Tamils emerge as kingmakers in Colombo
By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka's presidential aspirations
received a shot in the arm this week when a key Tamil party, the Tamil National
Alliance (TNA), promised him support in presidential elections to be held on
January 26.
In an election in which the majority Sinhala vote seems split down the middle
between the two frontrunners - incumbent Mahinda Rajapaksa and the opposition's
Fonseka - the TNA's endorsement of the latter could prove crucial.
The TNA's support of Fonseka is not without its ironies. Widely regarded as a
proxy of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the TNA with 22 seats in
parliament was a mouthpiece of the rebel group. It was a bitter critic of the
government's military
operations in Tamil areas and at the forefront of calls for a ceasefire in the
months preceding the final offensive against the LTTE. As army chief, Fonseka
was the man who spearheaded the military operations that culminated in the
LTTE's annihilation in May last year.
As far as the TNA is concerned, both President Rajapaksa and Fonseka have
"bloody records vis-a-vis the Tamils", a TNA member of parliament told Asia
Times Online. Indeed, if Fonseka carried out the military offensive against the
LTTE, with little concern for high civilian casualties, Rajapaksa authorized
it. And both have in the past shown little willingness to address Tamil
grievances.
Since his election as president in 2005, Rajapaksa has shown no inclination to
address the ethnic conflict, denying the very existence of an ethnic problem
and preferring to see the crisis as one of "LTTE terrorism" alone. This
disinclination has accentuated since May, with a tidal wave of Sinhala
triumphalism sweeping the country following the defeat of the LTTE.
As for Fonseka, he is a known Sinhala supremacist. He is of the view that "Sri
Lanka belongs to the Sinhalese" and that "minority communities", like the
Tamils, "can live in this country with us". In a 2008 interview, Fonseka said
Tamils "must not try, under the pretext of being a minority, to demand undue
things".
But both Rajapaksa and Fonseka are now singing a different tune with the Tamil
vote emerging as critical in a close presidential race.
In the months following the defeat of the LTTE, the president and the general
both claimed the credit. Rajapaksa went on an all-out campaign to build a cult
around himself as "savior" of the island's Sinhalese majority. A miffed Fonseka
hit out, as relations between the two - once close allies in the project to
defeat the LTTE - deteriorated.
In a bid to clip Fonseka's wings, Rajapaksa elevated him to the post of chief
of defense staff (CDS), a largely ceremonial post with reduced powers. A miffed
Fonseka resigned and then entered the presidential race.
Much has changed in the presidential race since Fonseka threw his hat in the
ring.
Two months ago, a landslide victory for Rajapaksa seemed a foregone conclusion.
Fonseka has changed that. Backed by a motley coalition of opposition parties
who are united in their determination to unseat Rajapaksa, Fonseka is putting
up a formidable challenge. He has the backing of the United National Party
(UNP), the Marxist Janata Vimukti Peramuna and also the support of key minority
parties like the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Western Peoples Front
(WPF). Not only has he managed to bite into what seemed the president's
impregnable Sinhala support base but he has also now got the backing of the
TNA.
With the Sinhala vote divided between them, the island's Tamils have emerged as
important kingmakers, with the potential of tipping the balance in favor of
either candidate.
Over the past several years, Rajapaksa and Fonseka cared little for Tamil
sentiment or suffering and bombed Tamil civilians in the name of fighting "LTTE
terrorists".
Now they are assiduously courting Tamil support. If Fonseka wrote to the
president expressing "deep concern" for the plight of the nearly 200,000 Tamil
internally displaced persons (IDPs), the latter sought to outdo him by allowing
the IDPs languishing in detentions camps to return home and lifting
restrictions on freedom of movement in Tamil areas. The Rajapaksa camp has put
out a high-profile campaign to reach out to the largely Hindu Tamil voters by
showing the president - a Buddhist - worshipping at Hindu temples.
But Fonseka seems to be ahead of the president in the battle for the Tamil
vote. While Rajapaksa has the support of Tamil parties like the Eelam Peoples
Democratic Party and the Ceylon Workers' Congress, Fonseka has managed to
clinch endorsement from the TNA.
It appears that Fonseka's "satisfactory" assurances to the TNA about finding a
political resolution to Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict sealed the deal. TNA leader
R Sambandan has said that Fonseka agreed to consider Tamil demands for a
meaningful devolution of power to the provinces and to free Tamil detainees
within a month of his election if no charges had been brought against them. In
a letter to the TNA, the former army chief has also pledged to free civil
administration in the north "from military, police and political interference".
He has also pledged to end the state of emergency which has been in force in
the island since March 1983.
In the 2005 presidential election, the LTTE called for a boycott of the poll, a
call that provided a boost to Rajapaksa's electoral fortunes. How the TNA
endorsement of Fonseka will play out in the vote remains to be seen. While it
is certain to narrow the gap between Rajapaksa and Fonseka, it is still unclear
whether it will be adequate to propel Fonseka to the presidency.
The Rajapaksa camp has been using state resources and the media to boost the
president's image. It has been projecting a Fonseka victory as resulting in a
military dictatorship in Sri Lanka. Indeed, Fonseka as a career soldier has
little experience in the working of a democracy. But Rajapaksa, his long years
of experience in the political arena notwithstanding, is no democrat either.
Analysts have pointed out that while Fonseka, like Rajapaksa, will likely do
little good for the island's fraying democracy, he has at least forced the
president to tone down his Sinhala-Buddhist triumphalism. He could also weaken
the Rajapaksa's brothers' long-term political project of consolidating their
hold over political power.
Even if Fonseka does not win the presidency, he could force the vote to a
second round, undermining the Rajapaksa brothers' dreams of crafting a
constitution to suit their dynastic ambitions.
"If Fonseka can deprive Rajapaksa of an outright victory by pushing the
election into a second round, the fallout may limit the ruling United People's
Freedom Alliance [UPFA] to only a marginal victory at the parliamentary
election [which must take place by April 22, 2010], thus preventing any
legislative intervention in the constitution," Tisarenee Gunasekara, a
Colombo-based political commentator points out. "The Fonseka factor has now
rendered uncertain not only the outcome of the presidential election but also
that of the parliamentary polls and thus the very future of the Rajapaksa
project."
Keen to tap into the groundswell of Sinhala nationalist support and confident
of a landslide win in presidential polls, that would in turn pave the way for
an outright victory in parliamentary polls, Rajapaksa brought presidential
polls forward by two years.
While he is still ahead in the race for the presidency, Rajapaksa's re-election
might not be as easy as originally envisaged. The Fonseka factor could kick in
and upset Rajapaksa's plans. Helped by an unlikely ally, the TNA, Fonseka could
force Rajapaksa to trim his ambitions.
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in
Bangalore.
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