Page 2 of 2 Embattled frontier Lost Opportunities. 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's
Response by S P Sinha
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
to time. Bangladesh succored the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) through the
MNF, but it later backed off, fearing Indian reprisals in the form of support
for Chakma militants. Breakaway cliques of TNV rebels that enjoyed the
patronage of Tripura's political parties and operated through the porous border
with
Bangladesh robbed the 1988 accord of its peace dividend.
In Assam, feelings of the evil step-mother-like treatment by the central
government in economic development, along with the dismemberment of the state
in 1972, built up a reservoir of resentment. Capitalizing on anti-immigrant
sentiment, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) arose in the mid-1980s
with the support of the then-Assam state government. Bodo tribals seeking a new
state out of Assam (within the Indian republic) took to insurgency in 1988,
allegedly with the blessings of Indian intelligence, to counter ULFA. Sinha
considers training camps in Bangladesh and espionage work for Pakistan to be
the two lifelines of ULFA. Myopically, he avoids mentioning the complicity of
the Myanmar junta as the third buoy.
Riding piggyback on the flood of Bangladeshi immigrants, numerous jihadi
outfits have cropped up in Assam with the goal of creating "Greater
Bangladesh". They might replace ethnic militant movements like those of
Kamtapur and Karbi-Dimasa as the locus of future insurgency. Sinha believes
that ULFA's ongoing purge of non-Assamese Indians is a stratagem to dig out
"working space for Bangladeshi Muslims". (p 308)
Taking the cue from Assam, Meghalaya underwent a number of violent riots since
1979 against non-tribal Indians, Bangladeshis and Nepalese. Leveraging the high
rates of unemployment and drug addiction in the state, ULFA has spawned front
organizations such as the Achik National Volunteer Council to facilitate safe
passage for its cadres to and from Bangladesh.
Thanks to the foresight of consultants like Verrier Elwin, Arunachal Pradesh
avoided the trademark violence. However, the settlement of Chakma refugees from
East Pakistan sparked worries and spawned fledgling militant groups like United
Liberation Army of Arunachal.
Trade in illicit narcotics keeps many northeast insurgencies going. Nagaland,
Manipur and Mizoram, which share a common border with Burma, together account
for the smuggling of an estimated 20 kilograms of heroin daily. Naga and
Manipuri underground organizations derive a major portion of their revenues
from drug trafficking. The NSCN is known to collect 20% tariffs on the value of
drugs passing through its territory. It is also the lynchpin of gunrunning in
the northeast to Southeast Asia's clandestine arms market.
India's counter-insurgency strategy in the troubled region graduated from
military solutions to "winning the hearts and minds" of disaffected tribes. To
isolate rebels in Nagaland and Mizoram, the Indian army grouped villages that
caused hardship for civilians. Policies like "area domination",
cordon-and-search and curfew along the international border could not be
avoided even though they restricted the freedom of communities.
To the Indian army's credit, '"civic action" (social welfare) that touched
people's lives at the grassroots was implemented in letter and spirit. The
spoilers are politicians and bureaucrats who are suspicious of any enhancement
of the army's public image as an instrument of social and economic change. Poor
relations between the army and local police also hamper intelligence gathering.
As part of psychological operations, the Indian army disseminates pamphlets
detailing the amoral life and debauchery of rebel leaders. Wherever possible,
it erects armed militia units called "village guards" to take on the despised
rebels. In Sinha's opinion, the security forces still lack tactical doctrines
to confront insurgents in crowded urban centers.
To breathe easier in the northeast, India has to ensure more efficient
administrators, infuse employment-generating investment, and curb illegal
immigration. Sinha advocates improved relations with Bangladesh and Myanmar,
but omits a deeper examination of regime shenanigans of these two countries. To
save the northeast, India needs to be sterner with fundamentalist regimes in
Dhaka and militarist regimes in Myanmar.
Lost Opportunities. 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's
Responseby SP Sinha. Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 2007. ISBN:
81-7062-162-3. Price: US$ 24. 357 pages
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