Page 2 of 2 Pakistan shakes off US
shackles By M K Bhadrakumar
about democracy while he goes about
resetting the parameters of Pakistan's political
life. He correctly estimates that what matters
most is his apparent willingness to wage a strong
military campaign against militants; his helping
hand in advancing an "intra-Afghan dialogue"
involving the Taliban; and his role in the event
of Washington deciding on a military showdown with
Iran in the coming months.
In sum,
Musharraf assesses he has a relatively free hand
to press
ahead with his political
agenda within Pakistan. He must be pretty much fed
up with the intrusive attitude adopted by
pretentious US functionaries and think-tanks in
recent months with regard to Pakistan's political
future. He has a point insofar as there aren't any
real "Pakistan experts" as such that the Bush
administration could claim to have. His sense of
exasperation was clearly showing in recent weeks
that functionaries in the US administration who
have no real grasp of the tough lay of the land in
Pakistan have been dictating to him democracy
lessons. They didn't even understand that one way
or another, historically, Pakistan always remained
on the razor's edge while life moved
on.
Washington's insistence that Bhutto
should join his team was the proverbial straw that
broke the camel's back. Under tremendous US
pressure, Musharraf, seemingly against his gut
instincts, acquiesced with the game plan
choreographed in Washington. He knows Bhutto is a
complex personality. But he also knows she has
influential supporters, like US ambassador to the
United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, whose
antipathies toward Musharraf date to his posting
in Kabul.
All the same, within the
fortnight since Bhutto's arrival in Pakistan from
exile on October 12, Musharraf has been proved
right. The American blueprint for Pakistan's
democratic transformation became stuck in the mud.
It was so visible that all could see, especially
when Bhutto began trading charges that the
establishment was conspiring to kill its future
prime minister, and the negotiations between the
two sides over fine-tuning their "deal" ground to
a halt. The frustrations deepened when Bhutto
realized that she was virtually confined to her
Karachi home.
Ironically, Musharraf found
he could seize the high ground once it began to
dawn on Washington that its hare-brained plan to
foist Bhutto atop the political heap in Islamabad
was simply unworkable. Plainly put, Bhutto was not
acceptable to the Pakistani establishment.
Washington had no "Plan B", either.
Musharraf's agenda Musharraf
struck fast. Now that he has "liberated" himself
from the political burden that Washington expected
him to carry, he feels free to act on his own
terms. This means first and foremost that he will
hold both the offices of president and chief of
army staff, at least until the elections, whenever
they are held (the January date seems unlikely
now). He will in all probability expect a new
Supreme Court to endorse his re-election as
president, which will enable him to be sworn in
for another term in office. Musharraf's
overwhelming win in last month's presidential
polls has not yet been ratified by the court.
Musharraf has certainly sized up that
Bhutto's political image has been badly tarnished
due to her controversial "deal" with him. It will
take a while for her to regain her credibility in
popular opinion within Pakistan. From Musharraf's
point of view, therefore, in the short term at
least, she is virtually rendered ineffectual as a
rallying point of opposition, even assuming that
she has the will to act in such a role.
But he may well keep a line of
communication open to her. Who knows, he may still
have a need for her, but that is something for the
future. More important, Musharraf needs to factor
that even after the present setback, Washington
and London may still not give up hope completely
regarding Bhutto's return to mainstream politics
in Pakistan's leadership structure. The sad
reality is that there are no other credible
figures in the democratic opposition other than
Bhutto who would be prepared in today's
circumstances to play according to the US script.
Meanwhile, Musharraf has virtually decided
to continue to rely on the present ruling party,
the Pakistan Muslim League, which has staunchly
resisted Bhutto's political accommodation. He has
chosen not to upset the apple cart. The
intelligence agencies feel greatly relieved that
the judiciary has been cracked and the dark days
of public accountability are over.
Musharraf continues to rely on the
resourceful, crafty Choudhury clan for holding
fort in Punjab, the heartland of Pakistani
politics. His equations with the Muttahida Quami
Movement (MQM), the party of the "Mohajirs"
(migrants from India at the time of the partition
in 1947), remain intact. MQM leader Altaf Hussain,
who lives in exile in London, has mildly distanced
himself from the imposition of emergency rule in
Pakistan, but he pointedly drew attention to the
"reasons" behind Musharraf's decision. Hussain
said sections of the judiciary, the legal
fraternity and the media exceeded their "rights,
traditions and etiquettes".
The MQM's
support for the regime is important for Musharraf.
It ensures that Pakistan's most populous city of
Karachi takes the imposition of emergency in its
stride. Again, it is highly possible that some
elements of the Islamic parties, such as the
Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam of Maulana Fazlur Rehman
will be co-opted in the coming weeks. Rehman is a
valuable link with the militant Islamist camp. The
regime has also assessed that former prime
minister Nawaz Sharif's return to Pakistan can be
endlessly stalled in the new circumstances with a
pliant judiciary.
All in all, the chances
of an eruption of popular agitation under the
leadership of the democratic opposition are almost
nil in immediate terms. This is despite the fact
that the reasons advanced by Musharraf for
imposing emergency rule lack credibility. He can
now count on the intelligence agencies to play
their traditional role of manipulating a coalition
of political forces that will steer the regime
successfully past the next parliamentary
elections. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz has hinted
elections are unlikely for another year. Musharraf
is evidently planning for the long haul.
Who has the last laugh? When
the epitaph of the Bush era in Pakistan's
contemporary history finally gets to be written in
a year's time, there will be a complex, engrossing
story to tell. Bush began reasonably well in 2001
by threatening to bomb the daylight out of
Pakistan and to dispatch that country to the Stone
Age. His threat of shock and awe indeed worked.
Musharraf quickly fell in line in the "war on
terror". The world community applauded Bush. But
in the process, Musharraf ensured his regime
gained international legitimacy.
Also,
Musharraf promptly put a price tag on Pakistan's
role in the "war on terror". He negotiated hard.
And he extracted out of the Bush administration in
bits and pieces over the past six years a
staggering amount of US$10 billion as assistance.
That kept the Pakistani economy going, the army
well equipped and his support base intact.
Of course, he took care to endear himself
and the Pakistan army as an indispensable ally to
Bush. As time passed, like a skilful commando, he
began walking a fine line - in and out of the "war
on terror" - almost unnoticed, as he pleased.
Certainly, Bush noticed but had to pretend he
didn't. There was no other option. Bush was
preoccupied in Iraq, and Musharraf knew that as
well.
In fact, Bush, who once saw Russia's
President Vladimir Putin's soul in his deep blue
eyes and liked it, has no choice but to keep
insisting he is on a "hunt" with Musharraf in the
Hindu Kush. Now, with a much-weakened Bush
presidency almost entering a lame-duck phase, it
is only natural that Musharraf feels he must look
ahead. He will know by now as well as anyone that
his number one public liability within Pakistan is
his close association with the George W Bush
presidency.
But continued US backing
remains vital for Musharraf's regime. How he
reconciles the conflicting interests remains to be
seen. One thing is for sure. None of Pakistan's
previous military dictators had such mastery over
the art of the possible.
M K
Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the
Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with
postings including India's ambassador to
Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
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