Page 3 of 3 India plays catch-up in the great game
By M K Bhadrakumar
This is a blatant admission that the Taliban enjoy safe haven in Pakistan and
still continue to be an instrument of regional policy for the Pakistani
establishment. The Taliban's political rehabilitation at this juncture is
certain to cause disquiet among regional powers. Conceivably, Iran and India's
resistance to the Taliban would seem to be fundamental. They have consistently
seen a connection between Islamic extremism in the region and the Taliban. They
would worry that once the radical movement is allowed entry into mainstream
political life, Afghanistan could easily get "Talibanized" almost overnight.
The ground reality is that the Taliban are today by far the best-organized
force in Afghanistan. It can easily eclipse other groups and establish its
dominance.
India's China syndrome
Curiously, among the key players in the Central Asian region - Russia, the US,
China, Iran and the European Union - India's
commonality of interests is at its maximum with China.
India, too, shares China's aversion to a bloc mentality or any extravagant
indulgence in the great game as such. India's priorities in fighting terrorism,
religious extremism and separatism are no less than China's. As with China,
these are contemporaneous issues that are "felt in the blood" and directly
impact on India's national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Like China, India follows a policy of scrupulously steering clear of any
interference in the internal affairs of the Central Asian states.
Ideally, therefore, China provides a fine example for India to emulate. Through
a sophisticated matrix of interlocking and mutually reinforcing regional and
bilateral formats, China has effectively advanced the pursuit of its national
interests in the region. Such an approach enabled China to leap over the large
morass of hostility and suspicion regarding Chinese intentions, which was a
backlog of the region's Soviet history. It also enabled China to harmonize with
Russia and avoid treading on Russian sensitivities regarding a region that
forms part of Russia's historical consciousness.
But just as China's is a story of diplomatic and political success, India's has
been a chronicle of dismal failure. The Central Asian region is a glaring
example of the lop-sided priorities in India's foreign policy. No serious power
can ignore the regions neighboring to it or its "near abroad". History
testifies to the importance of geography in foreign policy. Yet, India's
relations with the Central Asian region are virtually in a state of neglect.
(India's robust effort lately to source nuclear fuel from Kazakhstan is a noble
exception.) India's regional policy in Central Asia can only be summed up as
one of "masterly inactivity".
India started off brilliantly in the early 1990s, when the countries of Central
Asia appeared as independent sovereign entities. Thanks to Soviet propaganda,
which unfailingly preached the idealism of Indo-Soviet friendship, India was a
role model for the Central Asian states. Their leaderships, schooled in the
Kremlin's worldview, instinctively warmed to India. They solicited deep and
seamless involvement by India in their formative years of state formation.
Despite the big changes in the character of Delhi's ties with Moscow during the
period since 1991, Russia is still viewed as a traditional ally by India and
Russian influence in the Central Asian region as a positive factor for regional
stability and security. At the very minimum, India has no real clash of
interests with Russia in Central Asia.
But by the middle of the 1990s, it began to dawn on the Central Asian capitals
already that India wasn't focused enough on the region and that its priorities
lay elsewhere - in the faraway West. India was niggardly in making investments
in Central Asia; India neglected its trade with the region and failed to assist
the region to resuscitate its Soviet-era high-tech industry or even to
commercially tap its mineral resources; and India did nothing to develop its
communication links with the region.
Why is the SCO so important for India?
First and foremost, it is a security organization that focuses on regional
security and stability. Fighting terrorism, religious extremism and political
separatism forms the core of the SCO's agenda. In this sphere, India has shared
concerns.
The SCO is a comfortably large enough umbrella for a country of India's size to
take its due place. There is so single overbearing presence in the tent. All
decisions taken by the SCO are on the basis of consensus. The SCO is adamant
that it will not preach or prescribe any particular way of life to the world
community.
The SCO stands for a democratized world order based on multilateralism and
respect of international law. It gives primacy to the United Nations in world
affairs. It makes no distinction between countries, big and small. It believes
that security is indivisible. It respects national sovereignty in the conduct
of international relations. India should completely feel at home with the SCO
charter.
The SCO can creatively supplement India's "Look East" policy of engaging the
countries of the Southeast Asian and the Asia Pacific regions.
The SCO offers vast scope for economic cooperation. The organization may
undertake regional projects in infrastructure development, energy and
communications. It may develop in future common banking facilities and a common
market.
Indian diplomacy can aspire to utilize the SCO forum for tempering India's
relations with the organization's member countries - and observers.
However, there are troubling questions about the orientation of Indian policy
toward the SCO. India has largely adopted a lukewarm attitude towards it. Most
certainly, India has been wary of making any moves in the SCO's direction that
might be construed by the US as a "strategic defiance" of its regional policy
in Central Asia. The unsubstantiated Indian claim is that China has been
"blocking" India's membership of the SCO.
But the actuality seems to lie somewhere between. Washington has been eyeing
New Delhi as a partner in the pursuit of its "Great Central Asia" strategy.
This was most pronounced during the eight years of the George W Bush presidency
when the so-called US-India strategic partnership rapidly began getting
"militarized". Indian analysts began harboring a notion that India was poised
to play the role of a "balancer" in the international system and as a
"counterweight" to China in the US's Asian strategies.
Fortunately, given the "disconnect" between Indian strategic analysts and
policymakers in the establishment, official thinking mostly remained impervious
to these strange ideas. But a bizarre idea gained ground in the Indian
establishment that with kindred "Asian democracies" like Australia, Singapore
and Japan, Delhi could checkmate China's march in the region - a sort of
Wilsonian pipedream that belied ground realities.
At any rate, the illusions inculcated in the Indian mind during the Bush era
seem to be fast dissipating, thanks to a variety of factors that have compelled
a rethink about the US's role in the contemporary world, especially the shadows
cast by the global economic crisis. Fortuitously, India has also put behind it
the ill-conceived idea of a quadripartite alliance of "Asian democracies", with
the US, Japan and Australia as its partners.
In retrospect, Indian analysts
Failed to fathom the volatility in the international system.
Underestimated the growing tendencies of multilateralism.
Overlooked Russia's resurgence.
Failed to comprehend the centrality of Pakistan in the US's regional strategies
in South Asia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf.
Refused to take cognizance of the extent of interdependence developed in the
US-China relationship through the past decade, which made redundant for the US
any need of India as a "counterweight" to China.
Germane to all this was India's inability to come to terms with China's rise
and a lack of comprehension of the profound changes that swept over "communist"
China.
On balance, India's "China syndrome" seems to have come in the way of rational
long-term thinking towards the Central Asian region. The Indian strategic
community remained dogmatically wedded to the thesis regarding a pattern of
Chinese "encirclement" of India. Indian analysts lapped up the so-called
"string of pearls" thesis, propounded by a junior ex-Pentagon analyst. What
they overlook is that China's neighborhood policy is not necessarily and/or
invariably India-centric; that Pakistan, Nepal and Myanmar also happen to be
critically important neighboring countries for China in intrinsic terms; and
that it is unrealistic to expect Beijing to subject its relations with its
neighbors to a state of benign neglect as a gesture of friendliness toward
India.
Unlike India, China accords the highest priority in its foreign policy to
relations with its neighbors. The stability and friendliness of Nepal has a
direct bearing on Tibet's security. The communication links via Pakistan or
Myanmar by far shorten China's long-winded routes existing today via the
Malacca Strait. The Gulf region accounts for almost 90% of China's oil imports.
China is keenly seeking the export of its products to the booming Gulf markets
and in the newly developed African markets.
Second, what prevents India from pursuing a dynamic policy towards its
neighboring countries? Sri Lanka first offered the Hambantota port development
project to India, and China figured only as a second option. Besides, it is not
as if China disrupts India's efforts to develop its relations with its
neighbors like Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.
Again, the animated discourses in India about Sino-Pakistani military ties fail
to factor in that Pakistan, too, is entitled to keep up its defense
preparedness just as New Delhi has been justifiably vigilant about the Indian
military capability to handle threat perceptions vis-a-vis China or Pakistan.
India has very substantially jacked up its defense budget in recent years. This
scale of massive expenditure on military buildup finds acceptability in Indian
public opinion. Besides, China is not the only country that supplies weapons to
Pakistan. China's access to sophisticated military technology is actually far
more limited than that of France or the US or Russia or Israel. Pakistan today
is one of the biggest recipients of military assistance from the US, next only
to Israel.
Ultimately, therefore, a mutual understanding with China becomes the imperative
need if Indian policies are to be anywhere near optimal in tackling the
challenges of regional security and stability.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka,
Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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