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    South Asia
     Oct 26, 2007
Page 2 of 3
Pakistan's nut that won't crack
By Mark LeVine

crucial role in securing rights to land, particularly in the Afghan-Pakistani border regions that today are part of the NWFP and FATA.

Tribes and the foundations of Pakistani history
Both regions, which together comprise almost 100,000 square kilometers, are composed of at least a dozen tribes belonging, largely, to the Pashtun ethnic group. Pashtuns have long been



known for their refusal to submit to foreign domination, and the more than a dozen tribes of the regions that would become the NWFP and FATA fought a succession of outside powers in the 18th and 19th centuries, including the Mughal, Afghan, Persian and British empires, in their quest to retain as much local autonomy as possible.

The British alone engaged in well over four dozen "expeditions" in the frontier or tribal areas between 1847 and 1908, as part of the struggle for control of these strategically important regions against Czarist Russia. Despite the regular and large scale use of force - in the first war with the Pashtuns, 14,800 soldiers went into the tribal areas, only one came out alive - the British never managed to secure full control over them. This was a primary reason why the government of India acquiesced to relatively wide local autonomy for the regions compared with much of India or in other colonies.

Indeed, by 1877, the British administrator of the "frontier districts" described the regions as "a spectacle unique in the world ... where, after 25 years of peaceful occupation, a great civilized power has obtained so little influence over its semi-savage neighbors, and acquired so little knowledge of them ... There is absolutely no security for British life a mile or two beyond our border."

The NWFP was created by the British in 1905 as a reflection of the need to offer significant autonomy to the region's Pashtun majority if a semblance of order was to be maintained. Its seven agencies or districts reflected not just the power of Pashtun identity, but the enduring impact of Arab, Hindu, Sikh, Dravidian, Sindhi and Punjabi influences, and the confusing interplay of caste and tribal structure as well. Religiously, Sufism rather than the orthodox Islam today associated with the Taliban was dominant in the region.

Tribes, criminals and the law
Given the circumstances that led to its creation, it's not surprising that the tribes of the NWFP have born the stamp of criminality since the days of British rule. First, they were defined by the "Criminal Tribes Act" of 1871. Until 1917, tribes were classified as "Backwards Classes" or "primitive" and were divided into "criminal and wandering tribes, aboriginal tribes and untouchables".

Even today, the region is governed by the "Frontier Crimes Regulation Ordinance", which continues the centuries-old tradition of governments equating the frontier regions with lawlessness and criminality.

The British placed Peshawar, capital of the NWFP, under direct federal administration to ensure a modicum of control of the surrounding areas by the central government. But in the NWFP and what would become the FATA, tribal customs were allowed to govern most aspects of people's lives, as they do today.

Politically, when provincial elections were held beginning in 1935, the leaders of the main tribes, or maliks (often referred to as "feudal lords" in the West, and by some Pakistanis as well) were most often elected to the local or national assemblies, extending their local power by participating in the emerging British, and then Pakistani, state structures.

As the central government attempted to exert greater power over the frontier and tribal regions, however, the long-standing tensions between the secular laws of the state, sharia, or Islamic law, and 'urf, or local customs, grew. Aggravating the situation was the fact that the NWFP and FATA were home to a particularly powerful code of ethics and behavior, known as Pashtunwali, or the Pashtun way.

Pashtunwali is based on the powerful obligations to provide hospitality and sanctuary, even to one's enemies, yet at the same time to exact revenge at all costs against any slights against one's honor, or that of members of one's family, clan or tribe. The code also requires Pashtuns to abide by the decisions of the council of tribal leaders when they meet in the assembly known as the jirga, which decides on disputes and feuds.

The overall system long served not just to maintain honor (which is what most Western commentators focus on), but equally important, to maintain a rough equality and balance of power between and within tribes. This function is crucial because in the imperial as well as globalized eras, external forces have exercised power precisely by disturbing local equality, or at least stability, in order to create new political orders more favorable to their interests.

Indeed, this process generated significant instability in the tribal regions in the decades leading up to the creation of Pakistan in 1947, as economic transformations in India and neighboring regions increased the power of previously minor tribal leaders at the expense of the more established maliks. They in turn aligned themselves with the British and later central Pakistani governments to retain their hold on power.

As is so often the case in countries under colonial rule, the very system that the British imposed to maintain order politically was threatened by the instability their economic and military policies generated. As time wore on, the increasing power, corruption and exploitation of the "big Kahns" (as the maliks are also known)encouraged the rise of a new generation of charismatic religious figures, and eventually the Taliban. Their egalitarian and purified vision of a just Islamic order was more in line with local customs and ideals than were the actions of the politically connected major land-owning maliks.

What is particularly dangerous about this dynamic is that the coming together of the Taliban and the tribesmen brought into synergy two seemingly contradictory positions: the anti-nationalist and pan-Islamic identity of the Taliban, many of whom came from outside Pakistan, and the particularistic and locally rooted identity of the region's tribal groups.

The Taliban brought in their own, much needed financial resources to the region, and their activities were supported by then president Zia ul-Haq (to help legitimize his dictatorial rule), by the United States and Saudis, and by remittances sent home by migrants working in the wealthy Gulf countries. The local people offered hospitality, generations of anger at the central government, and a history of violent rebellion under the banner of Islam.

This combination of economic, geostrategic, political and ideological interests made the NWFP and FATA a natural base

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