Page 2 of 3 India plays catch-up in the great game
By M K Bhadrakumar
A "reset" in US-Russia ties, which the Barack Obama administration promised,
can work as a potential game-changer in the great game in Central Asia. But a
profound "reset" is a long haul. The US is still opting for a selective
engagement of Russia specific to areas that are of pressing relevance to
current US interests, such as the nuclear non-proliferation agenda and
terrorism and the situation around Iran. Russia, on the other hand, is seeking
an all-round engagement with the US on the basis of an equal partnership and
mutuality of interests and concerns. There is no evidence, however, that the US
is in a mood to grant such an elevated status to Russia as an equal partner on
the global stage.
All signs are that the Obama administration will not concede
Russia's special interests in its so-called "near abroad" in the post-Soviet
space. On the contrary, the US is accelerating the contestation for influence
in the Caucasus, the Caspian and in Central Asia.
Of late, the great game, which has been keenly pursued in Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, has spilled over into Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
The change of leadership in Ashgabat in 2007 has provided an opportunity for
the US to modulate that country's policy of "positive neutrality" in favor of
greater engagement with the West.
The prospects for sourcing Turkmen gas for the Trans-Caspian projects have
significantly improved. Turkmenistan also offers transit facilities for the US
to ferry supplies to Afghanistan. Ashgabat is steadily moving out of the
Russian orbit and edging close to the US. The Turkmen efforts to directly
access the world energy market without the Russian middleman can have a domino
effect on other energy producing countries in the region. In turn, it holds the
potential to erode Russia's overall standing in Central Asia and to render
ineffectual the Moscow-led regional integration processes.
But what is unfolding over Tajikistan is vintage great game from the 19th
century. Tajikistan's importance has increased as a gateway to Central Asia for
the US influence entrenched in Afghanistan. Tajikistan's strategic importance
can't be understated:
It is a corridor leading to the turbulent Ferghana Valley.
It borders Xinjiang.
It is a hotbed of militant Islam.
It is an oasis of Iranian (Persian) culture.
It controls the region's watersheds.
It is a principal route for drug traffickers.
It is Russia's furthest military outpost on the territory of the former Soviet
Union.
Over and above, of course, Tajikistan is integral to the stabilization of
Afghan polity, while Tajik nationalism can be a potent weapon in the hands of
Uzbekistan's adversaries.
Thus, for any number of good reasons, prising Tajikistan away from the orbit of
traditional Russian influence has become a key objective of US diplomacy. The
thrust of the US's so-called "Great Central Asia" strategy aims at pulling
Tajikistan toward Afghanistan so that a new dynamic will generate, which would
incrementally draw the Central Asian region away from Russian and Chinese
influence and toward South Asian countries, with Afghanistan acting as a hub or
a revolving door. The US has brought in international financial institutions to
explore the possibility of funding trans-regional projects that strengthen the
infrastructure and communication links between the countries of the Central
Asian region and the South Asian region.
The huge expansion of US influence in South Asia has come in handy in this
effort, as Afghanistan is a vital link that can connect Central Asia with South
Asia. The US's so-called "Great Central Asia" strategy under the George W Bush
administration aimed at drawing the Central Asian states away from the SCO
toward a regional cooperation arrangement with the South Asian region.
However, trans-border infrastructure projects of the sort envisaged in the US's
"Great Central Asia" strategy can be advanced only if intra-regional relations
between the countries of South Asia and their equations with the US pan out.
The standoff between the US and Iran remains a negative factor seriously
impeding regional cooperation.
Regional cooperation can advance and India's involvement in the Central Asian
region can gain in substance only if it can address the vexed issue of a viable
access route to the region. As things stand, the South Asian region as a whole
lacks a basic regional identity, let alone an awareness of the imperatives of
regional cooperation with the neighboring Central Asian region.
India and Pakistan are far from dispelling the mutual mistrust in their
relationship. There is opposition within India to resolving even "doable"
issues, pending the settlement of intractable problems. India also has turned
its back on the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project, which could have been
a potential stabilizer in the regional equations.
A Sino-Russian concord
Be that as it may, China appreciates that the contradictions and struggles
between Russia and the Western powers in the post-Cold War years are at a
defining moment. In comparison, the Sino-Russian relationship, with its
difficult history, reached an almost unparalleled level of mutual
understanding. That indeed helped the SCO gain flesh and blood. On the face of
it, the SCO is everything that former US president Richard Nixon and national
security advisor Henry Kissinger - who sought to keep Russia and China apart -
tried to prevent.
In respect of the geopolitics of Central Asia, China has shared concerns with
Russia, especially on two aspects. First, like Russia, China also harbors
misgivings about NATO's designs toward Central Asia and appreciates the Russian
efforts to keep the Western alliance out of the region. Second, Russia and
China have been thinking hard about the concept of Central Asia. The point is,
it is unrealistic for Russia and China (and for the SCO) to deal with the
processes which are going on in the Central Asian region without taking into
consideration the developments in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.
The SCO encounters the reality that even though Central Asia and South Asia
used to belong to different geopolitical templates until quite recently, this
is no longer so, especially after 9/11 provided the opportunity to the US to
establish a long-term presence in Afghanistan.
There are definite signs that extremist elements based in Afghanistan, which,
unsurprisingly, come under the covert influence of various external players,
will continue to test the resolve of Russia and China (and the SCO) as
guarantors of regional security and stability. In short, the unrest in Andizhan
in the Ferghana Valley in May 2005 was not a mere flash in the pan.
This is an added reason why the Xinjiang developments assume importance. What
muddies the waters is that the forces of militant Islam have had a
controversial history of lending themselves as geopolitical tools during the
Cold war era. Then, there are serious question marks about the exact
credentials of movements such as Hizb ul-Tahrir, which is based in London,
though ostensibly given to virulent anti-Zionist rhetoric, and is very active
in Pakistan and the Central Asian countries.
Given the convergence of Chinese-Russian interests with regard to Central
Asia's security and stability, the question has often arisen as to the SCO's
prospects of evolving into a NATO-like military alliance. The core issue is the
extent to which Russia and China will work together to safeguard their common
concerns and shared interests. If at all the SCO develops into a "NATO of the
East", that can only happen in the distant future. Neither Russia nor China is
looking for a military alliance between them. But, in the meanwhile, security
cooperation within the SCO is assuming new dimensions and may intensify,
especially if the Afghan situation continues to deteriorate.
China tacitly concurs with the Russian idea of a tandem arrangement involving
the CSTO and the SCO. There is a lot of overlap in the membership of the two
organizations. Five of the seven CSTO member states are in the SCO, while five
of the six SCO member states are in the CSTO. (CSTO comprises Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.)
Similarly, there are overlaps in the spheres of responsibility of the two
organizations. What may well happen is that the SCO may focus on the range of
so-called "new threats" rather than on the conventional form of military
threats, while the CSTO (which is, incidentally, developing a rapid-reaction
force similar to NATO's), maintains a common air-defense system, training of
military personnel, arms procurement, and so forth.
How does the West tackle the SCO's “challenge”? Arguably, the West doesn't
necessarily have to see the SCO as an antagonist. The stability and security of
Central Asia, which is the core mission of the SCO, is as much in the West's
interests as Russia's or China's. The modern-day "foreign devils on the Silk
Road" - drug traffickers, Islamic warriors or plain terrorists - are as much of
concern to the West's security as to the SCO member countries.
But we live in a real world. US efforts to weaken the SCO will continue. The
efforts may even be stepped up. By current indications, Washington is moving on
the basis of the assessment that the SCO is still some way from becoming a
strategic alliance and there is still time to weaken it. Equally, the US
counter-strategy toward any SCO role in Afghanistan will be by way of binding
Pakistan even closer to NATO. Washington is under compulsion to accommodate
Pakistan's legitimate interests in Afghanistan. The AfPak strategy serves this
purpose.
The rationale of the SCO having to move south from the Central Asian region is
obvious. Both Russia and China view with growing concern the deepening crisis
in Afghanistan. They adopt a two-track approach. First, they work closely on a
bilateral track with the government headed by President Hamid Karzai. At the
same time, they look for ways to involve the SCO. Russia and China are greatly
worried about the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan, though Russian
statements have been more forthright.
The so-called "hidden agenda" in the US's Afghan strategy has always intrigued
capitals in the region. The fact is that the eight-year "war on terror" in
Afghanistan has not only led to the establishment of a military presence in
Central Asia and the first "out-of-area" operations for NATO, which in itself
holds immense significance for international security, but has also
substantially reduced or even eliminated the threat of international terrorism
staged from the Hindu Kush for Western countries. Unfortunately, this much
cannot be said for the region itself. On the contrary, the Afghan war has:
Seriously destabilized Pakistan.
Led to the cross-border insurgency directed against Iran.
Promoted drug-trafficking.
Spurred activities by Islamist-driven insurgent elements based in Afghanistan
in Central Asia, Xinjiang and North Caucasus.
Made India a victim of terrorism originating from Pakistani soil.
Indeed, there is a degree of ambivalence on the part of the US with regard to
engaging the hardline Taliban. There are reports that the Pakistani military
has openly acknowledged its continuing contacts with the hardcore Taliban
leadership of Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani and has offered to bring the
Taliban to the negotiating table, provided the US curbs India's involvement in
Afghanistan.
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