Page 3 of 3 Why the US is losing in Afghanistan
By Anthony H Cordesman
It was not until September 11, 2008 - almost seven years to the day after 9/11,
that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs announced that the slow expansion of the
Afghan army would suddenly change from a goal of some 85,000 men to 162,100
troops. Mullen provided the following testimony to the House Armed Services
Committee on September 10, 2008:
As I once said about Iraq, let me now
say about Afghanistan. Absent a broader international and interagency approach
to the problems there, it is my professional opinion that no amount of troops
in no amount of time can ever achieve all the
objectives we seek. And frankly, sir, we are running out of time.
We can train and help grow the Afghan security forces ... and we are. In fact,
they are on track to reach a total end strength of 162,000 troops by 2010. The
Marines conducting this training are doing a phenomenal job. But until those
Afghan forces have the support of local leaders to improve security on their
own, we will only be as much as a crutch, and a temporary one at that.
It is important to note that these increases come after warning by the GAO and
others that the goal of making Afghan forces ready in 2011-2012 was not
realistic, even when qualified by the fact that such readiness would still be
limited and full development of adequate Afghan forces was planned to require a
lasting commitment of NATO/ISAF forces and a strategic partnership that
extended beyond 2019. The interim CSTC-A, Campaign Plan for the Development of
Afghan National Military and Police Forces agreed to in January 29, 2008, and
before two follow-on expansions in the force goals for the ANA, set the
following goals: Phase 1: Field/Generate Afghan National Security
Capability: Army and police forces are manned, have completed individual
training, and are equipped to 85 percent or better. Complete by mid-2010. Phase 2: Develop Afghan National Security Capability: Afghan and
Coalition forces will jointly plan, coordinate, and conduct operations.
Coalition forces will partner with army and police units to assist in the
development of capabilities necessary to achieve CM1. Complete by the end of
2011.
Phase 3: Transition to Strategic Partnership The Afghan
government will assume the lead responsibility for its own security needs, with
continued engagement by the international community. CSTC-A will have completed
its current mission and should transition into a security assistance
organization.
Underresourcing the Afghan National Army (ANA)
To put this expansion in perspective, the original goal set in 2002 was to
create an ethnically balanced and voluntary ANA force of no more than 70,000.
This goal was still being reaffirmed in 2006, and the US, NATO/ISAF, and the
Afghan government set the end of 2010 as the timeline for the establishment of
the ANA. It was not until February 2008, that they responded to the steady
growth in Taliban activity by endorsing a 10,000-person increase in the ANA
from 70,000 to 80,000.
The US also failed to provide serious funding for a force that could take on
serious counterinsurgency missions until FY2005, and then cut back in FY2006
for reasons that are remarkably hard to determine. It only began a truly major
funding effort in FY2007 and that was cut by more than 50% in FY2008 - only to
see the war worsen and the sharp increases in force goals that took place in
CY2008.
The US not only failed to adequately fund the ANA, it only reacted after the
Taliban-HI-Haqqani scored major gains in the power vacuum left by inadequate
forces and resources. It then reacted erratically and as if s surge in one year
could somehow solve the problem. The strategy for the ANA was no more coherent
or effective than the strategy for US force levels or US aid. The US was strong
on concept and rhetoric and dismally incompetent in planning, management and
execution.
The cost of failing to provide the proper resources for the Afghan Army, which
has been seen as the key alternative to more US troops, and the inability to
obtain more allied troops, has been that an effective force has not been
created as quickly as possible, and US and NATO/ISAF goals remain unmet. The
GAO summarized the progress in creating the Afghan Army as follows in a report
in June 2008.
The United States has invested over $10 billion to
develop the ANA since 2002. However, only 2 of 105 army units are assessed as
being fully capable of conducting their primary mission and efforts to develop
the army continue to face challenges. First, while the army has grown to
approximately 58,000 of an authorized force structure of 80,000, it has
experienced difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership positions
and retaining personnel. Second, while trainers or mentors are present in every
ANA combat unit, shortfalls exist in the number deployed to the field. Finally,
ANA combat units report significant shortages in about 40% of equipment items
Defense defines as critical, including vehicles, weapons, and radios. Some of
these challenges are due in part to competing U.S. global priorities. Without
resolving these challenges, the ability of the ANA to reach full capability may
be delayed.
The GAO also provided more details on the impact of
a slow start and systematic underfunding in the full report:
Since we reported in 2005, more personnel have been trained and assigned to the
ANA. Specifically focusing on combat troops, Defense reports that 37,866 combat
troops have been trained and assigned to the ANA as of April 2008, compared
with 18,300 troops in March 2005. Although this represents more than a twofold
increase in the amount of combat troops, it is approximately 5,000 forces less
than Defense had predicted would be trained by fall 2007. Moreover, new
positions have been added to the ANA�s structure since our 2005 report,
including an expanded Afghan air corps and the ANA force structure has
increased to 80,000.
While more troops have received training, as of April 2008, only two ANA units
- out of 105 rated - are assessed as CM1 - fully capable. Thirty-six percent of
ANA units (38 of 105 rated units) are assessed at CM2 and are capable of
conducting their primary mission with routine international support. The
remaining ANA units are less capable. Thirty-one percent (32 of 105 rated
units) are CM3-capable of partially conducting their primary mission, but
reliant on international support; 11% (11 of 105 rated units) are CM4 - formed
but not yet capable; and 21% (22 of 105 rated units) are not yet formed or not
reporting.
The expected date when the ANA will gain the capability to assume lead
responsibility for its own security is unclear. As of April 2008, monthly
reports provided by CSTC-A show the expected date of full ANA capability as
March 2011. However, this date does not account for shortfalls in the required
number of mentors and trainers. Thus, Defense officials cautioned that
currently predicted dates for the achievement of a fully capable Afghan army
are subject to change and may be delayed.
Defense assessment reports from November 2007 to February 2008 show between 8
and 12% of combat unit personnel were absent without leave (AWOL), with AWOL
rates as high as 17% for soldiers in one ANA corps. For the ANA to achieve
sustained growth, a senior Defense official stated that AWOL rates should be no
higher than 8%.
Although basic recruiting is strong, the ANA is experiencing difficulties
finding qualified candidates for leadership and specialist positions. Defense
reports that recruiting goals for ANA infantry positions have been met, despite
adjustments to increase ANA training output by 6,000 soldiers annually.
However, CSTC-A noted shortfalls in the number of candidates available for
non-commissioned officer (NCO) and specialty skill positions, such as logistics
and medical support. Between November 2007 and February 2008, ANA manning
levels for NCOs ranged between 50 to 70% of the authorized number.
Shortages exist in the number of embedded trainers and mentors fielded. For
instance, as of April 2008, the United States has fielded 46% (1,019 of 2,215)
of Defense's required number of embedded trainers. Officials attributed these
shortfalls to competing U.S. priorities for Defense personnel, including the
war in Iraq.
CSTC-A has submitted requests for additional forces to act as embedded trainers
to assist the ANA; however, the request has been deferred. As of April 2008,
members of the international community assisting in this effort have fielded 32
out of 37 mentor teams promised, although the number of international mentors
in the field is smaller than the number of US embedded trainers. Approximately
one-third of personnel in the field assisting ANA unit development are
coalition mentors, while two-thirds are US personnel.
Since we reported in 2005, new equipment plans for the ANA have been
implemented and the ANA has received more equipment items. In 2005, Defense
planned to equip the Afghan army with donated and salvaged weapons and armored
vehicles. However, much of this equipment proved to be worn out, defective, or
incompatible with other equipment. In 2006, Defense began providing some ANA
forces with US equipment. Further, as security deteriorated, equipment needs
changed and Defense planned to provide more protective equipment, such as
armored Humvees, and more lethal weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades ...
of 55 critical equipment items for ANA combat forces, CSTC-A reports having
less than half of the required amount on hand for 21 of these items.
The GAO reporting on shortages of US and NATO advisors are also only part of
the story. As Department of Defense reporting in June 2008 stated, As of March
2008, US ETTs require a total of 2,391 personnel; however, only 1,062 are
currently assigned (44% fill). The low fill-rate is due to the additional
requirement to provide support to the ANP though Police Mentor Teams (PMTs).
Full PMT manning requires 2,358 total military personnel. Currently, 921
personnel are assigned (39% fill). Sourcing solutions are being worked to
address the shortfall of personnel across the ETT and PMT requirements.
Afghanistan deployment requirements are being weighed against other global
manning priorities.
The failure to provide effective resources for the Afghan National Police (ANP)
has been even more serious. What is striking is that it took until FY2004 to
begin serious funding of the police effort. Given the lead times involved in
creating effective units, this meant that any major output from the funding
could only begin in FY2005 and could only gather serious momentum in FY2006.
In practice, however, the actual training effort was so badly manned and
organized, that the actual pace of progress has been far slower. Only 35,000
men had been trained as of January 2005, and no one knew how many had actually
stayed in service. This is scarcely reassuring for a force whose completion
dates have reflected a nightmare of slippage, whiles its force goal rose from
the original goal of 62,000 men to 82,000 in May 2007.
Since 2002, the
United States has provided about $6.2 billion to train and equip the ANP.
However, as of April 2008, no police unit was assessed as fully capable of
performing its mission. Over three-fourths of the police units were assessed as
not capable - the lowest capability rating Defense assigns to units that have
been formed. As of the same date, the ANP had reportedly grown in number to
nearly 80,000 - about 97% of the force's end-strength of 82,000. However, the
extent to which the ANP has truly grown is questionable given concerns that
have been raised by Defense about the reliability of police manning figures.
Building a capable ANP requires manning, training, and equipping forces;
however, several challenges have impeded US efforts to build a capable ANP.
The US is now experimenting with a new system called Focused District
Development where it takes all of the police in a given district offline for
training, and replaces them with a model unit in the interim. This effort only
began in November 2007, however, and is still experimental. So far, it has been
completed in less than 11 of 433 ANO units in 365 districts, if urban police
districts are included.
Moreover, the GAO notes, "Although Defense's newly adopted Focused District
Development initiative to reconstitute the uniformed police involves
considerable resources and is expected to last four to five years at a minimum,
no interim milestones or consistent end date for the effort are identified in
Defense�s five-page document, monthly status reports, or briefings that
outline the effort. In the absence of interim milestones and a consistent end
date for Focused District Development, it will be difficult to determine if
this ambitious new effort is progressing as intended. Without an end date and
milestones for the US effort to complete and sustain the entire ANP, it is
difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue
providing funding and other resources for this important mission - one that US
military officials stated may extend beyond a decade."
Anthony H Cordesman, the Arleigh A Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies.
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