Page 2 of 2 Musharraf remains the US's
best option By M K Bhadrakumar
can hope to get done during his
day-long visit, which will be the US diplomat's
second visit to Pakistan within a month.
First, Negroponte will be off the mark if
he imagines he can still catapult former prime
minister Benazir Bhutto into high office. (She
seems to pin residual hopes on Negroponte,
though.) The army and the Punjabi-dominated
establishment simply refuse to allow Bhutto to
come into the corridors of power. The
establishment sees Bhutto as a difficult
personality - "the most
corrupt, sluggish and
extravagant politician in Pakistan", according to
Musharraf's close confidante, Railway Minister
Sheikh Rashid Ahmed - and as a spent force
politically. Musharraf has publicly debunked her
claims to popularity in Pakistan.
The
establishment ensures that the country's
democratic opposition won't rally around Bhutto.
It is confident that elections set for January
will go ahead with or without her participation.
Meanwhile, Bhutto will need time to emerge from
the pervasive cloud of public suspicion that she
secretly consorts with the regime even now. Even
if Bhutto wins majority support in the elections -
which is highly unlikely - the present
constitution doesn't allow her to become prime
minister for a third time.
US pressure
tactic won't work Second, Negroponte may
complain, but the regime remains adamant that the
state of emergency is needed to ensure the smooth
conduct of elections. The regime calculates that
ultimately, political parties will participate in
the elections regardless of the emergency.
Third, the regime will cut back on the
"war on terror" if Negroponte tries any of his
famous tricks learnt in previous diplomatic
assignments (Honduras, Ferdinand Marcos'
Philippines), like threatening to cut off military
aid.
On the contrary, he may pick up from
Rawalpindi a fresh list of demands for military
aid. Musharraf told The New York Times on Tuesday
that the military is finding it impossible to
silence an amateur FM radio station run by the
leading pro-Taliban religious leader in Swat,
Maulana Fazlullah, for want of "technical means to
do it". He underscored that the US must therefore
give more aid. He also pointed out that out of 10
Cobra helicopters that the US has supplied, "We
have only one that is serviceable. We need more
support."
Fourth, Negroponte is bound to
disturb a hornets' nest if he broaches, however
diplomatically, the subject of the control of
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Islamabad has taken
very seriously a report in the Washington Post
that the Bush administration has drawn up
"contingency plans" in the event the Pakistani
military loses control of the weapons.
A
Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman promptly
denounced the "irresponsible conjecture" and
warned: "If there is any threat to our nuclear
assets and sovereignty, we have the capacity to
defend ourselves ... suffice it to say that
Pakistan possesses adequate retaliatory capacity
to defend its strategic assets and sovereignty."
Again, it must be understood that at every
stage in recent months Musharraf has acted on the
basis of decisions reached by the collegium of
corps commanders. While propagandists (in Pakistan
and abroad) may suggest that an army revolt
against Musharraf is conceivable, the general
indeed exudes the confidence of a military man who
commands absolute loyalty. In any case, the
Pakistani army has never witnessed a break in its
chain of command at the top, nor staged a coup
against one of its own.
In fact, it would
be the height of folly for Washington to try to
create dissensions within the Pakistani army,
which is the only institution that transcends the
various templates of ethnic, regional, and
religious differences that threaten the country's
unity and integrity. As long as the army stays
united, the Pakistani state has inherent stability
and a fair chance of outliving the weaknesses of
its civilian institutions, democratic elections or
any of the fragilities associated with civil
society.
Musharraf was essentially right
when he said this week, "The military is strong
and very disciplined. As long as the armed forces
of Pakistan remain united, which they will and
are, no harm can come to Pakistan. The harm can
come from the political dilemma. We have to
resolve the political dilemma." Of course, as long
as the armed forces remain united, the
"Talibanization" of Pakistan will remain a very
low probability - almost non-existent. The
implications for regional stability are
self-evident.
Persuasion may work
Thus, given the political gridlock ensuing
from the breakdown of the Musharraf-Bhutto deal
and the absence of any plan B, Negroponte will
have to take a good second look at what is on
offer from Musharraf - a continuation of the
present ruling alliance with adjustments. He could
always offer improvements. That's far from the
best scenario possible, but there may be little
choice in the matter.
Significantly,
a caretaker government has already been sworn in
on the eve of Negroponte's arrival, headed
by Mohammedmian Soomro, the chairman of the Pakistan
Senate and a dependable hand. It is just as well
that Negroponte is due to call on Punjab Chief
Minister Chaudhry Pervez Elahi, cousin of the
powerful leader of the present ruling alliance,
Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. Elahi is widely tipped
as the next prime minister of Pakistan.
Finally, Negroponte will know that after
all, Washington has ways to influence Musharraf,
and there is no need to insult the general and
unintentionally unleash the anger of the Pakistani
military. Musharraf has already offered that the
choice is entirely Bhutto's to be conciliatory or
confrontational. Negroponte and Musharraf could
find common ground in lifting the emergency as
soon as possible - they could even agree on a date
- or removing restrictions on the media and civil
society, or, better still, releasing political
leaders and activists from detention.
One
thing is clear. The military is not with Bhutto,
and the country doesn't seem to trust her.
Musharraf happens to be the only acceptable game
in Islamabad.
M K Bhadrakumar
served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service for over 29 years, with postings including
India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and
to Turkey (1998-2001).
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