Page 2 of 2 Afghanistan by the numbers
By Tom Engelhardt
Public opinion
Percentage of Americans opposed to the war in Afghanistan: 57%, according to
the latest CNN poll, an 11% rise since April. Only 42% now support the war.
Percentage of Republicans who support the war: 70%, according to the latest
Washington Post-ABC News poll.
Percentage of Americans who approve of Obama's handling of the war: 48%,
according to the latest CBS poll, a drop of 8 points since April. (Support for
increasing the number of troops in Afghanistan is now at just 25%, down 14%
from April.)
Percentage of British who feel their forces should be withdrawn
from Afghanistan: 59%.
Percentage of Germans opposed to that country's 4,000 troop commitment to
Afghanistan: More than 70%.
The presidential election
Estimated cost of staging the 2009 Afghan presidential election: $500 million.
Number of complaints of voting irregularities: More than 2,500 and still
climbing, 691 of them described as "serious charges."
Number of members of the "Independent Election Commission" not appointed by
Afghan president (and presidential candidate) Hamid Karzai: 0.
Cost of blank voting-registration cards in Ghazni province in May 2009: $200
for 200 blank registration cards.
Cost of such a card purchased by "an undercover Afghan journalist working for
the BBC" this autumn: $8.
Number of voter registration cards (not including fakes) reportedly distributed
countrywide: 17 million or almost twice the estimated number of eligible
voters.
Number of ballots cast at the Hajji Janat Gul High School polling place, half
an hour from the center of Kabul: 600.
Number of votes recorded for Karzai at that polling station: 996. (Number of
votes for other candidates: 5.)
Number of ballots marked for Karzai and shipped to Kabul from 45 polling sites
in Shorabak district in southern Afghanistan that were shut down by local
officials connected to Karzai before voting could begin: 23,900.
Number of fake polling sites set up by backers of Karzai where no one voted but
hundreds of thousands of votes were recorded: as many as 800, according to the
New York Times. (Another 800 actual polling sites were taken over by Karzai
supporters "to fraudulently report tens of thousands of additional ballots for
Mr Karzai".)
Number of ballots in Karzai's home province, Kandahar, where an estimated
25,000 Afghans actually voted, submitted to be counted: approximately 350,000.
Private contractors
Number of military contractors hired by the Pentagon in Afghanistan by the end
of June 2009: Almost 74,000, nearly two-thirds of them local hires, a 9% rise
over the previous three months.
Percentage of the Pentagon's force in Afghanistan made up of contractors in
March 2009: 57%.
Ranking for the percentage of contractors used by the Pentagon in Afghanistan:
highest in any conflict in US history.
Diplomats and the civilian surge
Cost of new "crash" program to expand the US "diplomatic presence" in
Afghanistan and Pakistan: $1 billion. ($736 million of which is slated for the
construction of a massive new embassy/regional headquarters in Islamabad,
Pakistan.)
Number of additional US government personnel reportedly slated to be sent to
Pakistan to augment the 750 civilians already there: almost 1,000.
Expected number of US government civilians to be posted at the US Embassy in
Kabul, Afghanistan by the end of 2009: 976. (There were 562 at the end of 2008
and there are now reportedly more than 1,000 diplomats, staff, and Afghan
nationals already working there.)
Estimated total number of civilians to be assigned to the US Embassy in Kabul
as part of a proposed ongoing "civilian surge" by 2011: 1,350 (800 to be posted
in Kabul, 550 outside the capital).
Cost of the State Department's five-year contract with Xe Services (formerly
Blackwater) to provide security for US diplomats in Afghanistan: $210 million.
Cost of the State Department's contract with ArmorGroup North America, a
subsidiary of US-based Wackenhutt Services Inc, to guard the US Embassy in
Kabul: $189 million.
Number of private guards provided by ArmorGroup North America: 450, based at
Camp Sullivan, several miles from the embassy compound where they reportedly
engaged in Lord of the Flies-style behavior.
The metrics of success
Defense Secretary Robert Gates on success in Afghanistan: It will take "a few
years" to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Admiral "Mike" Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Meet the Press:
"I believe we've got to start to turn this thing around from a security
standpoint in the next 12 to 18 months." (He would not directly answer the "how
long" question.)
Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on the Afghan War: "None of the
civilian officials or military officers interviewed in Afghanistan and
elsewhere expected substantial progress in the short term. They talked in terms
of years two, five and 10 ... Military officials believe the Afghanistan
mission can only succeed if troops are there far longer - anywhere from five
years to 12 years."
Military experts cited by Walter Pincus of the Washington Post warn: "[T]he
United States is taking on security and political commitments that will last at
least a decade and a cost that will probably eclipse that of the Iraq war."
Anthony H Cordesman, a member of a "team" put together by US commanding general
in Afghanistan Stanley A McChrystal to assess war strategy, and a national
security expert for the Center for Strategic and International Studies: "told
reporters recently that even with military gains in the next 12 to 18 months,
it would take years to reduce sharply the threat from the Taliban and other
insurgent forces."
Robert Dreyfuss of the Nation summarizing the opinions of a panel of experts on
the Afghan War, including Bruce Riedel, a 30-year CIA veteran and adviser to
four presidents, who chaired Obama's Afghan task force, two McChrystal task
force members, Kim Kagan and Cordesman, and the Brooking Institution's Michael
O'Hanlon: "(1) A significant escalation of the war will be necessary to avoid
utter defeat. (2) Even if tens of thousands of troops are added to the US
occupation, it won't be possible to determine if the US/NATO effort is
succeeding until 18 months later. (3) Even if the United States turns the tide
in Afghanistan, no significant drawdown of US forces will take place until five
years have passed." (Riedel commented: "Anyone who thinks that in 12 to 18
months we're going to be anywhere close to victory is living in a fantasy.")
New chief of staff of the British Army, General Sir David Richards: "The army's
role will evolve, but the whole process might take as long as 30 to 40 years."
(After much criticism, he retracted the statement.)
New NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen: NATO's mission in Afghanistan
will last "as long as it takes" to ensure that the country is secure.
Afghanistan by the numbers
Cost of a Kalashnikov rifle in Afghanistan today: $400-600.
Cost of a Kalakov (the Afghan name for a new model of Kalashnikov): $1,100.
(For a $150 surcharge, you can have it delivered to southern Afghanistan.)
Cost of a kilo of heroin in Afghanistan: $2,500. (Cost of that same kilo in
Moscow: an estimated $100,000.)
Cost in police bribes of getting contraband into or out of Afghanistan: "$20 on
each weapon, $100 for a kilo of heroin and $1,000 for each thousand kilos of
hashish."
Afghanistan's ranking among the globe's "weakest states", according to the
Brookings Institution: second weakest. (It is also regularly referred to as the
world's fourth poorest country.)
Unemployment rate in Afghanistan, according to the US Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) World Factbook: 40% (2008 figures).
Monthly wage for Afghan National Police: $110 (less than $4 per day).
Daily wage Taliban reputedly pays its fighters: $4-8. (Often the only "job"
available.)
How long it may take to get a case through a government court (with bribes):
4-5 years.
How long it may take to get a case through a Taliban court (without bribes): 1
day.
Number of registered Afghan refugees still in Iran and Pakistan: 3 million.
Number of al-Qaeda base camps estimated to be in Afghanistan today: 0. (All
reputable experts seem agreed on this.)
The next war
The price tag the Obama administration's budget team reportedly put on US
future wars almost every year through 2019: More than $100 billion a year.
The cost of equipping seven army brigades with a Boeing advanced coordinated
system of hand-held drones, robots, sensors, and other battlefield surveillance
equipment over the next two years: $2 billion.
Date when all 73 army active and reserve brigades will be equipped with the
system: 2025.
What can't be measured
Here's a conundrum to be considered and filed away under the rubric "impossible
to measure" as you leave the world of Afghan war metrics: The US continues to
struggle to train Afghan police and soldiers who will actually turn out and
fight with discipline (see above).
In the meantime, as a recent Washington Post piece by Karen DeYoung indicated,
the Taliban regularly turn out fighters who are reportedly using ever more
sophisticated and tenacious fire-and-maneuver techniques against the
overwhelming firepower of US and NATO forces. ("To many of the Americans, it
appeared as if the insurgents had attended something akin to the US Army's
Ranger school, which teaches soldiers how to fight in small groups in austere
environments.")
Both groups are, of course, Afghans. It might be worth considering why "their"
Afghans are the fierce fighters of history books and legend and ours, despite
billions of dollars and massive training efforts, are not. This puzzling
situation had its parallel in Vietnam decades ago when American military
advisors regularly claimed they would give up a division of US-trained South
Vietnamese forces for a single battalion of "VC".
Here's something to carry away with you: Life is invariably hard when you set
up your massive embassies, your regional command centers, your election
advisors, your private security guards, your military trainers and advisors,
your diplomats and civilian enablers and then try to come up with a formula for
motivating the locals to do your bidding.
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