Page 2 of
2 Intrigue
takes Afghanistan to the
brink By M K
Bhadrakumar
this fight," adding that the US
should "mean what they say ... [and] do what they
say".
Significantly, in the Washington
Post interview, Karzai went out of the way to
underline that his problem was not with Islamabad
or Tehran. He said he found Pakistan President
Pervez Musharraf "more cognizant of the problems
of extremism and terrorism. And that's a good
sign, and I hope we will continue in that
direction ... we do see eye-to-eye more than
before on this question ... Oh, he [Musharraf]
absolutely agrees that there is a problem and that
we have to fix it."
On Afghan-Iranian
relations, Karzai point-blank said, "We have
had
a particularly good relationship with Iran the
past six years. It's a relationship that I hope
will continue. The United States very wisely
understood that it was our neighbor and encouraged
that relationship ... the United States has been
very understanding and supportive that Afghanistan
should have a relationship with Iran."
Karzai was hitting back at Washington and
London. Make no mistake about it. He was
retaliating against a systematic Western attempt
to undercut his political stature and his
authority. How much of the Western game plan stems
from a well-thought out strategy aimed at
replacing Karzai is difficult to tell at the
moment. But, without doubt, there is an attempt to
browbeat him and to discredit Karzai's own
endeavor in the recent period to distance himself
from his Western backers.
Karzai's refusal
to allow the hare-brained American plan to
eradicate opium poppies by crop spraying; his
warming up to Musharraf; his refusal to review the
decision to expel the two EU and UN diplomats,
despite heavy diplomatic pressure from London; his
insistence on friendly feelings toward Tehran; his
spats with Britain; his pouring cold water on the
candidacy of Ashdown (knowing full well it was a
joint Anglo-American decision at the highest
level) - surely, a pattern has emerged.
Afghan sense of
independence Maybe, as the Independent
newspaper sarcastically noted, Karzai is simply
overworked. "He [Karzai] has not had a holiday
since September 11, 2001, and he is showing signs
of fatigue, contributing to the whispering
campaign against him and talk of his 'misjudgment'
in taking on the powerful donor countries. Maybe
he should consider a - short - vacation soon," the
daily concluded a highly critical commentary.
But what the Western capitals don't want
to concede easily is that Karzai would have his
reasons - including some genuine ones - for
putting the powerful donor countries in their
place. First, he is as proud an Afghan as any in
the Hindu Kush, no matter the circumstances of his
elevation as the president of Afghanistan six
years ago.
Today, he is in an unenviable
position. On the one hand, he is denounced in the
Afghan bazaar as a "US puppet", and on the other
hand the powerful donor countries constantly
trample on his authority and conduct themselves as
if Afghanistan is NATO's colonial outpost.
Karzai seems to have decided that he won't
allow himself to be taken for granted any longer.
A limit is certainly reached when a powerful donor
country begins its own clandestine "war on terror"
on Afghan soil directed against Afghan people
without even informing him or anyone in his
government - and Afghan intelligence operatives
learn about it accidentally from the memory stick
of a laptop. The sensational leak by Afghan
intelligence about Britain's covert war in
Afghanistan must be seen in perspective. If
Anglo-Afghan relations have sunk to such a low
point, is Karzai to be blamed?
Given the
backlog of history in the region, Britain should
never have cast itself in a lead role in an Afghan
war, howsoever compelling the geopolitical
compulsions of containing Russia or China might
be. Afghans still take pride in the Anglo-Afghan
wars. Equally, it is a gross error of judgement on
Washington's part to have overlooked this fact.
Besides, NATO's war isn't going too well,
to say the least. Karzai cannot be faulted if he
visualizes that it is an uphill task for the lame
duck administration in Washington to bring about
an historic course correction to the war at this
stage.
He would be sensing that the blame
game is poised to escalate and it is prudent to
distance himself. Again, Karzai is savvy enough to
read the political message when powerful donor
countries begin to destabilize him by openly or
surreptiously sponsoring his detractors, like
Abdullah or Jalali or Dostum. He feels bitter that
he has been used by Western powers and is now
being summarily dumped.
It shouldn't come
entirely as a surprise, therefore, if Karzai too -
somewhat like his counterpart in neighboring
Pakistan - chooses to drape himself in the Afghan
flag and declare unilateral independence. Beyond
the call of self-respect or good old-fashioned
nationalism, it is also a shrewd survival instinct
in challenging Afghan conditions.
Washington could consult the Soviet
archives and still learn a few things about
Afghanistan - how the comrades in Kabul in the
1980s and 1990s, who veteran Politburo members in
Moscow considered to be their helpless surrogates
in an impoverished Third World country, often
dictated how proletarian internationalism should
operate under pristine Marxist-Leninist
principles.
M K Bhadrakumar
served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service for over 29 years, with postings including
India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and
to Turkey (1998-2001).
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