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3 Afghanistan's ball back in
Pakistan's court By M K
Bhadrakumar
and dispassionately the
grave situation confronting the nation and the
likely options on how best to resolve the
conflict."
Sanctity of the Durand
Line The most important gain for Pakistan
is that the jirga affirmed that a key
component for peace in Afghanistan would be the
security and stability of the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border, commonly known as the Durand Line. "All
possible measures, therefore, must be adopted to
ensure that this becomes a border of peace
and
friendship bringing the two countries closer
together."
Thus border-monitoring
committees comprising tribesmen inhabiting the
region of the Durand Line, with the assistance of
Pakistani and Afghan officials, will undertake
monitoring of the cross-border movement of people
and identify the main routes for crossing the
border. The two governments will also draw up a
comprehensive Border Infrastructure Development
Project and involve the international community
for the speedy development of the region of the
Durand Line. Pakistan has also sought the creation
of a permanent body, the Pakistan-Afghanistan
Peace and Friendship Commission, for fostering
good-neighborly relations.
All in all,
Pakistan has come nearer than ever in the past 60
years in securing a Pashtun affirmation of the
sanctity of the Durand Line. The stamp of the
international community (read the US and other
major Western powers) guarantees the political
gain for Islamabad.
The jirga's
co-chairmen, interestingly, were Pakistani
Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao and former Afghan
foreign minister Dr Abdullah Abdullah, who was a
prominent leader of the anti-Taliban Northern
Alliance and a close aide of the late Ahmad Shah
Massoud. Talking to journalists in Kabul, both
Sherpao and Abdullah affirmed that the
jirga will have a far-reaching impact on
the restoration of durable peace in the region.
Abdullah, in particular, brings into the
jirga's decisions a truly "bipartisan"
Afghan character, given his prominent role in the
democratic opposition to Karzai's government. The
US has made a brilliant choice by calling on
Abdullah to be a bridge-builder. He is partly
Kandahari Pashtun and partly Tajik; he is a jihadi
with impeccable pedigree; he belonged to the
Jamiat-i-Islami (one of the original Islamist
parties in Afghanistan) and is a staunch Afghan
nationalist; and above all he is a forward-looking
intellectual and accomplished politician who
enjoys great credibility in the international
arena.
New thinking on Pakistan The heart of the matter is the recognition by
the United States and other Western powers that it
is only through recognition of Pakistan's
long-standing national interests that the
Afghanistan problem can be resolved. Indeed,
influential Western opinion-makers on both sides
of the Atlantic have been harping on three
directions in which Pakistani interests must be
accommodated.
First, by encouraging India
to reduce its presence in Afghanistan. To quote
Professor Vali Nasr of the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York in a recent article in The
Christian Science Monitor, "Pakistan does not view
Afghanistan through the prism of the 'war on
terror', but in the context of its own
vulnerabilities in the competition for power and
influence with India. That's why Islamabad has
everything to gain by playing the Taliban card ...
to keep Kabul weak and southern Afghanistan free
of Indian influence."
The jirga as
such has not taken a view on this tendentious
issue. Interestingly, Musharraf didn't press for
it, either. But then the jirga also neatly
sidestepped the sensitive issue of setting any
timeline for the presence of foreign military
forces in Afghanistan. It remains to be seen,
therefore, how the diplomatic tango involving the
US, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India will play out
in the coming period.
Second, there has
been a growing realization in Western capitals in
the past year or so that the time has come to
press Karzai's government to recognize the Durand
Line. But Karzai would have a problem on this
score if he didn't carry Pashtun opinion with him
in any such venture. As it is, his Pashtun support
base remains tenuous. It is in this respect that
the Afghan jirga has kick-started a
historic move in the direction of settling the
Durand Line. The jirga's decision to
strengthen the security and stability of the
Afghan-Pakistan border is tantamount to a
pan-Pashtun recognition of the sanctity of the
Durand Line. At a minimum, there is scope to build
up a consensus rapidly.
Third, the US has
recognized the importance of constructively
engaging the Taliban and offering them a role as
"stakeholders" in Afghanistan. This becomes
important for several reasons. A roll-back of the
Pashtun tribal structures to their old modes
(prior to the radicalization of the 1980s) cannot
be achieved as long as the Taliban remain as the
force of an irredentist opposition. That is to
say, any reversal of the so-called
"Talibanization" of Pakistan's tribal areas must
begin with a rehabilitation of the Taliban in the
power structures in Afghanistan. Again, an
intra-Afghan settlement is a necessary
prerequisite to enduring peace. It has become
clear by now that there is no military solution to
the Afghanistan problem.
Geopolitics of
the war Since the US intervention in
Afghanistan in October 2001, 425 American soldiers
and 226 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
troops have been killed. But the palpable sense of
urgency in Washington in working for a settlement
must be seen from different angles.
Of
course, the prospect of a terrorist threat to the
US and Britain remains very real. Second, the new
imperatives in the geopolitics
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