agency.
Deeply polarized and often violent at the best of times in recent decades, Sri
Lankan politics seems to have entered a new, deadlier phase. Post-election
violence is expected, especially in the event of Fonseka's possible arrest by
the government. What is particularly worrying is that the army is not a mere
observer any longer.
The election campaign was bitter, with Rajapaksa and Fonseka and their
supporters engaging in personal slander, even violence. The election has been
described as a grudge match in which the two main contenders seemed more
preoccupied with settling scores than with debating important issues
confronting the island-nation.
Close allies when they waged war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), Rajapaksa and Fonseka fell out following the military defeat of the
LTTE last May. Rajapaksa's cornering of all the credit for the victory over the
LTTE and his marginalizing of Fonseka - he promoted him to the largely
ceremonial post of chief of army staff - irked the latter. A miffed Fonseka put
in his papers and, when Rajapaksa announced presidential elections, decided to
run against the president.
Rajapaksa and Fonseka are Sinhala nationalist hardliners. Both were regarded as
war heroes by the Sinhalese and thus enjoyed support among the island's ethnic
majority. But Rajapaksa's support among rural Sinhalese is stronger and this
gave him a crucial advantage.
With the Sinhala vote divided down the middle between the two, the Tamils were
seen as kingmakers. Fonseka managed to win the support of the Tamil National
Alliance (TNA), the largest Tamil party in parliament and once regarded as the
mouthpiece of the LTTE, and Tamil votes were expected to help him narrow the
gap.
However, the TNA support doesn't seem to have made a big difference to Fonseka
as voter turnout in Tamil areas was low. This appears to have worked in
Rajapaksa's favor. In the 2005 presidential election, an LTTE boycott call kept
them away and this enabled Rajapaksa to scrape past his rival, Ranil
Wickremasinghe, to victory.
The presidential election was the first national election in post-war Sri Lanka
and the first time in three decades that Tamils could vote without fear of the
LTTE. Unlike in 2005, when an LTTE diktat kept them away from voting, this time
alienation from the state and the absence of choice among the candidates seem
to have held Tamils back from exercising their franchise. Although Rajapaksa
and Fonseka made conciliatory gestures towards the Tamils, this did not cut ice
with potential voters. Obviously, memories of their horrific war records will
need much more than election promises to erase.
In his second term, Rajapaksa has a long task list. He must undertake
immediately the rehabilitation of displaced Tamils and reconstruction of the
war-ravaged north and east. A political solution to the ethnic conflict awaits
his attention, having been completely neglected during his first term, when he
focused on a military solution. Ethnic conflict is very much alive, and unless
this is addressed, Tamil alienation, which is already deep-rooted, is in danger
of growing again.
Political polarization among Sinhalese, while serious in the past, has never
before been on the scale it was during this election campaign. The bitter
name-calling and personal slander wasn't restricted to the top levels but
trickled down to their supporters. It does seem that anger and revenge and the
need to settle scores, evident throughout the campaign, will not go away easily
post-election.
The manner in which the Rajapaksa camp used or abused state power during the
election - state-owned television channels and newspapers, for instance, were
brazenly used to project the president in a favorable light - will not be
forgotten by his opponents. They are likely to accuse him of rigging the vote
and engaging in violent protests.
Does Rajapaksa have it in him to extend a reconciliatory hand to his political
rivals? It seems unlikely. He was unwilling to extend it to the Tamils after
the LTTE's defeat. He is unlikely to extend it now.
When Fonseka threw his hat into the electoral arena, he was seeking revenge
against the president for sidelining him. It was revenge that motivated his
moves, not any vision of what he wanted to do for Sri Lanka. And it is revenge
that will dominate Rajapaksa's actions in the coming months. He is unlikely to
forget Fonseka's "disloyalty" to him or the serious allegations he leveled
against him.
It does seem that the Rajapaksa government will use all means to teach Fonseka
a lesson. Within hours of the closing of the vote on Tuesday, the Rajapaksa
camp indicated plans for legal action against the former general. Fonseka was
unable to vote on Tuesday as his name was not registered. This triggered
accusations from ministers and ruling party leaders that Fonseka was not
qualified to contest the election and had lied to hide this "truth'. The
Election Commission has clarified meanwhile that not being registered to vote
did not by itself affect his eligibility to run in the election.
Rajapaksa has six years to resolve the ethnic conflict and other issues
troubling the island-nation. It would be a pity if he frittered away these
years in settling scores with Fonseka. There is a possibility that the
government will dig to expose the Fonseka family's involvement in defense deals
and other alleged corruption.
One of the allegations leveled against Fonseka was that his entry into the
electoral arena and active politics had politicized the military. While
politicization of the military has indeed touched a new high in recent weeks
and Fonseka did play some role in this, Rajapaksa cannot absolve himself of
responsibility. Several senior military officers gave interviews in the
state-owned media undermining Fonseka's credibility and image. Besides, the
Defense Ministry website was a participant in the pro-Rajapaksa election
campaign. Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa is the president's brother.
As political commentator D B S Jeyaraj has pointed out, the politicization of
the military has been going on for decades. During Rajapaksa's first term,
members of Sinhala-Buddhist hardline parties like the Jathika Hela Urumaya
(JHU) were encouraged to mobilize recruits for the armed forces. They were even
allowed to visit army camps to boost the morale of soldiers.
There were allegations last year that Fonseka was planning a military coup. It
is believed that this was an important factor behind souring relations between
the president and the general and prompted the president to clip the general's
wings and appoint him to a powerless post.
According to Jeyaraj, this was followed by army officers believed to be close
to Fonseka being "transferred out of strategically important positions and/or
assigned to insignificant ‘powerless' posts". "Fonseka's parent 'Sinha'
regiment, once the pride of the army, has been relegated to duties in
non-strategic spheres." Parent regiments of the president's brother, such as
the Gajaba Regiment, and of army commander Jagath Jayasuriya, the Armored
Corps, "deemed more reliable and loyal [to the president] are entrusted with
key responsibilities nowadays," Jeyaraj writes.
The stakes are high for Rajapaksa. A large number of his family members are in
positions of power and influence in the country because he is at the helm. He
cannot afford to lose the presidency whether at the ballot box or to a coup.
In the run-up to polling day it was evident that he would use all means,
including misuse of state resources, to win the election. Having won, he is not
going to allow Fonseka to snatch that victory away, if allegations that Fonseka
is planning a coup are indeed true.
Clearly, Rajapaksa is not willing to take any chances.
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in
Bangalore.
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