So far, this tiny, provisional contingent represents the sum total of
additional troops the Obama administration has been able to pry out of
America's European allies, despite a sustained diplomatic drive to bolster the
combined NATO force in Afghanistan. In other words, even America's most loyal
and obsequious ally in Europe no longer appears willing to carry the burden for
what is widely seen as yet another costly and debilitating American military
adventure in the Greater Middle East.
6. Finally, in a move of striking symbolic significance, the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) passed over Chicago (as well as Madrid
and Tokyo) to pick Rio de Janeiro to be the host of the 2016 summer Olympics,
the first time a South American nation was selected for the honor. Until the
Olympic vote took place, Chicago was considered a strong contender, especially
since former Chicago resident Barack Obama personally appeared in Copenhagen to
lobby the IOC. Nonetheless, in a development that shocked the world, Chicago
not only lost out but was the city eliminated in the very first round of
voting.
"Brazil went from a second-class country to a first-class country, and today we
began to receive the respect we deserve," said Brazilian President Luiz Inacio
Lula da Silva at a victory celebration in Copenhagen after the vote. "I could
die now and it already would have been worth it." Few said so, but in the
course of the Olympic decision-making process the US was summarily and
pointedly demoted from sole superpower to instant also-ran, a symbolic moment
on a planet entering a new age.
On being an ordinary country
These are only a few examples of recent developments which indicate, to this
author, that the day of America's global preeminence has already come to an
end, years before the American intelligence community expected. It's
increasingly clear that other powers - even our closest allies - are
increasingly pursuing independent foreign policies, no matter what pressure
Washington tries to bring to bear.
Of course, none of this means that, for some time to come, the US won't retain
the world's largest economy and, in terms of sheer destructiveness, its most
potent military force. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the strategic
environment in which American leaders must make critical decisions, when it
comes to the nation's vital national interests, has changed dramatically since
the onset of the global economic crisis.
Even more important, Obama and his senior advisers are, it seems, reluctantly
beginning to reshape US foreign policy with the new global reality in mind.
This appears evident, for example, in the administration's decision to revisit
US strategy on Afghanistan.
It was only in March, after all, that the president embraced a new
counter-insurgency-oriented strategy in that country, involving a buildup of US
boots on the ground and a commitment to protracted efforts to win hearts and
minds in Afghan villages where the Taliban was resurgent. It was on this basis
that he fired the incumbent Afghan War commander, General David D McKiernan,
replacing him with General Stanley A McChrystal, considered a more vigorous
proponent of counterinsurgency. When, however, McChrystal presented Obama with
the price tag for the implementation of this strategy - 40,000 to 80,000
additional troops (over and above the 20,000-odd extra troops only recently
committed to the fight) - many in the president's inner circle evidently
blanched.
Not only will such a large deployment cost the US Treasury hundreds of billions
of dollars it can ill afford, but the strains it is likely to place on the Army
and Marine Corps are likely to be little short of unbearable after years of
multiple tours and stress in Iraq. This price would be more tolerable, of
course, if America's allies would take up more of the burden, but they are ever
less willing to do so.
Undoubtedly, the leaders of Russia and China are not entirely unhappy to see
the United States exhaust its financial and military resources in Afghanistan.
Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Vice President Joe
Biden, among others, is calling for a new turn in US policy, foregoing a
counterinsurgency approach and opting instead for a less costly
"counter-terrorism" strategy aimed, in part, at crushing al-Qaeda in Pakistan -
using drone aircraft and Special Forces, rather than large numbers of US troops
(while leaving troop levels in Afghanistan relatively unchanged).
It is too early to predict how the president's review of US strategy in
Afghanistan will play out, but the fact that he did not immediately embrace the
McChrystal plan and has allowed Biden such free rein to argue his case suggests
that he may be coming to recognize the folly of expanding America's military
commitments abroad at a time when its global preeminence is waning.
One senses Obama's caution in other recent moves. Although he continues to
insist that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran is impermissible and
that the use of force to prevent this remains an option, he has clearly moved
to minimize the likelihood that this option - which would also be plagued by
recalcitrant "allies" - will ever be employed.
On the other side of the coin, he has given fresh life to American diplomacy,
seeking improved ties with Moscow and approving renewed diplomatic contact with
such previously pariah states as Myanmar, Sudan and Syria. This, too, reflects
a reality of our changing world: that the holier-than-thou, bullying stance
adopted by the George W Bush administration toward these and other countries
for almost eight years rarely achieved anything. Think of it as an implicit
acknowledgement that the US is now descending from its status as the globe's
"sole superpower" to that of an ordinary country. This, after all, is what
ordinary countries do; they engage other countries in diplomatic discourse,
whether they like their current governments or not.
So, welcome to the world of 2025. It doesn't look like the world of our recent
past, when the United States stood head and shoulders above all other nations
in stature, and it doesn't comport well with Washington's fantasies of global
power since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. But it is reality.
For many Americans, the loss of that preeminence may be a source of discomfort,
or even despair. On the other hand, don't forget the advantages to being an
ordinary country like any other country: Nobody expects Canada, or France, or
Italy to send another 40,000 troops to Afghanistan, on top of the 68,000
already there and the 120,000 still in Iraq. Nor does anyone expect those
countries to spend $925 billion in taxpayer money to do so - the current
estimated cost of both wars, according to the National Priorities Project.
The question remains: How much longer will Washington feel that Americans can
afford to subsidize a global role that includes garrisoning much of the planet
and fighting distant wars in the name of global security, when the American
economy is losing so much ground to its competitors? This is the dilemma Obama
and his advisers must confront in the altered world of 2025.
Michael T Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at
Hampshire College and author of
Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy(Owl
Books). A documentary film version of his previous book, Blood and Oil, is
available from the Media Education Foundation at Bloodandoilmovie.com.
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