Rivals fiddle while Kabul burns
By Abubakar Siddique
Political tensions are on the rise in Afghanistan as the country braces for a
challenging presidential runoff on November 7.
On October 26, incumbent President Hamid Karzai rejected demands from his
election rival, former foreign minister, Abdullah Abdullah, that key cabinet
ministers be replaced and the country's top election official be removed if he
was to participate in the electoral process.
Abdullah claimed that Azizullah Ludin, head of the Afghan Election Commission,
should be fired immediately because "he
has left no credibility for the institution and, unfortunately, for himself".
"These are practical, very technical [conditions]," Abdullah said in explaining
his demand. "It will only help the transparency of the elections, and these are
the minimum conditions. And by meeting these conditions, I think we can [build]
the right foundation for the future of this country. It will be a step forward,
and the outcome of such an election - I will be the first one to welcome it
[whatever] that outcome would be."
Mohammad Yunos Fakur, a Kabul-based independent Afghan analyst, questions
Abdullah's true motives. Fakur suggests that Abdullah, who officially finished
second to Karzai in the first round with 31.5% of the vote, sees the
unlikelihood of a second-round victory and is trying to gain key concessions,
including power-sharing, ahead of the vote.
Analysts widely expect Karzai to improve on his first-round tally, which gave
him just under 50% of the vote. They expect Karzai to capitalize on his
incumbency by wooing Afghans who voted in the first round for third candidates,
such as populist lawmaker Ramazan Bashardost and reform-minded former Finance
Minister Ashraf Ghani.
'Moving toward a clash'
The notion that "politics is the art of the possible" is stretched to extreme
limits in Afghanistan. Given the country's peculiar circumstances, Afghan
analysts suggest that looking at mere poll numbers and predicting results based
on past voting patterns might only serve as a diversion from the real issue of
how to restore stability and deliver a credible and legitimate government.
Fakur says the two candidates are "moving toward a clash" and "are not agreeing
on any framework" on how to move forward. This, he says, is because both are
reluctant to concede to anything that might lessen their respective chances of
winning and, in turn, put them at risk of losing their political standing.
"Everything that led to their agreement, reconciliation, and possible solution
pleased people," Fakur says. "But when their disagreements lead to tension and
paralysis, it increases the concerns of the people. One reason for popular
optimism in Kabul is that they are grateful that in the presence of
international forces the political crisis would not morph into fighting."
In a country where recent history has been shaped by foreign invasions and
regional competition played out by armed proxies, the idea of a peaceful
transfer of power through elections has not gained currency among Afghan
politicians and factional leaders.
With the Western media's focus on the threats posed by extremists, little
attention has been paid to the importance of understanding the complexities of
Afghan politics.
Fakur suggests that though Karzai might eventually win enough votes to be
re-elected, it won't necessarily mean that he can deliver a strong, credible
government. Given Afghanistan's unique situation, in which insurgents control
large swathes of territory, Fakur suggests that Karzai will need to reach a
compromise with Abdullah and other figures who oppose him.
"The conditions in Afghanistan are such that North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, the Americans, and our neighbors have their interests here. And
we need to tailor our interests to their strategies," Fakur says. "If we keep
on stirring Afghan sentiments against the international community and work to
bring about a government here that clashes with the international community, it
won't help. Such a situation will move toward crisis, and this is the basic
problem."
Fakur suggests that apart from the internal dynamics, the lead-up to the runoff
is being shaped by the acts of the international community, and the Afghans'
perceptions of those acts.
He says that Karzai wants to show Afghans that he stood up to international
pressure to remove him from power. And Abdullah, Fakur says, saw opportunity in
Karzai's differences with the West, resulting in the demands he made ahead of
the runoff.
No compromise
Afghan parliamentarian Shukria Barakzai, who now supports Karzai in the runoff,
rules out the possibility of a compromise between the two and wants Afghan
voters to decide their future leader.
She suggests that despite Karzai's alliance with many notorious Afghan
strongmen, the electorate is likely to re-elect him because he is not
associated with the internecine conflict of the 1990s, when anti-Soviet
factions destroyed Kabul and other cities in their rapacious civil war.
Abdullah was a senior aide to late Afghan guerilla leader Ahmad Shah Massoud in
the 1990s when the Afghan capital was destroyed in factional fighting between
Masoud and other factions of the anti-Soviet mujahideen.
"For the people of Afghanistan, I think, Dr Abdullah is a symbol of yesterday's
Afghanistan and Karzai is a symbol of today's Afghanistan," Barakzai says. "And
Afghans won't like to go back to the dark days of our recent past. It is
because if we go back to the past, we will give away our present."
Hajji Sayed Daud, who heads the Afghan Media Resource Center in Kabul, is
well-acquainted with public opinion and popular thinking. He tells RFE/RL that
deal-making and the fact that Karzai controls the government machinery will
ensure his victory on November 7.
But he sees the rival sides as pushing the Afghan electorate toward ethnic
fragmentation. Karzai, a Pashtun, and Abdullah, a Tajik-Pashtun, each received
support that crossed ethnic and regional boundaries. But the mutual accusations
of fraud that followed the first round at times developed ethnic undertones,
with hawks from Karzai's side portraying themselves as protectors of Pashtuns,
and hawks from Abdullah's side as protectors of Tajiks.
Daud sees the growth of such sentiments in the run-up to the runoff as a bad
omen for the future of democracy and stability in his country.
"In the regions where Pashtuns live, they are being motivated to vote for a
Pashtun. And regions where other ethnicities - Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen,
Hazara - live, they are being told that the Pashtuns want to cling to the
leadership," Daud says.
"In my opinion, voting based on ethnicity moves Afghanistan toward destruction,
civil war, and division. It is the duty of both candidates not to exploit such
issues. But unfortunately, both Karzai and Dr Abdullah are engaging in this
now."
Daud suggests that to solve the governance crisis, disillusioned Afghans might
prefer a traditional loya jirga, or grand assembly of elders, who would
form an interim government and prepare ground for holding free and fair
elections.
In an interview with RFE/RL last week, former United Nations and European Union
special envoy for Afghanistan, Francesc Vendrell, suggested a similar solution.
Given its investment in the elections and the political process, the
international community is solely focused on holding the November 7 runoff.
But if even a successful election process fails to deliver an efficient and
credible administration, alternative solutions can be expected to gain currency
among Afghan politicians and Western policy makers.
Note
This article was written before before gunmen wearing suicide vests on
Wednesday stormed Bekhtar guesthouse in downtown Kabul, which is used by United
Nations staff. At least 12 people reportedly died during fighting at the scene,
including at least five UN staffers, three security guards and three Taliban
gunmen. A Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, told the media the attack was
meant to warn people not to help in the November 7 runoff presidential
election. The guesthouse siege was preceded by a minor rocket attack on the
presidential palace and followed two hours later by a rocket attack on the
Serena Hotel, a luxury hotel that is popular among foreign diplomats and
journalists and which has been attacked before.
Copyright (c) 2009, RFE/RL Inc. Reprinted with the permission of
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington DC
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