KATHMANDU - In what seems to be a balancing act, Prime Minister Madhav Kumar
Nepal embarks on a visit to China this week. His trip follows on a visit to
India in August, three months after he assumed office.
Premier Nepal's Chinese hosts are expected to listen to him patiently as he is
the head of the government of a country which shares over 1,400 kilometers of
mountainous border with Tibet. His first stop en route to Beijing will be
Tibet's capital, Lhasa, where Nepal maintains a consulate. The Chinese
authorities have not allowed any other country such a diplomatic presence in
the region.
The Nepali visitor is to be taken to Xian and Shanghai, besides Beijing, said
an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, describing the trip as a
goodwill visit. It is taking place after a
couple of postponements, mainly because of preoccupations on the Chinese side.
In the course of substantive talks in Beijing between Premier Nepal and his
counterpart, Wen Jiabao, an agreement of economic cooperation is to be signed
that will offer sizeable development assistance to Nepal. An ongoing
Chinese-aided project in Nepal is the construction of a mountainous road for a
second vehicular link with Tibet, from Rasuwaa pass, which will augment border
trade. The road is likely to be ready by next October.
China helped Nepal open its first road link for Kathmandu in the early 1960s,
when the then-king, Mahendra, had to assure Indian prime minister Jawaharlal
Nehru that communism would not be allowed to travel by jeep.
The second road link might eventually be useful for Nepal to diversify its
external trade, which is currently overwhelmed by imports from India.
That China's policy towards Nepal has remained "realistic" over decades is
admitted by Nepali diplomats and independent analysts alike. The homework they
do before embarking on any new project always remains strikingly thorough, and
the job is usually completed before the agreed timetable. And the Chinese,
unlike the Indians, do not meddle in Nepal's domestic politics.
Their consistent policy appears to be to deal with those Nepali leaders who
reach the seat of authority through a process internally agreed upon. Until
early 2006, Beijing held talks and negotiations with the country's kings. The
Chinese leadership turned to talking with new leaders once the people of Nepal
opted for a political change, in April that year.
That China quickly adjusts to an emerging scenario was witnessed when its newly
appointed ambassador became the first foreign envoy in Nepal to present his
credentials to the then-prime minister, Girija Prasad Koirala. The monarchy had
not been formally abolished at that time, and although playing dysfunctional
role, Gyanendra was still living in the king's palace.
Some Chinese diplomats in Kathmandu used to admit, in private conversations,
that the monarchy remained a factor of stability for Nepal, but they insisted
that China would respect the Nepali people's decision for a political change.
They did not bother whether the changes occurred in a genuine, spontaneous
manner.
China is now welcoming Premier Nepal as his country's interim prime minister.
While he has support from 22 of the 25 political parties that have
representation in the 601-strong Constituent Assembly, Premier Nepal's hosts in
Beijing are aware that his tenure may not go beyond next May and that he is
perceived as a "puppet" by the Nepali Maoists who make up the largest
opposition in the assembly. Nor is it hidden from public view that Premier
Nepal, who lost an election in April 2008, was "elected" prime minister under
extraordinary circumstances.
Contemporary media reports depict him as probably the weakest prime minister
since the advent of democracy in 1991. From a law-and-order standpoint, Nepal's
situation is precarious. Maoist-led street agitation is pushing the country to
the brink. It appears to be sitting on the top of a volcano, especially in the
context of a premature Maoist announcement to declare ethnicity-based
"autonomous republics".
Premier Nepal has done precious little to stop this divisive step. Instead, he
went ahead with his travel plans, which included leading an unusually large
delegation to the Copenhagen climate change jamboree last week. In a worsening
situation, he is now heading for China.
"Who is in charge in Nepal?" asked S Chandrasekharan, an Indian analyst, in an
article for the South Asia Analysis Group last week. This is a pithy comment,
coming as it does from India in the wake of unrefuted media reports that New
Delhi continues to extend its support to Premier Nepal, and will do so at least
until his country gets the promised new constitution.
Under these circumstances, the Chinese leaders are unlikely to take any
initiatives for negotiations that would have long-term effects on bilateral
relations. If past experience is taken into account, the Chinese are likely to
hear Premier Nepal attentively and reiterate their concern about the activities
of "Free Tibet" activists in Kathmandu and elsewhere in Nepal. Such activities
are presumed to have arisen in recent months, particularly by those who take
advantage of the long, porous and unregulated border with India. India regards
the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, as its honored guest.
While Kathmandu-based Chinese diplomats insist that China does not compete with
India in Nepal, ground realities do not corroborate such an assertion. It is
altogether a different point that not all of the Chinese perceptions and
concomitant measures are direct or visible. Some are latent as well as
indirect. Among the efforts openly made include its request to the government
of Nepal to set up police checkpoints in its northern border passes, even if
some of these points are remote and more or less inaccessible.
China has lately become very sensitive to New Delhi's bid to enhance its
security interests in Nepal, so much so that a local newspaper report attracted
the attention of the People's Daily inasmuch as it alluded to Nepal's purported
endorsement of a proposal to construct an airstrip in the western town of
Surkhet for the use of the Indian Air Force. Surkhet is close to the
tri-junction of Kaalaapaani, where India, China and Nepal meet.
In view of China's longstanding border dispute with India, which led to a brief
conflict in 1962, and India's fear that China would attack its rival by 2012,
hostilities between them are not mere imagination.
Some of the high-ranking Chinese officials visiting Nepal in recent months have
publicly told Kathmandu that China remained prepared to assist Nepal in
protecting its sovereignty and independence. This is often interpreted as a
veiled warning to India, whose interference in Nepal has been on the rise since
the political changes of 2006. The Chinese are also aware of the fact that
India has encroached on Nepal's territory at more than 50 border points.
"The Indian offensives, both diplomatic and non-diplomatic, are sure to
exacerbate tensions and thereby encourage Chinese counter-measures," Devraj
Dahal, a professor of political science, told Asia Times Online.
M K Bhadrakumar, a former Indian diplomat, asked a pertinent question in an
article published in The Hindu newspaper recently: Why are India's neighbors
getting so "manifestly attracted to fostering close ties with China?"
While Nepalis hope that Premier Nepal succeeds in securing firm Chinese
commitments to help Nepal as a country, there are apprehensions that he may be
tempted to utilize the opportunity to obtain goodwill for his own continuation
in the post he has occupied since May.
Dhruba Adhikary is a Kathmandu-based journalist.
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