A Bonapartist in the Indian Ocean
By M K Bhadrakumar
When a tea sapling was brought into Ceylon - present-day Sri Lanka - in 1824
from China and planted in the Royal Botanical Gardens, the British had no
commercial interests in mind. It took another 40 years before a plucky Scotsman
planted the first seedling, which blossomed into the famous Ceylon Tea and
became today's unshakeable pillar of Sri Lanka's economy.
The "Emerald Island" has obscure tales to tell. That is why when a
swashbuckling army chief by the improbable name of Gardihewa Sarath Chandralal
Fonseka abruptly discards his uniform and plunges into the country's steamy
politics, it becomes no simple matter. Sri Lankan democracy may never be the
same again.
Bonapartism isn't altogether new to the region. Pakistan's Ayub
Khan showed the way, back in the 1950s. Bangladesh followed 20 years later. Now
Sri Lanka, an entrenched democracy, seems fatally attracted to it. The
presidential election is not due until November 2011, but there are signs it
may be held as early as January.
There is nothing necessarily fatal if a soldier develops a passion for
politics. An Indian commentator pointed out that, after all, there is the
precedent of US president Dwight D Eisenhower, a five-star general. But then,
the nagging worry remains whether in the South Asian clime, like the sapling
brought in from distant China, Fonseka, a US Green Card holder, may blossom and
outgrow the botanical garden that Sri Lankan democracy used to be.
Tapping into Sinhala nationalism
On the face of it, there is nothing ingenious in the choice by the Sri Lankan
opposition parties led by the United National Party (UNP) to field Fonseka as
their common candidate against President Mahinda Rajapakse, who will be
contesting the election for a second term for the ruling United Peoples Freedom
Alliance.
The opposition is blatantly tapping into the reservoir of Sinhala chauvinism
and triumphalism and contesting Rajapakse's monopoly claim to have vanquished
the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the recently
concluded war.
Actually, there is no fundamental difference between the UNP and the ruling
alliance as regards the approach toward the Tamil problem. The UNP was never
lagging behind in supporting the war against the LTTE or the draconian
emergency regulations prevailing in the country. The UNP sees it primarily as
tactical that Rajapakse can be possibly trumped if a "war hero" is pitted
against him.
Fonseka, former chief of defense staff of the Sri Lankan armed forces, fits the
bill. He has no qualms about stoking the fires of Sinhala nationalism and is
easily recognizable in the local folklore as the warrior who hunted down the
Tamil Tigers.
Unsurprisingly, Fonseka is a man of many parts. He hails from the Karava
community, which dominates the economic activities and comprises the new
bourgeoisie and is estimated to account for over one-third of the Sinhala
population. Although caste controversy is never explicitly expressed in
Sinhalese politics, there has been a dialectic at work involving the
land-owning Goyigamas (who account for half the Sinhala population) and
the merchant capitalist Karavas.
Though milder than its Indian counterpart and lacking in the stratifying
ideology, caste organizations or caste endogamy of Hinduism, the Sinhalese
caste system plays a role in politics, as most Sinhala people see caste as a
positive principle of affiliation - although like Hindus in neighboring India,
they fight shy of admitting it. An achievement-oriented national elite based on
education (knowledge of English) has accrued over time, but local elites
continue to be dominated by powerful castes like the Goyigama and Karava.
Karavas are concentrated in the southern coastal towns like Moratuwa,
Panadura, Ambalangoda (Fonseka's hometown), Kalutara, Galle, and so forth.
Therefore, Rajapakse (who hails from Hambantota to the east of Galle) can no
longer hope to trade on southern provincialism. Fonseka brings into the
opposition presidential ticket a formidable caste combination insofar as the
UNP already enjoys a strong Goyigama base. To boot, Rajapakse hails from
the upper-caste landed gentry and is not part of the English-educated elite of
Colombo, the capital.
With the mounting economic crisis in Sri Lanka, the support for the Rajapakse
government has been fading, as the recent provincial council elections
signaled. Many factors - Rajapakse's autocratic methods, austerity measures
demanded by the International Monetary Fund, unrest among salaried class and
wage earners, the price of cash crops - have generated fluidity in the public
mood that may result in a political backlash as the economic and social crisis
deepens.
Meanwhile, the Tamil problem festers. No worthwhile initiative has been taken
to address the root problems leading to Tamil separatism. Tamil detainees
herded into camps ("welfare villages") number 255,551 according to the United
Nations and live in appalling conditions. Entry into the camps is barred to the
media, and aid organizations operate under severe restrictions.
A visionary army general
In short, Fonseka's candidature can gain traction. For a fleeting moment, it
seems Sri Lankan democracy may be the gainer. However, Fonseka introduces a
dangerous streak. Consider his resignation letter dated November 12 addressed
to Rajapakse. He wrote:
I would not be exaggerating to state that I was
instrumental in leading the army to this historic victory [over the LTTE], of
course, with your excellency's political support, which helped to materialize
this heroic action. Though the field commanders, men and all members of the
army worked towards this common goal, it is with my vision, command and
leadership that this yeoman task was achieved.
Fonseka went on
to allege Rajapakse dishonored the Sri Lankan Army's reputation by encouraging
cronyism, which has "already led to a deterioration of the high standards I
[Fonseka] was capable of introducing to the army." With an eye on the growing
disaffection within the officer corps, Fonseka taunted Rajapakse:
Your
excellency has commenced mistrusting your own loyal army which attained the
unimaginable victory just a week ago ... the same army which gained victory for
the nation was suspected of staging a coup and thereby alerting the government
of India once again on the 15th of October 2009, unnecessarily placing the
Indian troops on high alert. This action did tarnish the image and reputation
gained by the Sri Lanka Army as a competent and professional organization ...
in the eyes of the world. This suspicion would have been due to the loyalty of
the Sri Lanka Army towards me as its past commander who led the army to the
historic victory.
[The] army which I toiled to transform into a highly professional outfit is now
losing its way. Increased desertions ... disciplinary problems ... indicate an
unprofessional organization in the offing. During the last two months, the
members [who] deserted are higher than the recruitment.
Surely,
he didn't fail to accuse the president of gross all-round misgovernance -
neglecting the plight of the hundreds of thousands of Tamil refugees displaced
during the war; mismanaging the economy; promoting "waste and corruption";
curtailing "media freedom and other democratic rights", and so on.
What explains it all? Fonseka only recently derided Indian politicians as "a
bunch of jokers". Temperamentally and by reputation, he is not cut out for
politics. In his resignation letter, Fonseka listed out his post-retirement
benefits:
Your excellency would be kind enough to grant me sufficient
security which includes trained combat soldiers, a suitable vehicle with
sufficient protection (bullet proof) and escort vehicles for my conveyances ...
I wish to bring to your excellency's kind notice that over 100 men, six escort
vehicles and a bullet proof vehicle have been placed at the convenience of the
former commander of the navy ... I presume that such arrangements would be made
available to me ...
Indian Ocean geopolitics
No aspiring politician ever likes to be seen as self-seeking. Indeed, what
prompts someone like Fonseka to dive into the dangerous depths of politics? Is
he acting on own volition? If so, what is his agenda? If not, who is promoting
him?
The geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region does seem to provide the backdrop to
the engrossing power play. The UNP, which props him up, is traditionally
right-leaning and favors neo-liberal market-oriented policies. It consistently
toed a pro-Western (pro-US) orientation in foreign policy. The UNP leader,
Ranil Wickremesinghe, enjoyed close equations with the George W Bush
administration.
The US has been stepping up pressure on the ruling circles in Colombo,
especially on Defense Minister Gotabhaya Rajapaske, the president's brother
(who is a US citizen), as to any involvement in policy matters that constituted
human-rights violations in the conduct of the war against the LTTE.
The Rajapakse government is deeply concerned that Fonseka, who is a US Green
Card holder, has darkly hinted he's privy to "very highly sensitive" issues
related to the final stages of the war that are known only to a handful in the
top echelons of the defense establishment. Indeed, the last phase of a brutal
war can never stand the scrutiny of covenants regarding prisoners of war.
The US agenda goes beyond concerns over war crimes and human-rights abuses.
Washington has been feeling uneasy about Rajapakse's growing economic and
political ties with China. A malleable power structure in Colombo is crucial
for the US geostrategic interests in the Indian Ocean, which connects the
Persian Gulf with the South China Sea.
A Bonapartist may just be the crowbar Washington needs to rudely tear apart the
social contract on which Rajapakse based his political fortunes brilliantly so
far.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka,
Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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