Page 2 of 2 A surge towards disaster By Anthony Fenton
under Obama, measured as averaging 2.2-2.3 civilians killed per day, is
slightly higher than the ratio in the final days of the Bush administration.
[18]
Adding that the "basic rule of thumb is for every civilian killed you get three
or four resistance fighters", Herold estimates that under Obama "we've created
3-500 Taliban and resistance. This is absolutely a losing proposition".
RAWA added that "The surge in level of troops will also [result in a] surge in
protests against the US/NATO in Afghanistan and it will also push more people
towards the Taliban and other terrorist
groups as a reaction against occupation forces and their mistreatment against
people."
Others, such as neo-conservative academic Max Boot, charge that those who focus
only on the number of civilians killed are "naysayers", and encourages Obama to
"ignore" them and not "lose his nerve" in the face of mounting criticisms. [19]
By contrast, commenting on the Western media's banal treatment of the war's
toll on Afghan civilians, AbuKhalil said, "it can only be explained in terms of
utter racism ... that the country or the media of a country can tolerate such
high levels of civilian casualties on a regular basis".
For AbuKhalil, the persistent loss of Afghan life which tends to get swept away
by the "propagandistic term of collateral damage", indicates that policy-makers
and the media "decided this is something we can live with, this very high toll
of the civilian casualties of the country we are supposedly liberating".
Washington-backed President Hamid Karzi has repeatedly decried the air strikes
and other incidents, often carried out by secretive special forces units, that
have led to civilian casualties. A poll conducted by the BBC and ABC News in
February indicated rapidly declining support for both Karzai and the presence
of foreign soldiers among the civilian population. [20]
No end in sight
As McKiernan has stated repeatedly, it is actually wrong to characterize the
occupation's escalation as a "surge", which connotes a temporary influx in the
military footprint, as was the case in Iraq.
Recently, McKiernan said "this is not a temporary force uplift ... it's going
to need to be sustained for some period of time ... I'm trying to look out for
the next three to four or five years". [21]
Three to five years may itself be an underestimation of the anticipated
duration of the US's stay in Afghanistan. In recent testimony to the Senate
Armed Services Committee, (retired) Lieutenant General David Barno, a former
commander in Afghanistan, said the counter-insurgency campaign that he and
other experts are advocating could last until at least 2025. [22]
Ignored option: Ending the occupation
Contrary to the elite, bipartisan consensus inside North America that supports
the war's escalation, and echoing fears that are common among Afghans, RAWA
argues that "We think the 30,000 extra troops will only serve the US regional
strategy in changing Afghanistan to its military base, it will [have] nothing
to do with fighting the terrorist groups, as they claim".
AbuKhalil adds that poor coverage of the conflict, combined with the "cloak of
the United Nations", whose sanctioning of and presence in Afghanistan helps
provide legitimacy to the war, means that "the president of the United States
can do anything that he really wants, and that's what I think may allow for the
worsening plight of the conditions of the civilian people of Afghanistan."
For AbuKhalil, "anything short of complete withdrawal and allowing [Afghans] to
determine their future totally and independently of the United States is going
to be a compromise with the principle of self-determination".
Herold feels that mapping out a way to withdraw from Afghanistan should be
Obama's top priority: "I think that is what we really should be talking about
here, rather than entering into a much greater degree".
While all signs indicate at least a temporary escalation of the war under Obama
and General David Petraeus, who oversees the war as head of US Central Command,
an immediate exit strategy appears, for now, to be off the table.
Regardless, RAWA feels that "Today many people in Afghanistan ask for
withdrawal of the troops and regard them [as] useless to do anything good for
Afghanistan."
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